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Abstract
In a ground-based air defense (GBAD) military environment, defended assets on the ground re-
quire protection from enemy aircraft entering the defended airspace. These aircraft are detected
by means of a network of sensors and protection is afforded by means of a pre-deployment of
various ground-based weapon systems. A fire control officer is responsible for deciding upon an
assignment of weapon systems to those aircraft classified as threats. The problem is therefore
to find the best set of weapon systems to assign to the threats, based on some pre-specified
criterion or set of criteria. This problem is known as the weapon assignment problem.
The conditions under which the fire control officer has to operate are typically extremely stress-
ful. A lack of time is a severely constraining factor, and the fire control officer has to propose
an assignment of weapon systems to threats based on his limited knowledge and intuition, with
little time for analysis and no room for error. To aid the fire control officer in this difficult
decision, a computerised threat evaluation and weapon assignment (TEWA) decision support
system is typically employed. In such a decision support system a threat evaluation subsys-
tem is responsible for classifying aircraft in the defended airspace as threats and prioritising
them with respect to elimination, whereas a weapon assignment subsystem is responsible for
proposing weapon assignments to engage these threats.
The aim in this thesis is to model the weapon assignment problem as a multiobjective decision
problem. A list of relevant objectives is extracted by means of feedback received from a weapon
assignment questionnaire which was completed by a number of military experts. By using two
of these objectives, namely the cost of assigning weapon systems and the accumulated single
shot hit probability, for illustrative purposes, a bi-objective weapon assignment model is derived
and solved by means of three multiobjective optimisation methodologies from the literature in
the context of a simulated, but realistic, GBAD scenario.
The analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is implemented by means of assessments carried out in
conjunction with a military expert. The assignment of weapon systems to threats is achieved
by means of a greedy assignment heuristic and an AHP assignment model. Both these methods
provide plausible results in the form of high quality assignments achieving an acceptable trade-
off between the two decision objectives. However, a disadvantage of the AHP approach is that
it is inflexible in the sense that a large portion of its pre-assessments have to be reiterated if
the set of weapon systems and/or threats is adapted or updated.
A bi-objective additive utility function solution approach to the weapon assignment problem
is also developed as a result of various assessments having been carried out in conjunction
with a military expert. The assignment of weapon systems to threats is again achieved by
means of a greedy assignment heuristic and a utility assignment model. Both these methods
again provide high quality assignments of weapon systems to threats, achieving an acceptable
trade-off between the two decision objectives. However, a disadvantage of the utility function
approach is that if additional weapon systems are added to the current set of weapon systems,
iii
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which achieve objective function values outside the current ranges of the values employed, new
utility functions have to be determined for the relevant objective function. Moreover, both the
AHP and utility function approaches are also constrained by generating only one solution at a
time.
A final solution approach considered is the implementation of a multiobjective evolutionary
metaheuristic, known as the Nondominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II (NSGA II). This
approach provides very promising results with respect to high quality assignments of weapon
systems to threats. It is also flexible in the sense that additional weapon systems and threats
may be added to the current sets without the need of considerable additional computations or
significant model changes. A further advantage of this approach is that it is able to provide an
entire front of approximately pareto optimal solutions to the fire control officer.
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Uittreksel
In ’n militeˆre grond-gebaseerde lugafweeromgewing vereis bates op die grond beskerming teen
vyandelike vliegtuie wat die beskermde lugruim binnedring. Hierdie vliegtuie word deur middel
van ’n netwerk van sensors waargeneem en deur middel van ’n ontplooing van ’n verskeidenheid
grond-gebaseerde wapenstelsels afgeweer. ’n Afvuur-beheer operateur is verantwoordelik vir die
besluit om wapenstelsels aan vliegtuie wat as bedreigings geklassifiseer is, toe te wys. Die
onderliggende probleem is dus om die beste stel wapens, volgens ’n voorafbepaalde kriterium
of ’n stel kriteria, aan die bedreigings toe te wys. Hierdie probleem staan as die wapentoe-
wysingsprobleem bekend.
Die toestande waaronder die afvuur-beheer operateur besluite ten opsigte van wapentoewysings
maak, is besonder stresvol. ’n Gebrek aan tyd is ’n uiters beperkende faktor, en die afvuur-
beheer operateur moet gevolglik binne ’n tydspan wat weinige analise en geen ruimte vir foute
toelaat, wapentoewysings volgens sy beperkte kennis en intu¨ısie maak. ’n Gerekenariseerde
bedreigingsafskatting-en-wapentoekenningstelsel kan gebruik word om die operateur met besluit-
steun te bedien. In so´ ’n besluitsteunstelsel is ’n bedreigingsafskattingdeelstelsel verantwoordelik
om vliegtuie wat die beskermde lugruim binnedring as bedreigings of andersins te klassifiseer en
ten opsigte van eliminasie te prioritiseer, terwyl ’n wapentoewyingsdeelstelsel verantwoordelik is
om wapentoewysings aan die bedreigings voor te stel.
Die hoofdoel in hierdie tesis is om die wapentoewysingsprobleem as ’n multikriteria-besluit-
nemingsprobleem te modelleer. ’n Lys van relevante doelwitte is met behulp van ’n wapen-
toewysingsvraelys verkry wat aan militeˆre kenners vir voltooing uitgestuur is. Twee van hierdie
doelwitte, naamlik toewysingskoste en geakkumuleerde enkelskoot-trefwaarskynlikheid, is vir
illustratiewe doeleindes gebruik om ’n twee-doelwit wapentoewysingsprobleem te formuleer wat
met behulp van drie multikriteria-besluitnemingsmetodologie¨ uit die literatuur in die konteks
van ’n realistiese, gesimuleerde grond-gebaseerde lugafweerscenario opgelos word.
Die analitiese hie¨rargiese proses (AHP) is met behulp van assesserings in samewerking met ’n
militeˆre kenner ge¨ımplementeer. Die toewysing van wapenstelsels is met behulp van ’n gulsige
toewysingsheuristiek asook aan die hand van ’n AHP-toewysingsmodel bepaal. Beide hierdie
metodes is in staat om resultate van hoe¨ gehalte te behaal wat ’n aanvaarbare afruiling tussen
die twee doelwitte verteenwoordig. ’n Nadeel van die AHP is egter dat dit onbuigsaam is in die
sin dat ’n groot hoeveelheid vooraf-assesserings herhaal moet word indien meer wapenstelsels
en/of bedreigings by die huidige sisteem gevoeg word.
’n Twee-doelwit additiewe nutsfunksiebenadering tot die wapentoewysingsprobleem is ook met
behulp van velerlei assesserings in samewerking met ’n militeˆre kenner ontwikkel. Die toewysings
is weereens met behulp van ’n gulsige wapentoewysingsheuristiek asook ’n nutstoewysingsmodel
bepaal. Beide hierdie metodes is ook in staat om resultate van hoe¨ gehalte te behaal wat ’n
aanvaarbare afruiling tussen die twee doelwitte verteenwoordig. ’n Nadeel van die nutsfunksiebe-
nadering is egter dat indien addisionele wapenstelsels by die huidige stel wapenstelsels gevoeg
v
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word, en indien die waardes van hierdie addisionele wapenstelsels buite die grense van die doel-
funksiewaardes van die huidige wapenstelsels val, daar ’n nuwe nutsfunksie vir die relevante
doelwit van voor af bereken moet word. Beide die AHP- en die nutsfunksiebenaderings is
verder tot die lewering van slegs een oplossing op ’n slag beperk.
Laastens is ’n multikriteria evolusioneˆre metaheuristiek (die NSGA II) ge¨ımplementeer wat ook
goeie resultate in terme van hoe¨-gehalte toewysings van wapenstelsels aan bedreigings lewer.
Die voordeel van hierdie benadering is dat dit buigsaam is in die sin dat die getal wapenstelsels
en bedreigings in die huidige sisteem aangepas kan word sonder om noemenswaardig meer
berekeninge of groot modelveranderinge teweeg te bring. ’n Verdere voordeel is dat die meta-
heuristiese benadering daartoe in staat is om ’n front van benaderde pareto-optimale oplossings
gelyktydig te lewer.
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1.1 Informal problem description
In a typical Ground-Based Air Defense (GBAD) military environment, Defended Assets (DAs)
require protection from enemy aircraft entering the defended airspace. Such protection is af-
forded by means of a number of pre-deployed ground-basedWeapon Systems (WSs). A network
of sensors is responsible for detecting these aircraft after which the aircraft have to be classified
according to the perceived level of threat which they pose to the DAs. A Fire Control Offi-
cer (FCO) is responsible for assigning WSs to engage these threats. The decision problem of
assigning available WSs to threats is known as the Weapon Assignment (WA) problem.
Not only does the FCO have to propose a high quality assignment of WSs to threats under
conditions of severe stress, but his decision also involves a choice with respect to the number
of WSs assigned to each threat. Assigning more WSs to a threat may yield an increase in the
probability of eliminating the specific threat, but assigning too many WSs to a threat reduces
the number of WSs available for assignment at future time instants, which is not desirable in
case additional threats enter the defended airspace. The FCO should also consider the cost of
assigning these WSs, since the monetary cost of assigning some of these WSs is very high.
Furthermore, the FCO has to assign WSs to engage aerial threats at an appropriate time
instant. The problem is: Should he assign a WS to a threat at the current time instant, or
should he rather wait for a future time instant when the WS might achieve a larger probability of
successfully engaging the threat. Moreover, the WSs achieving a longer range typically involve
a higher monetary cost of assignment than do WSs achieving a shorter range.
Another factor contributing towards the stress experienced by the FCO is time. Time is of the
essence in the FCO’s assignment decision. The speed at which the enemy aircraft approach,
leaves little time for analysis or any delay in reaction times. Even a slight delay in reaction time
may lead to adverse consequences such as the destruction of one or more of the DAs and/or an
increase in casualties [28].
1
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Enemy aircraft may also try to overwhelm the FCO by saturating the defended airspace as
a result of employing a large number of aircraft which enter the defended airspace almost
simultaneously from different directions. If such a situation occurs, the decision problem of
assigning WSs to threats becomes very complex and almost impossible for the FCO to solve
optimally in real-time.
It is evident from the above discussion that the decision problem of assigning WSs to threats is
not an easy task, and the associated stress factor involved in the decision complicates matters
even further. A slight delay in the time to react or a call of poor judgment with respect to eval-
uating a threat or assigning a WS to a threat may result in adverse consequences. An example
of one such incident occurred on 3 July 1988, when the USS Vincennes missile cruiser misiden-
tified a commercial airliner as an attacking F-14 Tomcat fighter aircraft and accidentally shot
down the airliner by firing two radar-guided missiles at it [11, 60]. The result was catastrophic,
resulting in the death of all 290 passengers and crew members on board the airliner. After this
incident, the United States Office of Naval Research sponsored the development of a program
called Tactical Decision Making Under Stress (TADMUS) [11]. The aim of this program was
twofold, namely to improve decision making skills of operators by means of enhanced training
and to provide them with a computerised Decision Support System (DSS) [15].
The aim of such a DSS, called a Threat Evaluation and Weapon Assignment (TEWA) system,
is to provide the FCO with a good alternative or a small number of good alternatives from
which he may choose in conjunction with his own judgment, based on experience and training,
in order to make WA decisions. A TEWA system typically consists of two subsystems, namely
a Threat Evaluation (TE) subsystem and a WA subsystem. The TE subsystem is responsible
for assessing the level of threat posed to DAs by enemy aircraft, while the WA subsystem is
responsible for suggesting good assignments of WSs to engage these threats, taking into account
both the efficiencies of WSs with respect to the threats and the priorities of eliminating these
threats.
Typical WA models found in the literature involve only single-objective optimisation where the
aim is usually to maximise the overall probability of successful engagement of aerial threats
by WSs. This overall probability of successful engagement is computed using the Single Shot
Hit Probabilities (SSHPs) of the various WSs. Stated otherwise, the aim is therefore usually to
minimise the accumulated survival probabilities of these threats by assigning appropriate WSs
to engage these threats. The aim in this thesis is to investigate the possibility of modelling
the WA problem as a multiobjective decision problem. This includes the establishment of a
number of fundamental objectives for the purposes of WA and formulating a multiobjective
WA decision model by incorporating these objectives. Furthermore, a secondary aim is to
identify and suggest suitable solution methodologies for such a multiobjective WA model.
1.2 Scope and objectives pursued in this thesis
The scope of this thesis is restricted to the WA problem of assigning ground-based WSs to
targets within a GBADS at a single time instance. Six objectives are pursued in this thesis:
Objective I: To review the physical and functional elements typically residing within a GBADS
and, in particular, to describe the requirements, nature and working of a TEWA DSS employed
in a GBADS, while accentuating the requirements for a successful WA subsystem.
Objective II: To investigate and implement techniques for the extraction of a number of
fundamental objectives deemed important from a WA perspective which may be used in the
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derivation of a multiobjective WA decision model.
Objective III: To formulate a multiobjective WA decision model based on the problem objec-
tives defined in Thesis Objective II above.
Objective IV: To research and document various methodologies from the literature which may
be employed to find good solutions to multiobjective decision problems.
Objective V: To implement and illustrate the workings of the researched methodologies in
Thesis Objective IV above, in conjunction with the multiobjective WA model in Thesis Objec-
tive III within the context of a simulated but realistic GBADS scenario.
Objective VI: To suggest a number of ideas for possible future work in the context of the
multiobjective WA problem as possible enhancements to the work contained in this thesis.
1.3 Thesis organisation
This thesis contains six chapters. In Chapter 2 the reader is familiarised with TEWA in a
GBADS in fulfilment of Thesis Objective I in §1.2. The chapter opens with a brief introduction
to a typical GBADS, including and the hardware and software subsystems residing within such
a system. Three such hardware subsystems are described in §2.2–§2.3, namely DAs, sensors
and WSs. This is followed by a discussion on three GBAD software subsystems (in §2.4–§2.6),
namely the track management subsystem TE subsystem the WA subsystem. The physical
conditions under which a GBADS has to operate are described as the tactical environment
in §2.7. The chapter closes, in §2.8, with a description of a popular WA model based on the
classical assignment problem.
Chapter 3 mainly deals with Thesis Objective IV and contains a literature review on some of the
available methodologies for solving multiobjective decision problems. In §3.1 the reader is intro-
duced to multiobjective decision problems in general, including the notion of pareto optimality
in §3.1.2. The objectives, goals and attributes of decision problems are discussed in §3.1.3, and
this is followed by a description of how to establish the objectives for a multiobjective decision
problem. The working of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is reviewed in §3.2, including
a procedure which may be followed to ensure that the decision maker remains consistent (in
§3.2.1) and a discussion on the implementation, advantages and disadvantages of the AHP (in
§3.2.2). Utility theory in the context of one objective is reviewed in §3.3. This includes a
discussion on utility functions under certain as well as uncertain conditions (in §3.3.1) as well
as a discussion on qualitative and quantitative characteristics of utility functions. Qualitative
characteristics considered include monotonicity (§3.3.2), attitudes towards risk (§3.3.3), the cer-
tainty equivalent and risk premium (§3.3.4) and constant, increasing and decreasing attitudes
towards risk (§3.3.5). This is followed by a review of methods for evaluating quantitative utility
values in §3.3.6 and guidelines which may be followed during the assessment of utility values
§3.3.7. Utility functions involving multiple objectives are considered in §3.4. The chapter closes
with a discussion on multiobjective evolutionary algorithms in §3.5, focussing on a description
of the working of the Nondominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II (NSGA II) attributed to Deb
et al. [3] in §3.5.5.
Multiobjective decision making approaches towards WA are considered in Chapter 4. A method
for identifying objectives in a WA context is described in §4.1, in fulfilment of Thesis Objective II.
This is followed by a comprehensive description of a simulated, but realistic, GBADS scenario
which is employed to illustrate the working of the various multiobjective WA approaches. In
the remainder of the chapter the focus is on Thesis Objective III. The AHP assessments carried
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out in conjunction with a military decision maker are described in §4.3. This is followed by
a discussion on the evaluation of a bi-objective WA utility function in §4.4. This includes a
discussion on the assessment of independence between the objectives in §4.4.1, followed by a
description of the assessments carried out in conjunction with the decision maker in order to
establish qualitative characteristics of the individual utility functions in §4.4.2 and obtaining
quantitative utility values in §4.4.3. The assessments carried out during the evaluation of
the scaling constants for the objectives are described in §4.4.4. A bi-objective WA utility
function is finally presented in §4.4.5. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the computer
implemented version of the NSGA II employed to solve the bi-objective WA assignment problem
in the context of the scenario presented in §4.2.
Chapter 5 is devoted to the results obtained by means of the methodologies described in Chap-
ter 4 for solving the bi-objective WA decision model for the scenario described in §4.2, in
fulfilment of Thesis Objective V. The chapter opens with a summary of the results obtained by
means of the AHP in §5.1, followed, in §5.2, by a presentation of the results obtained by means
of the bi-objective additive utility function approach. This is followed, in §5.3, by a discussion
and interpretation of the results obtained by means of the NSGA II. The chapter closes with
various conclusions and recommendations based on the results obtained by each of the solution
methodologies.
Finally, Chapter 6 contains a summary of the work contained in this thesis, presented in §6.1.
This is followed, in §6.2, by an appraisal of the contributions of this thesis. The chapter closes
with a number of ideas with respect to possible future work related to the WA problem within
a multiobjective decision context, in fulfilment of Thesis Objective VI.
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The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the notion of a Ground Based Air
Defense System (GBADS) and the subsystems contained within a GBADS. This is achieved
by briefly considering the physical elements of a GBADS, namely the Defended Assets (DAs)
and sensors in §2.2 and Weapon Systems (WSs) in §2.3. A discussion on Track Managament
(TM) of threats follows in §2.4, and descriptions of the workings of the Threat Evaluation and
Weapons Assignment (TEWA) subsystems follow in §2.5 and §2.6, respectively. The effects of
the tactical environment on a GBADS are considered in §2.7 and the chapter concludes with
an explanation of a classical WA model in §2.8.
2.1 A ground based air defense system
In a military environment, a GBADS may be defined as a system in which a number of DAs on
the ground have to be defended against opposing enemy aircraft. A number of different types
of sensors and ground based WSs reside within a GBADS, which may aid in the defense against
enemy aircraft. Since WSs offer protection against aerial threats, the volume around the DAs
may be considered as the defended airspace. The specific bounded area in which own forces
are responsible for planning and conducting operations is known as the Area Of Responsibility
(AOR) [52]. Sensors are responsible for detecting aircraft entering the defended airspace and
WSs are available for possible assignment to and, if necessary, engagement of the aircraft which
are classified as threats, in an attempt to protect the DAs.
5
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Once aircraft have been detected in the defended airspace, they have to be labelled and classified
according to their hostility and platform type. The labeling and classification of aircraft both
form part of a process called TM. After classification, the aircraft may be assessed in terms
of the threat which they pose to DAs, in a process known as Threat Evaluatioin (TE), which
is achieved within a TE subsystem. One or more WSs may be assigned to the aircraft, based
on a thorough TE of the aircraft. The process of assigning and engaging ground based WSs is
known as WA and is conducted within a WA subsystem.
The WA subsystem relies on output obtained from the TE subsystem, and is therefore initiated
once the TE subsystem produces output. Combining these two subsystems yields the larger
TEWA system, which serves the purpose of a Decision Support System (DSS) providing decision
support (DS) to human operators in a GBADS. The reason for such DS is that conditions may
be very stressful for operators during aerial attacks and the problem of evaluating threats and
assigning weapons can easily become very complex and time consuming when a large number
of aircraft enter the system.
These subsystems are all contained within a GBADS. Hence, a GBADS may be thought of
as a system of subsystems. The subsystems contained within a GBADS may be divided into
hardware systems and software systems [44, 41]. The hardware systems consist of all the physical
elements such as DAs, sensors and WSs, whereas the software systems consist of TM and the
TEWA system.
An important element which may affect the operation of a GBADS is the tactical environment.
The tactical environment consists of components such as terrain and environmental conditions
which are considered at a later stage in this chapter. A typical GBADS is illustrated schemat-
ically in Figure 2.1.
SoftwareSystemsHardwareSystems
DAs
Sensors
WSs
TM
TE
WA
Ground Based Air Defense System
Figure 2.1: Schematic representation of the components of a typical GBADS.
2.2 Defended assets and sensors
Two important hardware systems contained in a GBADS are the collection of DAs and the
network of sensors. DAs are the objects in a GBADS which require protection from enemy
aircraft. The collection of DAs contained in a GBADS may consist of a single DA or may
comprise many DAs. Examples of DAs are air bases, crossroads, factories, harbours, main
bridges, power plants, etc. [43]. The importance of DAs in a GBADS also vary, as some DAs may
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be deemed more important or critical than others. The entire collection of DAs may therefore
be prioritised in a ranked list from most important to least important [43]. The collection
of prioritised DAs is integrated with available information on the observed aerial threats as
input data to the TE subsystem, whose ouput is provided as input to the WA subsystem. The
identification and prioritisation of DAs may be determined pre-operational.
A number of radar sensors reside within a GBADS. These sensors act as the “eyes” of the system,
detecting any aircraft which enter the AOR [44]. Sensors are therefore detection subsystems
which may be used to determine the altitude, direction, or speed of moving objects [57]. These
sensors are usually deployed as a system or network of sensors, called a sensor grid. A sensor
grid is employed to ensure that at least one sensor in a set of sensors covers a significant portion
of the AOR [40]. The sensors of a GBADS are therefore very valuable; Roux [43] even goes as
far as stating that sensors form the core of the TE subsystem. Examples of various types of
sensors include acoustic, electromagnetic, optical radiation and thermal sensors [43].
Since the emphasis of this thesis is on the WA subsystem and its workings, the interested reader
is referred to Roux [43] for a detailed description of DAs and sensors.
2.3 Weapon Systems
Ground based WSs are used in a GBADS to combat approaching threats. They are typically
positioned around DAs to provide maximum protection from threats. The physical lay-out of
the WSs in a GBADS is known as the WS deployment.
WSs in a GBADS may typically be divided into three categories: artillery systems, missile
systems and laser systems [40]. The WSs contained in this trio of categories are typical hard-kill
WSs, where the aim is to destroy a threat completely. For a more comprehensive discussion on
hard-kill WSs, the interested reader is referred to Potgieter [40]. On the other hand, there are
also soft-kill WSs which aim only to distract or disarm a threat in an attempt to protect DAs
[43].
When considering the deployment of WSs, the concept of layered Air Defense (AD) is important.
Layered AD is a well-known theoretical construct consisting of dividing the defended airspace
into different layers based on the capabilities of the various types of WSs [48]. Four different
layers reside within the South African air defense artillery (ADA) [43]. They are the inner,
middle, outer and in-depth layers, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. The figure represents a side
view of the divided, defended airspace into the four different layers, based on the range (both
horisontal and vertical) of WSs contained in each layer.
The first layer, the inner layer, is where Close-In WSs (CIWSs) and Very Short-Range AD sys-
tems (VSHORADs) are found. CIWSs are known for their short reaction times, high fire rates,
short effective ranges (less than 4 000 metres), lengthy deployment procedures (due to allignment
requirements), all-weather operation and intensive maintenance procedures [48]. VSHORADs
are known for their light weight (man portability), rapid deployment procedures and short
effective ranges (less than 6 000 metres) [43].
The second layer of defense, the middle layer, consists of Short-Range AD systems (SHORADs).
They are distinguished by their extended effective ranges (up to 20 000 metres), possible vertical
launch and their ability to operate during day or night time, as well as in all-weather conditions.
The third layer, the outer layer, consists of Medium-Range Surface to Air Missiles (MRSAMs)
with effective ranges of up to 80 000 metres and engaging altitudes of up to 18 000 metres [43].
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The forth and final layer, the in-depth layer, consists of long-range SAM (LRSAMs) and inter-
ceptor aircraft1. LRSAMs are known to have effective ranges of more than 80 000 metres. AD
coverage depends on the type of SAM used and the target to be engaged. The coverage provided
by an interceptor aircraft depends on the characteristics of the specific aircraft employed [43].
The current WSs artillery employed within a South African GBADS limits the layered AD to
only the inner and middle layers. Because of this limitation, only WSs residing within these
two layers are considered in this thesis.
DA
4–6 km 10–20 km 20–60 km
Range
3–5 km
6–8 km
14–18 km
A
lt
it
u
d
e
Middle Layer
(SHORADS)
Outer Layer
(MSAMS)
VSHORADS)
Inner Layer
(CIWS &
Aircraft
Range
Aircraft
Ceiling
In–Depth Layer
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Figure 2.2: Different layers of AD in a GBADS environment [20].
2.4 Track Management
A central software system in a GBADS is the TM subsystem. Information obtained from the
sensor grid is used to form a system track for each of the observed aircraft in the TM subsystem.
Typical information used in the creation of a system track is aircraft attributes. These attributes
include the speed at which the aircraft is travelling, the altitude of the aircraft and the direction
in which the aircraft is travelling [40]. The entire set of individual aircraft tracks resides in a
TM subsystem and is accessible by both the TE and WA subsystems.
Apart from labeling aircraft, TM also consists of two processes called Type Classification/ Iden-
tification (TCI) and Hostility Classification/Identification (HCI). TCI involves distinguishing
between aircraft platform types, such as rotary wing, fixed wing, cargo, missile, unmanned
aerial vehicle, EW platform or unknown [40]. The results of the TCI process are usually based
on reports from Observation Posts (OPs), as the required information is usually unavailable
from the kinematic data of aircraft. HCI involves the classification of system tracks as either
friendly, hostile or unknown. The process of HCI utilises an electronic aircraft interrogation sys-
1Interceptor aircraft are specifically designed to prevent missions of enemy aircraft, and rely on high speed and
powerful armament to complete a mission. They are usually employed against enemy aircraft such as bombers
and reconnaissance aircraft [55].
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tem called Identity Friend or Foe (IFF)2 in conjunction with Airspace Control Means (ASCM)3
or other measures to classify system tracks [1, 40].
The entire set of aircraft tracks generated by the TM subsystem are displayed on the Human
Machine Interface (HMI) to an Air Picture Manager (APM) who is responsible for managing
the aerial picture and system tracks. The platform type, hostility classification and raid size of
tracks may also be set manually by the APM via the HMI. The decision to alter or augment
track information manually, may be based on OP reports or other visual reports [40].
The importance of effective TM lies in the fact that the TE subsystem only considers system
tracks which have been classified as hostile or unknown, as discussed in the next section [44].
2.5 The TE subsystem
Another important software system of a GBADS is the TE subsystem. Only system tracks which
have been classified as hostile or unknown are considered in the TE subsystem. Information
from the sensors as well as the labelled and classified tracks, serve as real-time input to the TE
subsystem [44]. These system tracks, now known as threats, are further analysed by the TE
subsytem with respect to the threat which they pose to DAs.
Threats are typically analysed according to their capability and intent. The capability of a
threat is a reflection of its ability to inflict injury or damage to DAs. Factors which influence
the capability of a threat include the proximity of the threat to DAs and the characteristics of
WSs carried by the threat [45]. The intent of a threat refers to the will or determination of
the threat to reach DAs in order to inflict damage or injury. Factors which may be used to
ascertain the intent of a threat include the velocity of the threat, its course and altitude with
respect to DAs and its estimated attack technique (based on its movement) [45].
The capability of a threat is easier to estimate than its intent. It is therefore important for a TE
subsystem to be sophisticated enough to explore all the available information with respect to an
aircraft which enters the AOR and at the same time to be capable of producing a result based
on scant information [40]. A solution to this problem is proposed by Roux and Van Vuuren
[43], who suggest the use of a suite of TE models in conjunction with one another. The output
of a TE model is a threat value allocated to each observed threat. This value is an indication
of the level of threat that it poses to each respective DA.
A hierarchical representation of various levels of TE models may be found in Figure 2.3. The
simplest models are placed at the top of the figure and the more sophisticated models may
be found towards the bottom, consisting of more robust models. The topmost level consists
of flagging models which are only concerned with sudden changes in aircraft behaviour. These
models function on the basis that if any attribute of the detected aircraft deviates significantly
from that of their current or past values, an operator is flagged [40]. The middle level of TE
models hosts so-called deterministic models. These models use measures such as the distance
from aircraft to DAs and aircraft bearing with respect to DAs to generate threat values and
threat lists [40]. The more sophisticated probability-based models in the lower level attempt to
rather make use of probability values to express the threat that aircraft pose to the respective
DAs. One example of such a probability may be the probability that the aircraft will kill a
2IFF systems have the ability to differentiate between friendly and non-friendly aircraft. The interested reader
is referred to [1] for a more comprehensive discussion on modern IFF systems
3ASCM comprise guidelines for the use of the airspace inside the AOR. These guidelines are supplied to own
aircraft, and aircraft in the AOR which deviate from these guidelines are classified as hostile [40].
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DA [40]. Because the research reported in this thesis is mainly concerned with the working of
a WA subsystem, the TE subsystem is not discussed in further detail. The interested reader is
referred to Roux and Van Vuuren [45] for a full discussion on TE models.
The output obtained from the TE models is stored in what may be called a static TEWA
database4. This output is typically contained in the form of a two-dimensional matrix known as
a threat matrix representing the estimated threat values for each threat-DA pair. In addition,
a combined threat list representing the threat that an aircraft poses with respect to the entire
collection of DAs may also be derived from the threat matrix [40].
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Figure 2.3: A hierarchical illustration of the three different levels of TE models [43].
2.6 The WA subsystem
The third and final software system of a GBADS is the WA subsystem. WA entails the assign-
ment of available WSs to threats in an attempt to achieve some pre-specified objective. The
extent to which the objective is achieved may be used as criterion to evaluate the desirability of
WS-to-threat assignments. Examples of such objectives include minimising the expected aggre-
gated damage to DAs, maximising the number of threats engaged or maximising the expected
aggregated damage to threats [40]. To complicate matters, a WA subsystem may also operate
in different modes of operation. Examples of such modes are deterrance and attrition. In the
former case, a WS may fire at enemy aircraft in an attempt to scare them away5, while in the
latter case the aim is to fire at enemy aircraft in an attempt to maximize the inflicted damage6
[40].
The person aided by the WA subsystem is a Fire Control Officer (FCO). The main responsibility
of the FCO is the management of WSs in a WS deployment7. The management of WSs include
the assignments of WSs to threats as well as communication with the various WS operators [40].
4Static information refers to information which does not change in real-time and may be obtained pre-
deployment. This information is contained within a so-called static TEWA database. On the other hand,
dynamic information refers to information which may change during real-time and this information is contained
within the dynamic TEWA database [40].
5In deterrance mode a WS would typically be assigned to a threat as soon as possible.
6In attrition mode a WS would typically be assigned to a threat once the threat reaches the area where the
WS is most effective with respect to that threat.
7The management of WSs in a deployment is also known as fire control (FC) [40].
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The FCO acts as the human Operator In the Loop (OIL) when assignments are proposed and
engagements have to be executed [43].
The FCO may use a TEWA system as a tool to aid in the decision to assign WSs. He is
therefore authorised to alter certain proposals made by the TEWA system. TE proposals which
may be altered include the ranking of the threats in the proposed threat list and resetting the
value of a threat to the maximum possible value if desired, in order to invoke a condition called
enhanced reaction8. In extreme cases, and only when absolutely necessary, may a FCO alter
the properties of threats or remove them completely from the set threats [40].
The WA subsystem requires the combined threat list output from the TE subsystem as well as
a set of data called the Engagement Efficieny Matrix (EEM) as input. The EEM consists of a
three-dimensional matrix, containing predicted effectiveness values of the WSs with respect to
the entire set of observed threats. The EEM has the following dimensions: number of WSs (i),
number of threats (j) and number of future time steps (ts). Hence, the size of the EEM matrix
depends on the ranges of values of these three attributes [40]. The EEM and its operations is
contained within the EEM component and a graphical representation of an EEM may be found
in Figure 2.4. Each WS is associated with an effectiveness value with respect to observed threats,
known as the Single Shot Hit Probability (SSHP) [40]. SSHP values are normally supplied by
the manufacturers of WSs and are based on the characteristics of the specific type of WS in
use. The SSHP values are used in the construction of the EEM, and form the core of the EEM.
j
i
ts
Figure 2.4: Graphical representation of an EEM which serves as input to a WA subsystem.
Information contained in the EEM may be filtered to make provision for elements contained in
the tactical environment [40]. In essence, by filtering the contents of the EEM, the original SSHP
values are discounted to make provision for restrictions posed by the tactical environment. The
information used to populate the EEM, is stored in the static and dynamic TEWA databases. A
flight path prediction model (FPP) is used to predict the effectiveness values of WSs at a number
of future time steps, if desired, so as to investigate whether the threats will be contained within
the SSHP range of WSs within a number of future time steps [40]. A typical flight path
prediction model predicts efficiency values for a period up to 120 seconds [41, 44]. However,
caution should be taken when predicting these values, as predicting too far into the future may
lead to poor estimates which may jeopardise the output result of the WA subsystem.
8Enhanced reaction is a typical quick response technique used when a threat is detected very close to a threat
for the first time [40].
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Once the EEM has been populated, its contents is presented in real-time to the WA model
component contained in the WA subsystem. A WA model is responsible for suggesting WS-
threat pairings, and it requires both the combined threat list from the TE subsystem as well as
the EEM as input [40]. Such a WA model produces output in the form of a proposed assignment
list. This list contains possible assignments of WSs with respect to the observed threats. The
resulting assignment list is also stored in the dynamic TEWA database. The components of the
WA subsystem may be seen in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: The components of a WA subsystem, as well as the flow of information between these
components.
The proposed assignment list is displayed on the HMI, and has to be approved by the FCO.
The FCO studies the assignment list, and once he is satisfied with the proposals, he authorises
engagements in the assignment list. WSs are then alerted with Engagement Orders (EOs). If
the FCO is not satisfied with some of the proposals in the assignment list, he may alter the
list in order to enforce assignments based on his own judgment [40]. Once an EO is relayed
to a WS, it has to reply with either a “WILLCO” (WILL COmply) or “CANTCO” (CAN’T
COmply) command. If a “WILLCO” reply is received, the WS is considered engaged. If a
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“CANTCO” reply is received, the particular WS has to be replaced by another WS returning
a “WILLCO” reply [41, 44]. The individual engagements may be integrated into a so-called
active engagement list.
The FCO has the authority to create manual engagements and override TEWA proposed en-
gagements. He also has the power to place a hold on an engagement or to cancel an engagement
altogether [40]. The former may be achieved by means of a “HOLD FIRE” command and the
latter via a “STOP FIRE” command.
Once a WS is engaged, a tracking process is initiated which involves the tracking of the threat
by the WS, until it is ready to fire. When a WS finds a suitable opportunity, it fires at the
relevant threat. The result of a WS firing may yield a status of either a success or a failure.
An executed engagement is deemed a success if the relevant threat is hit or failure if a threat
is missed. Once a success or a failure is obtained, the entire TEWA process is repeated for the
next time interval. During these last steps, the information of the current status of the WS
is relayed continuously to the FCO to keep him informed [41, 44]. The working of the TEWA
system, is illustrated in Figure 2.6.
TEWA System
Sensing TM TE WA
Assignment
List
Engagement
List
Tracking
Result
Fire EO
FCO
Figure 2.6: A schematic representation of the working TEWA system.
2.7 The tactical environment
The tactical environment refers to the physical conditions in which a GBADS has to operate [36].
These conditions lead to a reduction in not only the performance of own system operations, but
also affects the performance of enemy aircraft. It is therefore essential to assess and understand
the impact that these conditions may have on the performance of subsystems operating within
a GBADS. The assessment of the tactical environment forms part of the so called Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)9. The elements of the tactical environment, may be divided
9“IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analysing the threat and environment in a specific area” [27].
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into terrain features and environmental conditions [44].
The surrounding terrain in which a GBADS operates, may have a significant impact on not only
the ability of sensors to discover threats, but also on the ability of WSs to operate efficiently
[40]. A crucial requirement of some sensors, is an electronic or optical Line Of Sight (LOS)10
in order to be able to detect threats and to obtain the necessary information regarding these
threats (e.g. position, activities and resources of threats) [30].
Some WSs are also limited by terrain to only engage threats that are within LOS, and thus can
provide no protection against threats which are concealed behind obstacles residing within the
terrain. A WS deployment in an area where the terrain is scattered with various obstacles is
therefore highly discouraged [40].
In addition to the constraints placed on systems by terrain, terrain may also be used to the
advantage of enemy aircraft in order to approach DAs. Enemy aircraft may use the surrounding
terrain to receive cover against WSs [30]. The techniques employed by enemy aircraft to conceal
themselves from ground based WSs by using the surrounding environment are called cover and
concealment11.
Environmental conditions of the tactical environment refers to the effect that conditions such as
weather may have on the subsystems of a GBADS. Environmental conditions may be divided
into natural environmental conditions and induced environmental conditions [20]. Natural en-
vironmental conditions consist of weather conditions such as atmospheric pressure, cloud cover,
dew point temperature, humidity, precipitation, temperature, visibility, wind speed and wind
direction [26]. Induced environmental conditions refers to smoke and debris caused by encoun-
ters between threats and GBAD WSs [48]. Because of the nature of induced environmental
conditions, they are much harder to anticipate than natural environmental conditions, resulting
in the focus typically shifting more towards natural environmental conditions [43].
Adverse natural weather conditions affect not only the capabilities of sensors and WSs deployed,
but may also have a dramatic impact on the crew operating these systems [40]. Extreme
temperatures may cause WSs to malfunction and heavy rainfall, fog or very windy conditions
causing sandstorms, may have a significant impact on the LOS required by some sensors and
WSs. Strong winds may cause projectiles of ammunition to be steered off course, resulting in
a failure of engagements. Finally, adverse weather conditions may make it difficult to deploy
certain WSs and sensors as these weather conditions limit the accessibility of the deployment
areas [43].
It is important to examine the current as well as predicted future weather conditions as this may
be used as an advantage to own forces or to the disadvantage of aerial threats [40]. Furthermore
it is, of course, important to exploit the tactical environment to its maximum extent.
2.8 A WA model based on the classical assignment problem
Extensive research has been done on the WA model component of the WA subsystem. For
example, Du Toit [21] and Potgieter [40] propose a number of mathematical WA models ranging
10LOS refers to the presence of a visible, distinct path between two objects which is not impeded by terrain
features [29].
11Typical cover and concealment techniques employed include contour flying, popping-up, terrain masking and
flying with terrain cover. The interested reader is referred to [30] for a more comprehensive discussion on cover
and concealment techniques.
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from dynamic12 to static13. The scope of this thesis limits the use of these models to only the
static case. However, the interested reader is referred to [21, 40] for an in depth discussion on
mathematical WA models.
The model which will serve as a point of departure in later chapters of this thesis, is known as
the k-cardinality WA Problem (k-WAP). This model is based on the classical WA assignment
problem of Ahuja [4] and was adjusted for the assignment of up to k-WSs by Potgieter [40]. In
this model, at most k of the m(τ) WSs available at time τ may be assigned to any of the n(τ)
threats at time τ [40]. Assumptions made in this model include that the SSHP of a WS with
respect to a threat depends only on the WS and threat involved, and that the events of a threat
surviving engagements by two different WSs are independent [40].
The objective in this model is to minimise the accumulated weighted probability of survival of
the observed threats. The probability that a threat will survive, is calculated by taking the
product of the probabilities of surviving WS engagements assigned to it, thus representing a
product of the efficiencies of all the WSs assigned to it [40]. This probability of survival is then
weighted by the priorities of eliminating a threat when a WS-threat engagement proposal is
made. Stated mathematically, the problem is therefore to
minimise
n(τ)−1∑
j=0
Vj(τ)
m(τ)−1∏
i=0
qij(τ)
xij (τ), (2.1)
subject to the constraints
n(τ)−1∑
j=0
xij(τ) ≤ 1, i = 0, . . . ,m(τ)− 1, (2.2)
m(τ)−1∑
i=0
xij(τ) ≤ k, j = 0, . . . , n(τ)− 1, (2.3)
xij(τ) ∈ {0, 1}, i = 0, . . . ,m(τ)− 1, (2.4)
j = 0, . . . , n(τ)− 1, (2.5)
where Vj(τ) represents the priority of eliminating threat j at time τ , qij(τ) is the probability of
survival of threat j when WS i is assigned to threat j at time τ and xij(τ) is a binary variable
which is equal to one if WS i is assigned to threat j at time interval τ , or zero otherwise [40].
The probability that threat j will survive an engagement by WS i is therefore 1− pij(τ), where
pij denotes the SSHP if WS i is assigned to threat j. This model is constrained by two sets of
constraints. The first set limits each WS to be assigned at most once, and the second constraint
ensures that a maximum of k WSs may be assigned to any specific threat [40].
2.9 Chapter summary
The focus in this chapter was to provide the reader with a brief review on the available literature
related to a GBADS and its subsystems. This was achieved by describing a typical the GBADS
architecture in §2.1 and further discussing each subsystem of a GBADS. The hardware systems
12A WA problem is considered dynamic when the allocation of weapons to threats is considered over some
window of time [40].
13A WA problem is considered static when the position and number of weapons and threats are fixed and
known [40].
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in a GBADS were discussed first, with a short introduction on DAs and sensors in §2.2, followed
by a more comprehensive discussion on WSs in §2.3.
A central software system of a GBADS is the TM subsystem, as discussed in §2.4. This was
followed by a brief discussion on the TE subsystem in §2.5. The WA subsystem was described
more comprehensively in §2.6 and the tactical environment, which may negatively influence a
GBADS, was considered in §2.7. The chapter closed with a review of a classical WA model
which is based on the classical assignment problem.
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This chapter contains a literature review on decision making analysis and a discussion of three
very well-known approaches available in the literature which may be used to solve multiobjective
decision making problems. In §3.1, unidimensional decision making theory is briefly mentioned
and the reader is familiarised specifically with multiobjective decision analysis.
17
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
18 Chapter 3. Multiobjective approaches from the literature
A first approach considered in solving multiobjective decision making problems is the Analytic
Hierarchy Process (AHP) discussed in §3.2, which offers the reader a comprehensive study on
the working, advantages and limitations placed on the AHP.
This is followed by a discussion on unidimensional utility theory in §3.3, where qualitative
characteristics of utility functions are discussed as well as procedures to calculate quantitative
values for utility functions. Guidelines for assessing unidimensional utility functions may be
found towards the end of the section.
A discussion on multiobjective utility functions and the conditions relating to each of the re-
spective types of utility functions may be found in §3.4 which is followed by a discussion on
the techniques which may be used to evaluate values for the scaling constants contained in
multiobjective utility functions.
The chapter concludes with a discussion on multiobjective evolutionary algorithms as well as a
discussion on the Nondominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II (NSGA II) in §3.5.
3.1 Decision making theory
Decision making occurs in the lives of most individuals on a daily basis. Deciding which clothes
to wear each morning, or deciding which job to take from among a number of alternative
job offerings, are just some examples of decisions an individual may face. The way in which
individuals deal with decisions and the manner in which they make their decisions are the
essence of decision making theory. Decision making may be considered to be unidimensional if
it is based on one criterion or multi-dimensional if more than one criterion is considered.
3.1.1 Decisions with multiple conflicting objectives
Decision making usually occurs with respect to different criteria. Consider, for instance, the
choice in buying a house. An individual may be faced with a number of alternatives, but he
may consider decision criteria such as the price, safety in the neighbourhood and distance to
nearest schools and work. In order to make a decision, he has to balance these criteria to find
the alternative which best satisfies all of them simultaneously [9]. Complicating the problem
even further, is the fact that some or all of these criteria may not be completely satisfiable,
because they are conflicting. When these conditions are present, the decision falls within the
realm of multicriteria decision making or multiobjective decision making.
Example 1 Consider a situation where a decision maker is in the market for a new vehicle.
After careful consideration, he finds that the price, the life expectancy and the reliability of
the vehicle are his main criteria when choosing a suitable vehicle. The decision maker prefers
the cheapest vehicle, with the longest life expectancy and, simultaneously, the most reliable.
Unfortunately, it is very unlikely to find a vehicle with all of these properties. The three criteria
may also be seen as the decision maker’s objectives1 in choosing a vehicle. Suppose he can
choose between three alternatives with the vehicles exhibiting the properties in Table 3.1.
Vehicle A is the cheapest with the shortest life expectancy and the least reliable. Vehicle C is
the most expensive, but has the longest life expectancy and is very reliable. The properties of
vehicle B, are in between those of Vehicle A and C.
1For the sake of consistency, the criteria will be referred to as the objectives of a decision maker in the
remainder of this thesis.
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Properties of three vehicles Vehicle A Vehicle B Vehicle C
Price R 25 000 R75 000 R120 000
Life expectancy 5 years 7 years 12 years
Reliability Unreliable Reliable Very reliable
Table 3.1: The properties of three potential vehicles.
From an objective point of view, it may be said that the decision maker has the need to minimise
the price he pays for the vehicle, and maximize the life expectancy and reliability of the vehicle he
chooses. Since all of these objectives cannot be met simultaneously, a compromise with respect
to some or all of the objectives will have to be made in an attempt to be able to make the
particular decision. The reason behind such a compromise is that the above objectives behave in
a conflicting manner, since a more reliable vehicle has a higher price tag attached to it, and at
the same time the reliability has to be maximised and the cost minimised. 
Example 1 highlights some of the concepts involved in multiobjective decision problems. Nu-
merous techniques in the literature may be used as tools to approach and solve multiobjective
decision problems. A few examples of such techniques include the analytic hierarchy process,
goal programming methods, outranking methods and utility theoretic approaches [9].
3.1.2 The notion of Pareto optimality
The concept of multiobjective decision problems naturally gives rise to the notion of multiob-
jective optimisation. In single objective optimisation, the focus is aimed at finding the globally
optimal solution. However, this is not the case in multiobjective optimisation. In multiobjective
optimisation, the focus is aimed at finding a set of solutions each of which yields an extremal
value for at least one of the objectives. Due to the conflicting nature of the objectives, there
usually does not exist such a single solution which minimises or maximises all of the objec-
tives simultaneously. Hence, the aim is to find a set of solutions which represent acceptable
compromises between objectives [12, 17].
The set of feasible solutions usually contain solutions which are superior to other solutions with
respect to all the objectives, but are inferior to other solutions with respect to one or more
objectives [17]. Such a subset of solutions is known as the nondominated set of solutions in the
solution space and is also called the Pareto optimal solutions. These solutions form the so-called
Pareto optimal frontier when plotted in solution space. Nondomination implies that none of the
solutions contained in the Pareto optimal set are absolutely better than any other solution in
the set [17]. Hence, the decision maker is presented with a set of Pareto optimal solutions from
which he may choose, based on some personal associated priorities of the objectives. The Pareto
optimal set of solutions are considered the best set of solutions to a multiobjective problem.
Since the remaining solutions in the solution space are dominated by the Pareto optimal solution
set, they are considered the dominated solutions. An example of a dominated solution set and
nondominated solution set may be found in Figure 3.1, where the dominated set is represented
by the black dots, and the nondominated set is represented by the grey dots.
Suppose that x = [x1, . . . , xn] and y = [y1, . . . , yn] are solution vectors containing criteria
elements for each objective i. For a multiobjective optimisation problem in which all objective
functions have to be minimised, x strictly dominates y, (denoted by x ≺ y), when each element
in x is less than or equal the corresponding element in y, and at least one element in x is
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strictly less than the corresponding element in y; that is xi ≤ yi for all i, and xj < yj for some
j [12]. Similarly, for a multiobjective optimisation problem in which all the objectives have to
be maximised, x strictly dominates y when xi ≥ yi for all i, and xj > yj for some j.
f 1
(x
)
f2(x)
Figure 3.1: Illustration of the solutions contained in the Pareto frontier for a two-objective minimisation
problem in which the objective functions are f1 and f2.
3.1.3 Objectives, goals and attributes in decision making applications
When solving a multiobjective decision problem, it is necessary to establish the objectives of the
decision maker. This is usually achieved with the help of a decision analyst who is responsible for
probing the decision maker to identify the complete set of objectives of the decision maker. The
objectives of a decision are usually a representation of the direction in which a decision should be
steered for improvement [33]. As mentioned in the previous section, a decision maker is typically
faced with a number of objectives that have to optimised simultaneously. Understanding the
objectives of a decision is one of the key elements in the decision making initiation phase, as
this will act as the foundation of the decision problem. It is therefore important that both
the decision analyst as well as the decision maker have a clear view on exactly what each of
the objectives reflect. Clemen and Reilly [14] propose that an objectives hierarchy, with all
the essential objectives and attributes, should be constructed. This may result in a better
understanding and experience of the objectives and their related attributes.
Goals should not be confused with objectives. A goal may be defined as something that has
to be achieved. Hence, a goal has the outcomes of either having been achieved or not. The
difference between a goal and an objective is that an objective is something the decision maker
strives towards, while a goal is achieved or not [33]. Considering as an example, the objective
of a courier service to minimise the total time in transit for any given parcel. A goal may be to
deliver at least 95% of all parcels within 48 hours from the time of receiving the parcel.
An attribute may be defined as the measure of an objective. If the objective is to maximise profit,
the natural attribute may be the amount of profit in rand value [33]. Certain objectives do not
have natural attribute scales, and finding appropriate attribute scales for these objectives may
be a daunting task, due to the fact that these objectives are often very difficult to quantify;
some may not be quantifiable at all. One way of avoiding this problem is to use a different
attribute scale as a proxy, which should be closely associated with the original objective [14].
The difference between proxy and natural attributes, is that proxy attributes do not measure
the objective directly. Gregory and Keeney [25] provide an example of using a proxy attribute
for a manufacturing firm where the objective is to maximise product quality. There may be no
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obvious way to measure product quality directly, hence, a proxy attribute may be the percentage
of products returned. This illustrates that the proxy attribute indirectly measures the product
quality.
The objectives in a decision may be separated into means and fundamental objectives. Means
objectives may be defined as objectives which help to achieve other objectives, whereas funda-
mental objectives may be defined as objectives which reflect on what the decision maker really
wants to achieve [14]. Clemen and Reilly [14] gives the example of an objective of a working
individual to work fewer hours. Working fewer hours may result in him having more time to
spend with his family, at home, or that he has more time available to engage in other activities
representing fundamental interests. It is clear that minimising working hours is a means ob-
jective, since it helps to achieve the fundamental objectives of spending more time with family
or having more time to engage in other activities. Minimising working hours aids the deci-
sion maker in achieving the things that are important to him, in other words his fundamental
objectives.
Fundamental objectives may be organized into a structure called a fundamental objectives hi-
erarchy, consisting of different levels of objectives [14]. The objectives found towards the top
levels are considered the universal objectives, while the objectives found towards the bottom
are considered those objectives which explain upper level objectives.
Example 2 Consider an example adapted from Clemen and Reilly [14]. Figure 3.2 depicts a
fundamental objectives hierarchy in the context of vehicle safety. The overall objective, found
at the top level, is to maximise vehicle safety. Three lower level objectives, namely to minimise
loss of life, to minimise serious accidents and to minimise minor injuries, may be found on the
next level. These objectives are also considered fundamental objectives in the sense that each of
them represents a different sector of safety.
Maximize
vehicle safety
Minimize
loss of life
Minimize
serious injuries
Minimize
minor injuries
Adults Children Adults Children
Figure 3.2: An example of a fundamental objectives hierarchy [14].
If desired, the hierarchy in Figure 3.2 may be expanded further, by including to minimise the loss
of lives of children and to minimise loss of lives of adults below the minimise serious injuries
objective, for example. 
Figure 3.3 contains a general fundamental objectives hierarchy taken from Keeney and Raiffa
[33]. The figure depicts a schematic representation of a set of fundamental objectives. The
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upper level objectives are represented by the symbols X1 and X2 and the lower level objectives
by Y1, Y2, . . . , Y13 respectively. Preferences for objectives may be assessed at the upper or
lower level objectives. Here X1 and X2 are subjectively assessed composites of Y1, . . . , Y5 and
Y6, . . . , Y13, respectively [33]. The purpose of going through all the trouble of expanding the
hierarchy as far as possible by including many details may be to obtain a better understanding
of the upper level objectives, X1 and X2.
X1 X2
Y1 Y2
Y3
Y4 Y5
Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10
Y11 Y12 Y13
Figure 3.3: A general fundamental objectives hierarchy [33].
Means objectives are organised into networks, called means objectives networks as shown in
Figure 3.4, which was taken from [14]. It ties to the previous example of vehicle safety, where
means objectives may be to maximise the use of vehicle safety features or to minimise accidents.
These objectives assist in the achievement of the maximise safety objective. The network may
be expanded even further by adding other means objectives, such as to motivate the purchasing
of safety features on vehicles, to maintain vehicles properly and to maximise driving quality. A
means objective is not restricted to assist only one other objective. Means objectives may be
linked to various other objectives, if applicable. From Figure 3.4, it can be seen that having
reasonable traffic laws helps to achieve both the objective of maintaining vehicles properly and
maximising driving quality.
Care should be taken not to confuse the network of means objectives with the fundamental ob-
jectives hierarchy. Telling fundamental objectives apart from means objectives and structuring
them accordingly are considered to be very important in the development process of a multiob-
jective decision model. Both of these structures have their advantages and disadvantages, but it
is the lower level objectives of the fundamental objectives hierarchy which forms the basis with
respect to which several outcomes are measured. Means objectives may be considered as a way
to help establish fundamental objectives and may sometimes act as substitutes for fundamental
objectives in a situation where the fundamental objectives may be very difficult to measure [33].
3.1.4 Establishing objectives
The process of how to isolate or identify objectives usually involves a decision analyst or a
facilitator interviewing a decision maker or group of decision makers. During the interview the
decision maker may be asked to answer a set of questions which may lead to possible objectives.
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Maximise
safety
Maximise use of
vehicle-safety features
Minimise
accidents
Maintain
vehicles
properly
Motivate purchase
of safety features
on vehicles
Maximise
driving quality
Require safety
features
Educate public
about safety
Enforce
traffic laws
Have reasonable
traffic laws
Minimise driving
under influence
of alcohol
Figure 3.4: An example of a means objectives network [14].
The decision maker(s) should be probed in order to determine a good estimation of the objectives
which he/they deems important. The replies from the decision maker(s) should be questioned
in order to make him/them think harder about their initial reactions. Keeney [32] proposed the
following techniques and questions which may be used in such an interview:
1. Develop a wish list. What do you want? What do you value? What should you want?
2. Identify alternatives. What is a perfect alternative, a terrible alternative, some reasonable
alternative? What is good or bad about each?
3. Consider problems and shortcomings. What is wrong or right with your organisation? What
needs fixing?
4. Predict consequences. What has occurred that was good or bad? What might occur that
you care about?
5. Identify goals, constraints and guidelines. What are your aspirations? What limitations are
placed on you?
6. Consider different perspectives. What would your competitor or your constituency be con-
cerned about? At some time in future, what would concern you?
7. Determine strategic objectives. What are your ultimate objectives? What are your values
that are absolutely fundamental?
8. Determine generic objectives. What objectives do you have for your customers, your em-
ployers, your shareholders and yourself? What environmental, social, economic, or health and
safety objectives are important?
9. Structure objectives. Follow means-ends relationships: Why is that objective important?
How can you achieve it? Be specific: What do you mean by this objective?
10. Quantify objectives. How would you measure achievement of this objective? Why is
objective A three times as important as objective B?
Objectives may also be obtained from a group of decision makers as a team, especially in large
corporations where decisions are typically not made by a single individual. In such a scenario,
objectives may be obtained by hosting facilitated workshops with a team of decision makers.
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The degree of intensity of these workshops may vary. A simple discussion between the facilitator
and team of decision makers may be sufficient to capture the necessary information. However,
this procedure may fail to encapsulate the true detail of the problem and is not recommended
for complex problems [9]. On the other hand, a workshop may be adapted to include a more
comprehensive infusion procedure. In this instance a more detailed set of objectives may be
captured [9].
A well-known method which may be applied in a facilitated workshop is one called a Post-it2
session. During such a session, post-it notepads are handed out to the team of decision makers.
They are then required to write down all the ideas and facts which they deem relevant to the
problem. Team members are then invited to stick their notes to a flat surface, which is visible
to other team members, in order for their ideas to be shared and discussed among themselves
[9]. In this way it is anticipated that an inclusive set of objectives will be obtained. It should
be noted that the efficiency of this technique relies heavily on the abilities and skills of the
facilitator. For a more comprehensive discussion on Post-it sessions and its extensions, the
interested reader is referred to Belton and Stewart [9].
Another popular method is the Delphi Method. This method is used to structure the commu-
nication process in a group facilitation context [35]. The conventional Delphi method consists
of a team of respondents (usually experts in the relevant field, and in this case, the decision
makers) who are required to complete a questionnaire, concerning relevant questions relating
to the problem at hand [35, 54]. This questionnaire may be developed prior to the process
and handed to the decision makers to complete. After completion, the results are summarised
and analysed by a facilitator or a team of facilitators. These results are then anonymously
presented to the decision makers and they are given a chance to review everybody’s original
responses based on the feedback from the first round of results [35]. This process is repeated
until a stopping criterion is reached, such as reaching a maximum number of rounds or until a
consensus is reached [54].
In essence it is believed that the Delphi method works in such a way that it scales down the
range of possible objectives, and will eventually converge to the appropriate ones [54]. The
above listed techniques by Keeney [32], may be used to develop an appropriate questionnaire
in order to identify objectives. This questionnaire may then be implemented by means of the
Delphi method so as to obtain an appropriate set of objectives for the decision problem at hand.
Identifying objectives may be a painstaking process, but a well-structured decision model may
significantly simplify the decision making process at a later stage, especially when independence
between different objectives is evaluated.
3.2 The analytical hierarchy process
A first approach towards multiobjective decision making is the so-called analytic hierarchy
process (AHP). It was developed by Thomas L. Saaty in the 1970s and has been researched
extensively [46]. It is a well-known technique in decision making and has been used by many
decision makers world wide in a variety of fields. It was designed to recommend the best solution,
considering all the objectives and preferences of the decision maker [51].
Once the objectives of the decision maker have been specified, these objectives are used in the
AHP to evaluate all of the alternatives with respect to each objective by means of comparisons
2Post-It refers to a piece of stationary called a post-it notepad containing an adhesive strip on the back to
stick to various surfaces [23].
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between two alternatives at a time. Each comparison is represented by a numerical value based
on an index of priority to the decision maker. These values are then converted into score values,
which represent how well each alternative “scores” on each objective. Numerical values are also
established for each objective, representing the weight each objective will contribute in the final
calculation of the process. These weights are then combined with the numerical score values
of the alternatives, with respect to each objective, to obtain a single final score value for each
alternative. These values are used to make a recommendation with respect to the best possible
alternative, taking into account all the objectives and preferences of the decision maker.
The first step in the AHP is determining a numerical weight value wi for the i
th objective.
The weights for each objective may be calculated by constructing an n × n matrix (known as
a pairwise comparison matrix), where there are n objectives [9]. The content of this matrix A
is a representation of how important one objective is with respect to another. The entry aij
(where i represents a row and j represents a column) is therefore a number representing how
much more important objective i is than objective j in the case where objective i is preferred
to objective j [62]. These numbers may be seen in Table 3.2 and was taken from Winston [62];
they represent a measurable scale from 1-9 where the number one means that objective i is
as important as objective j, while the number nine means that objective i is absolutely more
important than objective j [9].
Value of aij Interpretation
1 Objectives i and j are of equal importance.
3 Objective i is weakly more important than objective j.
5 Experience and judgment indicate that objective i is strongly more important
than objective j.
7 Objective i is very strongly or demonstrably more important than objective j.
9 Objective j is absolutely more important than objective j.
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values mean that the importance is midway between two of the
importance values above.
Table 3.2: An interpretation of measurable values used in the construction of a pairwise comparison
matrix in the AHP [62].
When constructing a pairwise comparison matrix, all the entries on the diagonal, must have a
value of one [9], because objective i cannot be more important than itself. It is also important,
for the sake of consistency, that aij = k should imply that aji =
1
k [5]. The consistency of a
decision maker can be measured by a consistency index which will be discussed later in this
section.
Suppose the decision maker is perfectly consistent, that there are n objectives and that wi
represent the weight of objective i. Then, according to Winston [62], the decision maker’s
pairwise comparison matrix should take the form
A =


w1
w1
w1
w2
. . . w1wn
w2
w1
w2
w2
. . . w2wn
...
...
...
wn
w1
wn
w2
. . . wnwn


. (3.1)
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To recover the vector w = [w1, w2, . . . , wn] from A, consider the system of n equations,
AwT = ∆wT , (3.2)
where wT is an n-dimensional column vector and ∆ is an unknown number. It is clear that
the system of equations in (3.2) always has the trivial solution w = [0 0 . . . 0], for any number
∆. If a decision maker is perfectly consistent, and thus has a pairwise comparison matrix of
the form A, and ∆ = 0 is not allowed, then it can be shown that (3.2) has as only nontrivial
solution the eigenvalue ∆ = n and the corresponding eigenvector w = [w1 w2 . . . wn]. Hence,
the weights of a perfectly consistent decision maker can be obtained from the only nontrivial
solution to (3.2) [62].
In the case where a decision maker is not perfectly consistent, suppose the largest number for
which (3.2) has a nontrivial solution wmax is denoted by ∆max. Since the choices of the decision
maker exhibit a slight inconsistency, it is expected that ∆max should have a value close to n,
and that wmax should contain values close to those of w. This expectation was verified by
Saaty [46], who proposed that w should be approximated by wmax and that the consistency of
the decision maker should be measured by considering the deviation of ∆max from n. Winston
[62] describes a two-step procedure to approximate wmax. These weights obtained from the
pairwise comparisons, as made by the decision maker, reflect the importance of each objective
with respect to one another, and are used in the calculation of the final overall score of each of
the decision maker’s alternatives.
The first step in the process is to normalize the pairwise comparison matrix A by dividing each
entry in column j of A by the sum of all the entries in column j [5, 62]. The resulting matrix,
called Anorm, has the property that the sum of the entries in each column adds up to one. The
second step is to approximate wmax, which will be used as an estimate of w [5, 62]. This may
be achieved by taking the average of the entries in the ith row of Anorm to estimate the weight
wi for objective i. The process is explained by means of an example.
Example 3 Suppose a student is to start his first year of university education in a couple of
months. He is faced with the decision of which university to attend. Suppose he receives notice
of acceptance from four universities, namely Stellenbosch University (SU), the University of
Cape Town (UCT), the University of Pretoria (UP) and Northwest University (NWU). His
decision will be based on the facilities offered (FO) by the various universities, the cost (C) of
attending a university and the resulting proximity to family (PF), which form the objectives in
his decision making process. Suppose that after careful assessment the student arrives at the
pairwise comparison matrix
A =


FO C PF
FO 1 5 3
C
1
5 1
1
2
PF
1
3 2 1

,
or after dividing each column entry in A by the sum of that column, the normalized matrix
Anorm =


FO C PF
FO 0.6522 0.6250 0.6667
C 0.1304 0.1250 0.1111
PF 0.2174 0.2500 0.2222

.
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The weights for each of the objectives may be computed as
w1 =
0.6522 + 0.6250 + 0.6667
3
= 0.6479,
w2 =
0.1304 + 0.1250 + 0.1111
3
= 0.1222,
w3 =
0.2174 + 0.2500 + 0.2222
3
= 0.2299.
The weight w1 is the weight associated with facilities offered, w2 is the weight associated with
cost and w3 is the weight associated with proximity to family. 
The next step is to determine a numerical score value si for each alternative which is a reflection
of how well an alternative scores on a particular objective [5, 62]. The process involves the
calculation of score values for each alternative, similar to that of the calculation of the weights
of the objectives. The process is initiated by constructing a pairwise comparison matrix for each
objective. In this case the rows and columns of the matrix represent the possible alternatives of
the decision maker. Each matrix is normalised and the average of each row is calculated. The
resulting values are used as an indication on how well each alternative scores with respect to
that particular objective.
Example 4 (Continuation of Example 3) Suppose that after careful consideration, the stu-
dent constructs the pairwise comparison matrix
B =


US UCT UP NWU
US 1 2 4 3
UCT
1
2 1 3 4
UP
1
4
1
3 1 2
NWU
1
3
1
4
1
2 1


for the FO objective, and that for the cost and PF objectives, he finds the pairwise comparison
matrices
C =


US UCT UP NWU
US 1 3 13
1
4
UCT
1
3 1
1
5
1
6
UP 3 5 1 13
NWU 4 6 3 1


and
D =


US UCT UP NWU
US 1 2 15
1
4
UCT
1
2 1
1
5
1
4
UP 5 5 1 2
NWU 4 4 12 1

,
respectively.
The resulting scores of each objective with respect to each objective is given in Table 3.3. 
Finally, the overall score of each alternative may be computed as
n∑
i=1
wisi, (3.3)
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Objective US UCT UP NWU
FO 0.4522 0.3180 0.1327 0.0974
C 0.1341 0.0615 0.2761 0.5283
PF 0.1096 0.0769 0.4977 0.3158
Table 3.3: Scores for a students’ alternatives for each objective.
where wi represents the weight associated with objective i, si is the score for the particular
alternative on objective i, and n is the number of objectives. The alternative rendering the
highest score is considered the best alternative, and is recommended as the best choice. When
calculating the overall score, more weight is given to an alternative’s score on the important
objectives [62].
Example 5 (Continuation of Examples 3 and 4) The calculations
US = (0.6479 × 0.4522) + (0.1222 × 0.1341) + (0.2299 × 0.1096) = 0.3346,
UCT = (0.6479 × 0.3180) + (0.1222 × 0.0615) + (0.2299 × 0.0769) = 0.2312,
UP = (0.6479 × 0.1327) + (0.1222 × 0.2761) + (0.2299 × 0.4977) = 0.2341, and
NWU = (0.6479 × 0.0971) + (0.1222 × 0.5283) + (0.2299 × 0.3158) = 0.2001.
may be made to find overall scores for each of the student’s alternatives. When considering these
calculations it seems that the student should choose to attend the University of Stellenbosch for
the duration of his studies. Given his comparisons and objectives, this is the alternative with
the best outcome yielding the highest overall score. 
3.2.1 Ensuring that the decision maker remains consistent
In order to obtain valuable results, it is important to ensure that the decision maker remains
consistent in the assessment of his comparisons. A process which measures the consistency of a
decision maker may be found in Albright and Winston [5], Belton and Stewart [9] and Winston
[62]. The procedure consists of four steps and makes use of a random index (RI), which may be
found in Table 3.4.
n RI
2 0
3 0.58
4 0.90
5 1.12
6 1.24
7 1.32
8 1.41
9 1.45
10 1.51
Table 3.4: Random index values for different values of n [62].
The first step is to calculate AwT , wherew is the n-row vector of the estimated weights obtained
from the pairwise comparison matrix A. The vectors AwT and w are used to determine the
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ratio,
δ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ith entry in AwT
ith entry in wT
. (3.4)
Using δ from (3.4), the consistency index (CI) may be calculated as
CI =
δ − n
n− 1
. (3.5)
In the final step the CI is compared to the RI in Table 3.4 for the corresponding value of n. The
level of consistency is satisfactory when the value of the ratio CI/RI is smaller than 0.10 [9, 62].
However, if the value of the ratio exceeds 0.10, crucial inconsistencies may exist, jeopardising
the results of the AHP.
If a decision maker exhibits perfectly consistent behaviour, then the ith entry in AwT equals
n (ith entry of wT ), implying that in this case CI = 0. The RI values in Table 3.4 for different
values of n are merely average values of CI if the entries in A were to be chosen at random [62].
This, of course, is subject to the constraints that the entries on the diagonal of A must be equal
to one, and that
aij =
1
aji
, i, j = 1, . . . , n. (3.6)
The consistency of the decision maker may also be measured during the assessment of the score
values of the alternatives to ensure that the scores obtained are accurate. The same procedure
may be followed as used with the consistency measurement of weights for the objectives.
Example 6 (Continuation of Example 3-5) Consider the pairwise comparison matrix A
in Example 3. For matrix A, it follows that
AwT =

1 5 31
5 1
1
2
1
3 2 1



0.64790.1222
0.2299

 =

1.94850.3667
0.6902

 ,
and that
δ =
1
3
{
1.9485
0.6479
+
0.3667
0.1222
+
0.6902
0.2299
}
= 3.0037.
The CI is calculated by means of (3.5) as
CI =
3.0037 − 3
2
= 0.0018.
Since CI
RI
= 0.00180.58 = 0.0032, which is less than 0.10, the conclusion may be reached that the
comparisons made by the student are consistent. It can easily be shown that the decision maker
also exhibits consistent behavior in the pairwise comparison matrices B,C and D by using the
easy four step procedure explained above. 
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3.2.2 Implementation, advantages and disadvantages
The AHP is a very powerful tool in decision making theory, and it is mainly due to its simplicity
and computational efficiency that it is often used by decision makers. The AHP may easily be
implemented on a spreadsheet, but there also exist specialised computer software which may
assist in implementing the AHP. The AHP may become difficult to implement on a spreadsheet
when the number of objectives and alternatives are large.
The AHP is very effective when used in situations where groups of people work together on
complex decision making problems [51]. Furthermore, many real-life decision problems include
factors which may be difficult to quantify or compare. There might also be a communication
gap between decision makers due to their difference in perspectives or the different fields in
which they operate. One of the advantages of AHP is that it addresses these problems [51].
Another capability of the AHP is that it can compare different alternatives with respect to
objectives which are totally incommensurable.
Although use of the AHP has advantages, it also has its disadvantages. A specific disadvantage
which received considerable criticism in the literature is a consequence called rank reversal.
When a new alternative is added to a decision which does not change any of the outcomes of
the existing set of alternatives, this addition might change the rank-order of the current set of
alternatives as determined by the AHP [9, 51].
3.3 Utility theory in one dimension
Another well-known approach towards making multiobjective decisions in the literature is em-
bodied in the field of utility theory. The aim in utility theory is to transform monetary gains or
losses of decision makers as a result of uncertainty into so-called utility values, and to present
these values in the form of a function [5]. Epstein [22] states that a utility value defines a
measure of effectiveness of a particular strategy. A utility value consists of a numerical value
assigned to a payoff, which may be a wealth gain or loss reflecting the relative utility to the
decision maker. Such utility values may then be represented in the form of a utility function3. A
utility function therefore encapsulates a decision maker’s attitude towards risk [5]. The aim of
a utility function is to provide a mathematical model which reflects the preferences of a decision
maker under the different types of risk attitudes which he exhibits. Clemen and Reilly [14]
claim that it is not necessary to develop a model which captures the risk attitude of a decision
maker perfectly. A model which is able to present preferences with a moderate feeling towards
risk may be sufficient.
The birth of utility theory dates back to 1713 in the assessment of risky monetary ventures by
Nicholas Bernoulli, called a expected utility model. However, this model was only solved in 1738
by Nicholas’s cousin, Daniel Bernoulli, as what is known as the St. Petersburg paradox4 [59, 61].
3The Oxford dictionary of statistics defines a utility function as, “A function that takes a numerical value
for each possible state of a system (usually an economic system) and is intended as a measure of the benefit or
usefulness of that state” [7].
4Think of a situation where a game is played by repeatedly flipping a fair coin. The event of the coin landing
tails ends the game, which means that the coin is flipped repeatedly until a tail appears. A payoff of R1 is
received when the first head appears and is doubled every time a head appears after that, thus resulting in a
payoff of 2n if the coin is flipped n consecutive times, each time landing heads. How much would an individual
be willing to pay to partake in this game? A rational decision would be to participate in the game if the fee to
pay the game is less than the expected payoff. It can easily be shown that the expected payoff of this game is
infinitely large, which means that an individual should be willing to pay any amount of money to play the game.
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In its earlier consumer economics forms, the notion of utility was referred to as final degree of
utility, effective utility, specific utility, marginal efficiency or even marginal desirability [13].
Von Neumann and Morgernstern [33, 62] developed a number of axioms with respect to expected
utility5. They proved that if a decision maker’s preferences satisfy these axioms, then a utility
function exists for the decision maker and the expected utility approach is a suitable way for
making consistent decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Accepting the Von Neumann and
Morgernstern axioms also ensures that the decision maker exhibits consistent behaviour during
the decision making process. These axioms are well known in the field of utility theory and are
widely available in the literature [19, 22, 62].
Axiom 1(a)—Complete ordering: A decision maker is able to rank the possible outcomes of a
decision in terms of preference. That is, for any two outcomes Ai and Aj , the decision maker
either prefers Ai to Aj , Aj to Ai or is indifferent between Ai and Aj .
Axiom 1(b)—Transitivity: For any three outcomes Ai, Aj and Ak of a decision, if a decision
maker prefers outcome Ai to outcome Aj and outcome Aj to outcome Ak, then the decision
maker must prefer outcome Ai to Ak.
Axiom 2(a)—Continuity: For any outcomes Ai, Aj and Ak of a decision, if a decision maker
prefers outcome Ai to outcome Aj and outcome Aj to outcome Ak, then there exists a probability
0 < p < 1, such that the decision maker is indifferent with respect to choosing between a sure
outcome Aj and a lottery
6 in which Ai is received with probability p and Ak is received with
probability (1− p), as illustrated in Figure 3.5.
L1 L2
1
p
1− p
Ai
Ak
Aj
Figure 3.5: A sure outcome L1 and a lottery L2 illustrating the continuity axiom.
Axiom 2(b)—Substitutability: If a decision maker is indifferent with respect to choosing between
lotteries L′ and L′′, then in any probability tree that includes lottery L′ as a subtree, the decision
maker is also indifferent to substitution of L′′ for L′.
Axiom 3—Monotonicity or the unequal probability: For any two outcomes Ai and Aj of a
decision, if a decision maker prefers outcome Ai to outcome Aj, the decision maker will prefer
a lottery with a higher probability of obtaining Ai.
Axiom 4—Independence: Consider the following sets of outcomes, A1, A2, A3, . . . , An andB1, B2,
B3, . . . , Bn of a decision. If the decision maker prefers Ai to Bi or is indifferent with respect
to choosing between Ai and Bi for all i = 1, . . . , n, then an even chance of obtaining A1 or A2
or . . . or An is preferred or equivalent to an even chance of obtaining B1 or B2 or . . . or Bn,
respectively.
However, this is not the case since some prices are just to high to play the game. This problem is known as the
St. Petersburg paradox [47, 59].
5The expected utility of a lottery is calculated as the sum of the outcomes, multiplied by their respective
probabilities. If a choice has to be made between a number of lotteries, the lottery yielding the highest expected
utility is recommended as the best alternative.
6A lottery is used as a metaphor to illustrate the condition of uncertainty.
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Utility functions may be defined in terms of both as qualitative characteristics and quantitative
characteristics. Qualitative characteristics may be used to indicate a specific attitude towards
the preferences with respect to outcomes for a decision maker. These characteristics may be used
to derive restrictions on the utility function, and in the process simplify the assessment procedure
of the utility function. Qualitative characteristics provide the decision maker with the possibility
to perform sensitivity analysis, as well as performing different consistency tests so as to ensure
that the preferences of the decision maker are consistent [33]. Qualitative characteristics include,
monotonicity, risk attitudes, the certainty equivalent and the risk premium.
Quantitative characteristics refer to the assessment of utility values for various outcomes [33].
This may be done by using techniques such as the certainty equivalent approach or the probability
equivalent approach. Both the qualitative and the quantitative characteristics may be used
to determine a suitable utility function which may yield a good representation of the true
preferences of the decision maker.
3.3.1 Certainty versus uncertainty
The events which may occur during decision making may take place under two typical con-
ditions, known as certainty and uncertainty. When the outcomes in a decision have specific
characteristics that one knows for certain before the decision is made, the decision is said to be
made under conditions of certainty. Decisions made under certainty means that each specific
strategy leads to a specific outcome. Examples of decision making under certainty may be
found in economic games, especially those including factors such as production schedules, cost
functions or time-and-motion considerations [22]. When the outcome of a decision consists of
a set of outcomes having a known a priori probability distribution, the decision is said to be
made under uncertainty [22].
Example 7 Suppose a decision maker wants to purchase a new laptop computer. The attributes
affecting the decision includes the price, size and the life expectancy of each computer. The val-
ues for each attribute may be found in Table 3.5. If the decision is based only on the information
contained in Table 3.5, the decision occurs under certainty. This is due to the fact that all the
Attribute Computer A Computer B
Price R11 500 R12 000
Size 17 inch 18 inch
Life expectancy 3 years 2 years
Table 3.5: Characteristics of two different laptop computers.
values of each outcome is known for sure. However, should the life expectancy of the computers
follow some probability distribution function, the decision making occurs under conditions of
uncertainty. 
Decision making under conditions of certainty may be modelled by value functions (also known
as ordinal utility functions) [14, 62]. Value functions rank the sure outcomes of a decision in a
way that remains consistent with the preferences of the decision maker [14].
Decision making under conditions of uncertainty may be modelled by cardinal utility functions
[14]. Cardinal utility functions employ ranking procedures as do value functions. The differ-
ence is that in the cardinal case, lotteries are rank-ordered instead of sure outcomes, whilst
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maintaining a level of consistency with the risk attitude of the decision maker. The importance
of distinguishing between certain and uncertain conditions lies in the methods incorporated to
assess a decision maker’s utility function. Some methods are more appropriate if used under
conditions of certainty, uncertainty or both [14].
3.3.2 Monotonicity
Keeney and Raiffa [33] state that when it is relevant to represent the outcomes of a decision
by means of monetary asset position, a large portion of decision makers would prefer a larger
amount to a smaller amount, in which case
x1 > x2 ⇔ u(x1) > u(x2), (3.7)
for two outcomes x1 and x2, where u represents a utility function. This implies that the utility
function is monotonically increasing. In the case where a smaller amount is preferred to a larger
amount (e.g. the response time to calls for a fire brigade) it holds that
x1 > x2 ⇔ u(x2) > u(x1), (3.8)
which means that the utility function is monotonically decreasing. A utility function may also be
transformed from a monotonically increasing to a monotonically decreasing function by changing
the effectiveness measure, also known as the attribute. For further details on the transformation
of the effectiveness measure, the interested reader is referred to Keeney and Raiffa [33].
In addition to the possibility of a utility function being either monotonically increasing or
monotonically decreasing, it may also be nonmonotonic. A nonmonotonic utility function occurs
where an outcome with a higher value is preferred up to some point, whereafter a smaller value
is preferred to a higher value. An example of such a nonmonotonic utility function is found in
medical terms in the level of blood pressure of an individual [33]. There exists an acceptable level
of blood pressure for a specific individual. A low level of blood pressure is undesirable and higher
values are preferred up to the acceptable level. On the contrary, high levels of blood pressure
are also undesirable and lower values are preferred down to the acceptable level. The utility
function for the blood pressure of an individual is therefore a nonmonotonic utility function. An
example of a nonmonotonic utility function may be seen in Figure 3.6. In this figure the utility
function is monotonically increasing up to point, A, whereafter it is monotonically decreasing.
Utility
A
Figure 3.6: An example of a nonmonotonic function.
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3.3.3 Attitudes towards risk
Another qualitative characteristic of utility functions, is the attitude towards risk that a decision
maker exhibits. Any real-life decision making situation contains a form of risk — whether it is
the choice of stock market to invest in, or a choice among a few different job offerings — it is
only the degree of risk that varies.
Example 8 Suppose a decision maker may choose to play one of two different games. In the
first game a fair coin is flipped and the decision maker has the opportunity to either receive R 200
or lose R 10. In the second game, a fair coin is also flipped, but the decision maker can either
receive R 4 000 or lose R 2 500. These games are represented by the decision tree in Figure 3.7.
The expected values for each game may be calculated as R 200(0.5)−R 10(0.5) = R 95 for Game
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
−R 2 500
R 4 000
−R 10
R 200
Game 1
Game 2
Figure 3.7: A decision tree for a choice between two games having different outcomes.
1, and R 4 000(0.5) −R 2 500(0.5) = R 750 for Game 2. 
If the decision maker in Example 8 considers only the expected values of Game 1 and Game 2
to base his decision on, it is very likely that he will choose the game with the highest expected
value (that is, Game 2). When a decision maker considers only the expected value criterion (i.e.
the average or expected payoff of the alternatives) to base his decision on, it implies that the
decision maker does not take into account any risk involved in making a decision [14]. However,
most individuals would, in fact, rather prefer to play Game 1 instead of Game 2, because it
involves less risk.
On the other hand, there are decision makers who would actually choose to play Game 2 instead
of Game 1, regardless of the risk involved. Their choice is not based on the expected value,
but because they exhibit a more positive feeling towards risk. This demonstrates that decision
makers exhibit different attitudes towards risk. Those decision makers who are sensitive or
afraid of risk, are said to be risk-averse decision makers and they would typically try and avoid
any form of risk. Risk averse decision makers are those who would prefer to play Game 1 in
Example 8. Decision makers who are more attracted to riskier choices are said to be risk-seekers
[14]. Risk seekers are not afraid to take any form of risk involved in a decision, and would much
rather prefer riskier choices. These decision makers would prefer to play Game 2 in Example 8.
Decision makers who are neither risk-averse nor risk-seeking, are said to be risk-neutral [14].
Decision makers who present a risk-neutral behaviour do not care about risk, — all risk aspects
involved in their choice of preference are ignored when facing a decision. Since there is no risk
involved in their decision, the expected value criterion is an acceptable measure for choosing
among alternatives for a risk-neutral decision maker [14].
It was briefly mentioned in the beginning of §3.3 that an individual’s utility function encapsulates
the attitude towards risk that he/she exhibits. A decision maker’s attitude towards risk may
be derived from the form of the graph of his/her utility function.
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Risk-neutralRisk-seeker
Risk-averse
Utility
Monetary gain
Figure 3.8: The three different attitudes towards risk presented on a two-dimensional utility graph for
a monetary gain.
A decision maker is said to exhibit a risk averse attitude if and only if his utility function has
a concave form. The converse of this definition implies that a decision maker exhibits a risk
seeking attitude, if and only if his utility function has a convex form. The utility function of
a risk neutral decision maker is simply a straight line [14, 33, 62]. The trio of graphs, each
representing a different individual’s utility function, may be seen graphically in Figure 3.8.
A procedure which may be used to determine a decision maker’s attitude towards risk, is to
present him with a choice between a lottery having equal outcomes of x1 and x2, and a sure
outcome consisting of the expected value of the lottery. If the lottery is presented to the
decision maker for a number of times with various values of x1 and x2, and the decision maker
continuously prefers the sure outcome to the lottery, he is considered to be risk averse. If the
decision maker continuously prefers the lottery to the sure outcome, he is considered to be risk
seeking [33]. And finally, if the decision maker is continuously indifferent between the lottery
and the sure outcome, he is considered to be risk neutral.
3.3.4 The certainty equivalent and risk premium
Two further qualitative characteristics of utility functions are the certainty equivalent (CE) and
risk premium (RP). The CE for a given lottery L may be defined as that specific amount x, for
which a decision maker is indifferent with respect to choosing between L and the sure amount
x [33, 62]. Consider Game 2 in Example 8 again. Suppose the decision maker is indifferent
with respect to choosing between a sure amount of R 500 and playing Game 2. The indifference
amount of R 500, is then considered to be the decision maker’s CE. This implies that if the
decision maker is offered an amount which is anything less than R 500, the decision maker will
choose to play Game 2, and if the decision maker is offered an amount which is anything more
than R 500, the decision maker will choose to take the sure amount.
A very useful property of the CE is that it may be used to determine the risk attitude of a
decision maker. Keeney and Raiffa [33] state that a decision maker exhibits a risk averse attitude
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for a monotonically increasing utility function, if and only if the CE of any nondegenerate7
lottery, is less than the expected value of that lottery. The converse of this statement implies
that a decision maker exhibits a risk seeking attitude for a monotonically increasing utility
function, if and only if the CE of any nondegenerate lottery is greater than the expected value
of that lottery.
Alternatives may be ranked according to their CEs, which is similar to ranking alternatives
according to their expected utilities [14]. Two alternatives having the same CEs, imply that
they have the same expected utility values. Hence, if two alternatives have the same CEs, the
decision maker should be indifferent with respect to choosing between these alternatives.
Keeney and Raiffa [33] define the RP as “the amount of the attribute that a decision maker is
willing to give up from the average, to avoid the risk involved in the relative lottery.” The RP
may also be seen as the premium that the decision maker is willing to pay to avoid risk [14].
The RP may be calculated by taking the difference between the expected value of a lottery and
the CE of that lottery [14, 62].
Example 9 (Continuation of Example 8) Consider the Game 2 in Example 8. Suppose the
CE of the decision maker for Game 2 is R 500. His RP may be calculated as R 750 − R 500 =
R 250. This implies that the decision maker is willing to give up R 250 in expected value, to
avoid the risk involved in playing Game 2. 
The RP is related to the risk attitude exhibited by the decision maker. Winston [62], and
Keeney and Raiffa [33] state, that for any nondegenerate L, a decision maker’s attitude towards
risk is risk-averse if and only if the RP of L is greater than 0, is risk seeking if and only if the
RP of L is less than 0 and risk-neutral if and only if the RP of L is exactly equal to 0.
The notions of the CE and RP of a given lottery may be explained by means of the graph in
Figure 3.9. It may be seen from Figure 3.9 that the utility of the CE is equal to the expected
utility (EU) value of the lottery, implying that the decision maker should be indifferent with
respect to choosing between these two values [14]. To find the CE of the lottery, a horisontal
line may be drawn from the EU value until the utility function is reached. Dropping a vertical
line from that point to the horisontal axis will yield the CE value. The RP is represented by
the distance between the CE and EV as indicated in Figure 3.9. The horisontal line from the
EU reaches the utility curve before it reaches the vertical line of the EV, and because the EV
is greater than the CE, this implies that the RP for a risk-averse individual should take on a
positive value [14]. It can easily be shown that for a risk-seeking individual the converse is true.
In this case the RP takes on a negative value, implying that the individual would have to be
paid to decline an opportunity.
3.3.5 Constant, decreasing and increasing risk attitudes
The concept of risk attitudes may be expanded further, by investigating how decision makers
react towards risk if their monetary wealth position changes. The reason for such an expansion
is to determine whether decision makers would rather prefer a riskier alternative if they are in a
wealthier position, or whether their decision would not be influenced by their wealth positions
[33]. These are very common behaviour amongst decision makers. They may feel, that since
they are in a wealthier position, they can afford to take the riskier option.
7A nondegenerate lottery may be defined as a lottery where no one of the outcomes has a probability value
of one of occurring [33].
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x2x1
RP
CE EV
EU
Utility
Utility function
u(x2)
u(x1)
EU= pu(x1) + (1− p)u(x2)
EV= p(x1) + (1 − p)(x2)
Figure 3.9: The risk premium presented graphically for a risk-averse decision maker [14].
A reasonable measure is to observe how the value of the RP for a lottery is affected when a
constant amount, k is added to the payoffs in the specific lottery [14]. Consider risk averse
individuals first. For a decision maker to be consistently risk averse, the RP should remain
constant for any value of k [14]. This means that the wealth position of the decision maker does
not influence his choice.
For a decision maker to be decreasingly risk averse, the RP of any lottery should decrease as
the value of k increases [33]. This means that a decision maker becomes less risk averse as his
wealth position increases. For a decision maker to be increasingly risk averse, the RP of any
lottery should increase as the value of k increases. This means that the decision maker becomes
more risk averse as his wealth position increases.
Decision makers may also exhibit consistently risk seeking, decreasingly risk seeking or increas-
ingly risk seeking behaviour. Consistently risk seeking behaviour is similar to that of consistently
risk averse behaviour in the sense that the RP should remain constant for all the values of k.
The difference is that the decision maker is risk seeking. For a decision maker to be decreasingly
risk seeking, the RP for any lottery should increase as the value of k increases. Finally, for a
decision maker to be increasingly risk seeking, the RP for any lottery should decrease as the
value of k increases [33].
As will later be explained, certain specific types of utility functions may or may not be appro-
priate to use when certain risk attitudes are present. Keeney and Raiffa [33] show, for instance,
that an exponential utility function is not suitable for a decreasingly risk averse individual. The
benefit of being acquainted with these types of risk attitudes of decision makers, is that it may
prove useful in choosing an appropriate utility function corresponding to the risk attitude of
the decision maker.
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3.3.6 Assessing utility values
The assessment of utility values may be seen as a topic of subjective judgement and may be
assessed in a number of ways [14]. Techniques which follow subjective procedures, include
the certainty equivalent approach and the probability approach. However, if certain character-
istics of the risk attitude of a decision maker are known, utility values may be assessed by
using pre-determined mathematical functions [14]. Pre-determined utility functions include the
exponential utility function and logarithmic utility function [33]. One advantage of using a pre-
determined function is that the often tedious process of assessments involved in a subjective
approach is circumvented [14]. Although assuming a pre-determined functional form for a utility
function seems very appealing, it also has its constraints and limitations, such as the limitation
placed on the usage of certain utility functions due to the risk attitude exhibited by the decision
maker.
When assessing utility values subjectively, the first step is to specify the range of values for the
possible outcomes. This helps to narrow down the number of assessments, since values falling
outside of the specified range are omitted from the assessment procedure. Specifying a range,
may also prevent any confusion on the decision maker’s side, since values falling outside the
range may have no valuable meaning to the decision maker [33].
The next step is to assign utility values to the best and worst outcomes in the specified range
of outcomes denoted by x+ and x−, respectively. These extremal outcome values are assigned
utility values of 1 and 0, respectively [14, 62]. Utility values of the other possible outcomes
are contained in the range of 0 and 1, and may be calculated by using any one of a number of
subjective methods or pre-specified utility functional forms.
The certainty equivalent technique
A popular, subjective technique for assessing utility values under conditions of certainty or
uncertainty is the CE technique. As the name suggests, the CE technique repeatedly utilises
the notion of a CE (see §3.3.4) in order to construct a utility function [14].
The technique involves providing the decision maker with a choice between a lottery, having
two outcomes, x− and x+, with equal probability as shown in Figure 3.10 [14]. The decision
maker is asked to provide his CE for this lottery. Because the decision maker is indifferent with
0.5
0.5
x−
x+
CE
A
B
Figure 3.10: A lottery for the assessment of a utility function using the CE technique.
respect to choosing between the lottery and the CE, the expected value of the lottery should be
equal to the u(CE) [14]. The utility values u(x+) and u(x−) are known and hence, the utility
value of the CE may be calculated as
u(CE) = 0.5u(x+) + 0.5u(x−). (3.9)
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A forth utility value may be assessed by providing the decision maker with a lottery containing
different payoff values (The utility values of these payoffs should be known). This procedure
may be repeated until a reasonable number of utility values are assessed, thereby tracing out
the decision maker’s utility function.
Example 10 Suppose that a decision maker is presented with the lottery A in Figure 3.11.
The decision maker is asked to provide a CE for the lottery, and suppose that after careful
consideration he claims a CE of R 1 900. Since R 5 000 and R 500 represent the best and worst
outcomes respectively, they are assigned utility values of one and zero respectively. By using
Axiom 1(b), the utility value for R 1 900 may be calculated as
u(1 900) = 0.5u(500) + 0.5u(5 000)
= 0.5(0) + 0.5(1)
= 0.5.
Another utility value may by calculated by using a different lottery. In this lottery, the decision
0.5
0.5
R 5 00
R 5 000
CE
A
B
Figure 3.11: An example of the lottery used in the assessment of a utility function using the CE
approach in Example 10.
maker has to provide a CE for a lottery involving a fair chance in winning either R 5 000 or
R 1 900 (because the utility values of these outcomes are known). Suppose he claims a CE of
R 3 000 for the lottery. The utility value of R 3 000 may be calculated as
u(3 000) = 0.5u(5 000) + 0.5u(1 900)
= 0.5(1) + 0.5(0.5)
= 0.75.
Continuing this process, a number of utility values corresponding to different outcomes may
be determined. Suppose a utility value of 0.25 is assessed for R 1 000 and 0.875 for R 4 000.
Presenting the utility values on a two dimensional graph, with the monetary gain represented
by the horisontal axis, and the utility values on the vertical axis, yields the utility function
represented in Figure 3.12. 
When the CE technique is applied, the first assessed value corresponding to x0.5, has utility
value u(x0.5) = 0.5, because u(x
+) = 1 and u(x−) = 0. It can also be shown that the second
utility value assessed during the process described above (associated with an outcome x0.75) and
the third utility value assessed during the process described above (associated with an outcome
x0.25) are u(x0.75) = 0.75 and u(x0.25) = 0.25, respectively [33].
These values may be used to verify the consistency of the decision maker. The decision maker
is asked to supply his CE for the lottery in Figure 3.13. Since u(x0.5) = 0.5 and
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Figure 3.12: The utility function assessed by means of the CE approach for Example 10.
u(CE) = 0.5u(x0.25) + 0.5u(x0.75) = 0.5,
the conclusion may be drawn that, in order for a decision maker to be consistent, his CE should
be equal to x0.5 [33]. Furthermore these values may also be used to confirm whether a utility
function is risk averse or risk seeking. Recall from §3.3.4 that an increasing utility function
is risk averse if the assessed CE values are less than the expected values of their respective
lotteries. If the CE values are larger that the expected values of their respective lotteries, the
utility function is risk seeking. One disadvantage of this technique is that assessing CEs may
be a tedious process.
0.5
0.5 x0.25
x0.75
Figure 3.13: A lottery to verify the consistency of a decision maker using CEs.
The probability equivalent approach
Another technique for utility assessment is called the Probability Equivalent (PE) technique,
and is suitable for use in decision making under conditions of certainty or uncertainty. The
PE technique is similar to the CE approach in the sense that lotteries are used to assess utility
values. In the PE technique, the decision maker is presented with a lottery containing the
outcomes x+ and x−, with probabilities p and (1 − p), respectively, and a sure amount y. The
value of y represents the amount for which a utility value is sought. This situation is shown
graphically in Figure 3.14. The decision maker is asked to identify the probability value p which
renders him indifferent with respect to a choice between the lottery and the value of y [14]. This
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indifference implies that the expected utility of the lottery must be
u(y) = p u(x+) + (1− p)u(x−)
= p(1) + (1− p)(0)
= p.
The value of p which makes him indifferent, is considered his utility value for that particular
value of y [14]. This procedure is repeated until a reasonable number of utility values have been
assessed, thus tracing out the decision maker’s utility function.
p
1− p
x−
x+
y
C
D
Figure 3.14: An example of the lottery used in the assessment of a utility function using the PE
approach.
Example 11 (Continuation of Example 10) Consider the same scenario as in Example 10,
but with the lottery represented in Figure 3.15. Suppose the decision maker wishes to assess his
utility value for a R 1 500 payoff. The decision maker is asked to provide the value of p which
makes him indifferent with respect to a choice between the lottery and the sure outcome of
R 1 500. By using Axiom 2(a), he concludes that a value of 0.4 makes him indifferent. Hence,
u(1 500) = 0.4. By repeating the process, but with different values for the sure outcome, a
number of utility values may be assessed for different payoff values. The assessed utility values
in conjunction with the payoff values, may then be presented on a graph similar to the one in
Figure 3.12, to trace out the utility function. 
p
1− p
R 5 00
R 5 000
R 1 500
C
D
Figure 3.15: The lottery used in the assessment of a utility function using the PE approach in Exam-
ple 11.
A very important matter in modelling the preferences of any decision maker, is ensuring that
the decision maker remains consistent during the assessment process. Keeney and Raiffa [33]
describe one such method when the PE approach is used. Suppose x1, x2 and x3 represent a
series, where the decision maker prefers x2 to x1 and x3 to x2. Furthermore, suppose that x2 is
the certain amount which makes the decision maker indifferent with respect to a choice between
the lottery having outcomes x3 and x1 with probabilities p and (1−p), respectively. In order for
a decision maker to be consistent, the value of p must be such that u(x2) = pu(x3)+(1−p)u(x1),
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or simplified,
p =
u(x2)− u(x1)
u(x3)− u(x1)
.
It is finally noted that if a decision involves only a few outcomes (possibly up to approximately
50), then the PE approach may be sufficient to assess utility functions, but for larger problems
alternative approaches are recommended [33].
An exponential utility function
Pre-determined utility functions exist in the literature, which may be selected to assess utility
values for different outcomes. A pre-determined utility function is usually chosen based on the
qualitative characteristics displayed by the decision maker, such as a decision maker’s attitude
towards risk. One pre-determined function which may be used if a decision maker exhibits a
form of risk aversion is an exponential utility function [14, 33]. An exponential utility function
takes the form
u(x) = 1− e−x/R, (3.10)
where e is the natural number (i.e. the base of the natural logarithm, or approximately 2.71828)
and R represents the level of risk aversion displayed by the decision maker, known as the risk
tolerance [14]. The concern in using an exponential utility function, is to determine the value
of R which best represents the level of risk aversion of the decision maker. A small value of R
will yield a more curved function, implying a more risk averse decision maker. In contrast, a
larger value of R will yield a flatter curve, implying a less risk averse decision maker [14].
The value of R may be evaluated by using a lottery similar to the one in Figure 3.16. The
decision maker has a choice between playing the lottery, having an equal chance of receiving an
amount of x or losing an amount of x2 , or not playing the lottery at all. The largest value of x
for which the decision maker is willing to play the lottery is considered his risk tolerance [62].
0.5
0.5
x
−
x
2
Figure 3.16: An example of a lottery to calculate the risk tolerance of a decision maker in the case of
an exponential utility function.
A significant advantage of using an exponential utility function, is that it is relatively easy to
assess the parameter of the function, since it only involves assessing an appropriate value of R.
A disadvantage of using the exponential utility function, is that it is limited to decision makers
exhibiting risk averse behaviour.
3.3.7 Guidelines for assessing utility functions with one attribute
Since various techniques are available in the literature to assess utility functions, there is no
specific set of fixed rules which may be followed during the assessment of a utility function.
Keeney and Raiffa [33] state that the reason for this is “because the assessment of utility
functions is as much of an art as it is a science.” Even though a fixed set of rules does not exist
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for the process of utility assessment, a set of useful guidelines, proposed by Keeney and Raiffa
[33], may be adopted when the preferences of a decision maker is assessed.
It is usually assumed that both the analyst and the decision maker have a clear understand-
ing about the problem at hand, and that they have established the important objectives and
attributes, and have structured them accordingly. It is also assumed that the decision maker
has been briefed about decision making analysis, and that he understands the reasons behind
the evaluation of his preferences [33]. It is important to prepare the decision maker for the as-
sessment procedure. A pre-assessment process involving motivating the decision maker to think
hard about his feelings towards the various outcomes and making sure that both the analyst
and the decision maker understands that the aim is to assess the preferences of the decision
maker [33].
A first step in the utility assessment procedure should be to establish whether the utility function
is monotonic or not [33]. This may be achieved by using a line segment of the form in Figure 3.17.
To investigate whether the utility function is monotonic or not, the decision maker should be
asked whether he prefers outcomes A or B. Suppose he chooses outcome B above A. He should
then be asked whether he prefers outcome D or C. Suppose he chooses outcome D above C. A
few more of these preference questions may be asked and finally the following general question
should be put to the decision maker: “If outcome xi is greater than xj, will outcome xi always
be preferred to outcome xj?” An affirmative answer to this question implies that the utility
function is monotonically increasing. If the decision maker indicates that he will always prefer
outcome xi to outcome xj when xi is smaller than xj , the utility function is monotonically
decreasing. If no conclusion can be made about the monotonicity of the utility function, this
should be explained to the decision maker and he should be given the opportunity to reevaluate
his preferences before nonmonotinicity is assumed. This may help to educate the decision maker,
rather than to leave him biased [33].
x− A B C D x+
Figure 3.17: A representation of the outcomes of a decision to assist in the verification of monotonicity.
The next step in the utility assessment process should be to determine the risk attitude of the
decision maker, which will determine whether the utility function is risk averse, risk neutral
or risk seeking. The result of this step may be verified by presenting the decision maker with
the lottery in Figure 3.18. This lottery presents the decision maker with an option between a
sure outcome x and a lottery involving an even chance of gaining amounts of x − k or x + k.
The decision maker should be asked for his preference between these two outcomes for arbitrary
values of x and k. This procedure should be repeated for several different values of x or k, in
each case keeping one value fixed and then varying the other, and vice versa. The values should
include the entire range of possible values of the outcomes.
Alternatively, Keeney and Raiffa [33] suggest that the decision maker should be asked: “If the
values of x and k are varied for different amounts over the range of the outcomes, would the
sure outcome x always be preferred to the lottery?” An affirmative answer , would be sufficient
to assume that the decision maker is risk averse. If x is preferred consistently, it may be safe
to assume that the decision maker is risk averse. Finally, if an indifference occurs consistently,
a risk neutral attitude may be assumed. Finally if the lottery is preferred consistently, a risk
seeking attitude may be assumed [33].
The next step in the utility assessment procedure involves verifying whether the utility function
is consistently, decreasingly or increasingly risk averse. The RP may be used for this purpose.
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A
B
0.5
0.5
x+ k
x− k
x
Figure 3.18: A lottery used in the verification of the risk attitude incorporated in a utility function.
A monotonically increasing utility function is consistently (decreasingly, increasingly, respec-
tively) risk averse if the RP remains constant (decreases, increases, respectively) for the various
outcomes [33]. In order to compute the RP, it is necessary to calculate the CE for the lottery
with possible outcomes as shown in Figure 3.19, for a number of values i, where xi increases as
the value of i increases.
0.5
0.5 xi+1
xi−1
CE(xi)
Figure 3.19: A lottery used to determine constant, decreasing or increasing risk aversion.
An alternative approach may also be used to calculate the RP of a decision maker for the lottery
A in Figure 3.18, for specific values of x and k. In this case the decision maker should be asked
what the impact may be on this RP if the value of x is increased, while maintaining the fixed
value k. If the RP increases as the value of x increases, then it is safe to assume that the utility
function is increasingly risk averse. On the other hand, if the RP decreases, it may be assumed
that the utility function is decreasingly risk averse [33].
Quantitative values for the utility function may next be assessed. This step is performed by
means of the CE approach or PE approach discussed in §3.3.6. The decision maker may then
either find a utility function directly (e.g. by fitting a curve through the utility values), taking
into account that the function should comply with the previous qualitative and quantitative
assessments, or the decision maker may use a pre-determined utility functional structure dis-
playing the previous qualitative characteristics and determine relevant parameters in order to
obtain an appropriate utility function [33].
Inconsistency of a decision maker during the assessment process should be considered a fatal
error, as inconsistencies may jeopordise the outcome of the results. It is thus important to
include appropriate measures throughout the entire assessment procedure to maintain a high
level of consistency. Whenever any inconsistencies occur, the reasons behind such inconsistencies
should be explained to the decision maker which, in turn, should motivate him to rethink his
preferences for certain outcomes [33]. This may lead to a possible repetition of certain areas of
the assessment.
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3.4 Utility functions in multiobjective decision space
In the previous section, a number of ways of assessing single objective utility functions was dis-
cussed. Assessing utility functions for decisions in one dimension seems rather straight forward,
since the procedures described in §3.3 has to be carried out for only one objective, for each of
the alternatives. The question arising, is what happens in the case where multiple objectives
are considered simultaneously in a decision problem? In such a case, one utility function is
sought which represents all of the objectives and their respective attributes simultaneously.
A number of utility functions for assessing multiple conflicting objectives exist in the literature,
and the most popular ones are the additive utility function, the multilinear utility function and
the multiplicative utility function. These utility functions simply consist of a scaled combination
of the individual utility functions assessed for each objective by means of addition and/or
multiplication. This allows for the multiobjective utility function to be broken down into several
smaller utility functions (a notion called separability). These individual utility functions may
then be assessed separately, by using any one of the techniques discussed in §3.3, thus simplifying
the assessment of the combined multiobjective utility function significantly [14, 33].
An important phenomenon in multiobjective utility functions, is the interaction between the
attributes. In order to utilise any of the multiobjective utility functions, certain conditions have
to be satisfied regarding the interaction between the respective attributes [33]. These conditions
are known as the utility independence conditions, and three of these conditions that the author
is aware of are described below. For the sake of simplicity, the case where only two objectives
are considered is discussed.
Preferential independence
The first independence condition is called preferential independence. Suppose there are two
objectives, with their respective attributes denoted by X and Y. Attribute X is considered pref-
erentially independent of attribute Y if preferences for specific outcomes of X do not depend
on the level of outcome of the attribute Y [14, 33]. If attribute Y is also preferentially indepen-
dent of attribute X, the attributes are said to be mutually preferentially independent. Mutual
preferential independence is considered a necessary condition for a utility function to have the
characteristic of separability discussed earlier [14]. To illustrate the concept of preferential
independence, consider the following example.
Example 12 Suppose a decision maker is presented with a choice between different projects,
where the cost in Rand value of a project and the time of completion in days of a project are
considered as the attributes. Assume that for a specific project the decision maker prefers a
time of completion of 10 days to 20 days if the cost of that specific project is R 200. If the
decision maker also prefers the same time of completion when the cost is R 400, then the time
of completion attribute is preferentially independent of the cost attribute. This means that the
decision maker will always prefer a shorter time of completion regardless of what the cost is.
Consider the same scenario where the cost is now fixed at R 200, and the decision maker prefers a
10 day time of completion instead of a 20 day completion time. If the decision maker also prefers
a 20 day time of completion to a 30 day completion, then cost is preferentially independent of
completion time. Hence, the conclusion can be made that completion time and cost are mutually
preferentially independent [14]. 
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Preferential independence may easily be verified by presenting the decision maker with a se-
quence of paired comparisons between different values of attribute X, whilst keeping attribute
Y fixed at a specific level. In such a sequence of comparisons the decision maker is asked to
give his preference with respect to the outcomes of attributes X in each pair. The procedure
is repeated with the same set of outcomes for attribute X, but with different fixed values of
attribute Y . If the decision maker prefers the exact same set of outcomes of attribute X at each
iteration, it is safe to assume attribute X is preferentially independent of attribute Y [14]. For
mutual preferential independence the process should be repeated, but by keeping attribute X
fixed at different levels and asking the decision maker for preferences with respect to different
values of attribute Y . If attribute Y is also preferentially independent of attribute X, it is safe
to assume that the attributes are mutually preferentially independent.
Since preferential independence is concerned with attributes having sure outcomes, it is con-
sidered a suitable condition for decision making under conditions of certainty. However, if
conditions of uncertainty are present, preferential independence are not quite strong enough; in
such cases a stronger independence condition is required [14].
Utility independence
A stronger independence condition than that of preferential independence is the well-known
condition of utility independence. An attribute X is considered to be utility independent of
attribute Y , if preferences for uncertain choices featuring various levels of outcomes of attribute
X do not depend on the level of outcome of attribute Y [14]. If it can be shown that attribute
Y is also utility independent of attribute X, then the objective corresponding to attributes X
and Y are said to be mutually utility independent.
Example 13 (Continuation of Example 12) Consider the attributes of Example 12 again.
Assume once again that the cost attribute X is fixed at R 200. Suppose that the decision maker’s
CE for having a 50% chance of Y = 10 and a 50% chance of having Y = 20, is assessed at a
value of 15. If the decision maker’s CE for the probability-based outcomes remains unchanged for
various fixed values of X, then Y is considered utility independent of X. If it can be ascertained
that X is also utility independent of Y , then the conclusion can be made that X and Y are
mutually utility independent. 
When a decision maker’s preferences for attributesX and Y exhibit mutual utility independence,
a suitable utility function is the multilinear utility function
u(x, y) = kXuX(x) + kY uY (y) + (1− kX − kY )uX(x)uY (y), (3.11)
where
uX(x) = utility function on X scaled so that uX(x
−) = 0 and uX(x
+) = 1, (3.12)
uY (y) = utility function on Y scaled so that uY (y
−) = 0 and uY (y
+) = 1, (3.13)
kX = u(x
+, y−), (3.14)
kY = u(x
−, y+), (3.15)
where kX and kY represent the scaling constants for attributes X and Y , respectively [14].
The individual utility functions uX(x) and uY (y) are considered to be conditional utility func-
tions, implying that each should be evaluated whilst keeping the outcome of the other fixed at a
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specific value [14]. The last term, (1− kX − kY )uX(x)uY (y), in the multilinear utility function
allows for the modelling of interaction between the attributes. Keeney and Raiffa [33] describes
how the coefficient (1 − kX − kY ) may be used to determine whether attributes X and Y are
complements of or substitutes for each other. High preference values of attributes X and Y
result in high valued conditional utility functions, which will result in a higher overall utility
value u(x, y) if the coefficient (1 − kX − kY ) is positive. Hence, if the coefficient is positive,
attributes X and Y are said to complement each other [14, 33].
However, if the conditional utility values are large and the coefficient (1− kX − kY ) is negative,
this will result in a lower overall utility value u(x, y), implying that attributes X and Y work
against each other [14].
Finally, if one of the conditional utility values are large and the other small, the effect that a
negative coefficient (1 − kX − kY ) may have on the overall utility value may not be that large
as in the case where both conditional utility values are large. This implies that the attributes
X and Y are substitutes.
It can easily be shown that the scaling constants kX and kY are equal to u(x
+, y−) and u(x−, y+),
respectively, by substituting the individual utilities from (3.12) and (3.13) into (3.11). The
interested reader is referred to Clemen and Reilly [14] for a proof of this result.
The notion of utility independence may seem synonymous with the conditions of preferential
independence. However, note that in the case of utility independence, conditions of uncertainty
are included in the assessments. Utility independence may easily be verified by presenting the
decision maker with the lottery shown in Figure 3.20. The level of attribute Y is fixed at a
specific outcome yk and the decision maker is asked to assess CEs for different values of attribute
X. The level of attribute Y is then fixed at a different level of outcome, and the decision maker
is asked to assess CEs for the same set of outcomes of attribute X. The process is repeated
while each time keeping attribute Y fixed at different levels, covering the entire range of possible
values of attribute Y . If each set of assessed CEs are exactly equal to each other, the conclusion
may be drawn that attribute X is utility independent of attribute Y .
0.5
0.5 xi, yk
xj , yk
CE, yk
Figure 3.20: A lottery used to verify whether attribute X is utility independent of attribute Y .
To verify mutual utility independence, the procedure is repeated using a lottery involving dif-
ferent outcomes of attribute Y , whilst repeatedly keeping attribute X fixed at different levels.
If attribute Y is also utility independent of attribute X, the attributes are mutually utility
independent, and the multilinear utility function may be used to present the preferences of the
decision maker.
The question is how many assessments should be carried out before an independence condition
may be assumed? Having too few assessments, may compromise the final results and having too
many assessments may complicate the procedure unnecessarily. Keeney and Raiffa [33] state
that, in practice, a sufficient number of conditions to consider is approximately four spanning
the entire range of possible values of attributes X and Y .
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Additive independence
The final independence condition is the so-called additive independence condition, which is
considered the strongest form of independence amongst the independence conditions. When
additive independence is present, it can be said that changes in lotteries involving attribute X
do not affect preferences for lotteries involving attribute Y [14]. The difference between assessing
additive independence and utility independence is that with additive independence uncertain
outcomes over both attributes are assessed, whereas in utility independence assessment one of
the attributes consists of a sure outcome.
When a decision maker’s preferences for the attributes exhibit additive independence, the utility
function may be taken as the additive utility function
u(x, y) = kXuX(x) + kY uY (y), (3.16)
where uX(x) and uY (y) are the respective individual utility functions for attributes X and Y ,
and kX and kY represent scaling constants associated with attributes X and Y , respectively.
The values of the scaling constants should be greater than zero and they should sum to one
[14]. The best and worst outcomes are again assigned values of one and zero, respectively.
One way of verifying whether additive independence holds, is to first verify whether mutual
utility independence holds for the attributes, since mutual utility independence is a necessary
condition for additive independence [33]. If attributesX and Y are mutually utility independent,
additive independence may be verified by presenting the decision maker with the two lotteries
shown in Figure 3.21.
0.5
0.5
x−, y−
x+, y+
L1
0.5
0.5
x−, y+
x+, y−
L2
Figure 3.21: Two lotteries to verify the condition of additive independence for attributes X and Y .
Lottery L1 represents two possible outcomes which may occur with equal chance, where the
first outcome involves the best outcomes for both attributes and the second outcome involves
the worst outcomes for both attributes. Lottery L2 also involves two possible outcomes which
may occur with equal chance, but the first outcome involves the best and worst outcomes
of attributes X and Y , respectively, while the second outcome involves the worst and best
outcomes of attributes X and Y , respectively. If the decision maker has a clear preference for
either of Lotteries L1 or L2, then additive independence cannot hold [14, 62]. However, if the
decision maker is indifferent between Lotteries L1 and L2, then it is safe to assume additive
independence between attributes X and Y , and the additive utility function may be used to
present the preferences of the decision maker.
Failure to comply with the independence conditions
Although it seems relatively easy to verify the independence conditions described above between
attributes, it is possible that these conditions cannot be verified for certain attributes. The
implication of this is that none of the utility functions discussed can be used as multiobjective
utility functions. However, the preferences of the decision maker still have to be modelled.
Keeney and Raiffa [33] discuss a few options which may be used to address this problem. A
first alternative is to assess the utility values by means of a direct assessment. This involves
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assigning utility values of 1 and 0 to the best (x+, y+) and worst (x−, y−) pairs, respectively,
and assessing utility values of other outcomes by using reference lotteries8.
Another very popular approach is to transform or adjust the attributes of the objectives and
continue the assessment with the new set of attributes in the hope that some of the independence
conditions may be verified by using the new set of attributes. However, if this transformation
procedure is followed, care should be taken that the new set of attributes should still capture
the essence of the problem.
Assessing weights for objectives
All the multiobjective models discussed in this section consist of a scaled addition or a scaled
addition and multiplication of the individual assessed utility functions of the objectives. Keeney
and Raiffa [33] describe a useful technique involving CE assessments to find values for the
scaling constants. The aim is to find as much information with respect to indifferences between
outcomes and lotteries. This information is then used to derive a set of equations in a number
of unknowns, which are solved simultaneously to find values for the scaling constants.
Consider again the multilinear utility function
u(x, y) = kXuX(x) + kY uY (y) + (1− kX − kY )uX(x)uY (y), (3.17)
where u(x+, y−) = kX and u(x
−, y+) = kY . Suppose the decision maker is indifferent between
the outcomes (x1, y1) and (x2, y2). Then it follows by (3.17) that
kXuX(x1) + kY uY (y1) + (1− kX − kY )uX(x1)uY (y1) = kXuX(x2) + kY uY (y2)+
(1− kX − kY )uX(x2)uY (y2). (3.18)
It is assumed that uX(x) and uY (y) have been assessed, implying that equation (3.18) has the
two unknowns kX and kY .
Now suppose that the decision maker is indifferent between a sure outcome (x3, y3) and a
lottery involving an outcome (x1, y1) of occurring with probability p and an outcome (x2, y2) of
occurring with probability (1− p). This implies that
u(x3, y3) = pu(x1, y1) + (1− p)u(x2, y2). (3.19)
By substituting u(x3, y3) into (3.17), and by substituting this together with u(x1, y1) and
u(x2, y2) into (3.19) yields the equation
kXuX(x3) + kY uY (y3) + (1− kX − kY )uX(x3)uY (y3) =
p(kXuX(x1) + kY uY (y1) + (1− kX − kY )uX(x1)uY (y1))+
(1− p)(kXuX(x2) + kY uY (y2) + (1− kX − kY )uX(x2)uY (y2)). (3.20)
Since uX(x) and uY (y) are known, (3.20) also involves the two unknowns kX and kY . Therefore,
(3.18) and (3.20) may be solved simultaneously for the scaling constants kX and kY .
Scaling constants may also be evaluated by using the lottery in Figure 3.22. In this case the
decision maker is asked to provide the probability value p for which he is indifferent to the lottery
A, involving outcomes (x+, y+) with probability p and (x−, y−) with probability (1−p), and the
8Clemen and Reilly [14] discuss such a direct assessment in full detail and the interested reader is referred to
[14] for further detail.
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sure outcome B. By substituting u(x+, y+) and u(x−, y−) into the multilinear utility function,
values of 1 and 0 are obtained, respectively, since u(x+) and u(x−) are assigned utility values
of 1 and 0, respectively. Recall that u(x+, y−) = kX . Since the decision maker is indifferent
between the lottery A and the sure outcome B in Figure 3.22, kX = p(1) + (1 − p)(0) = p.
It may therefore be concluded that the probability which makes the decision maker indifferent
with respect to the lottery A and the sure outcome B in Figure 3.22 is the scaling constant kX
[14, 62].
A
B
p
1− p
x−, y−
x+, y+
x+, y−
Figure 3.22: A lottery used to determine scaling constants for a multiobjective utility function.
It may easily be shown in the same way that the scaling constant kY is the probability p which
makes the decision maker indifferent to the same lottery A in Figure 3.22, but with a different
sure outcome B, of (x−, y+).
Of course, if the attributes are additive independent, the scaling constants kX and kY should
sum to one, as discussed in §3.4. If this is not the case, the reason should be explained to the
decision maker, and the assessment procedure repeated.
3.5 Multiobjective evolutionary algorithms
Although classical multiobjective optimisation approaches, such as the AHP and utility theory,
seem very appealing to use, they have a few disadvantages. Many classical optimisation methods
involve scaling the objectives into a single objective. The problem with such an approach is
that solutions are typically very sensitive to the weights associated with these objectives. This
requires the decision maker to have an in-depth knowledge about the decision problem [17]. In
addition, these methods are subjective in nature, thus depending on the input of a decision
maker, which may lead to inconsistencies, such as a decision maker’s preferences not remaining
constant during the assessment procedure. Therefore consistency tests have to be put into place,
which add on to the already tedious assessment process involved in these approaches.
Moreover, classical optimisation methods focus on finding only one solution in the set of pareto
optimal solutions at a time [3]. This implies that the method has to be repeated for a number
of parameter values in an attempt to find different solutions on the pareto frontier [17].
Multiobjective evolutionary algorithms, which are able to solve problems in a multidimensional
decision space, may be used to address this problem. A distinct characteristic of these algorithms
is that they are able to find multiple solutions on the pareto frontier in one single run [3].
Evolutionary algorithms, as the name suggests, make use of different evolutionary concepts,
also known as operators, to strive to the optimal solution in the solution space. One such evo-
lutionary algorithm is a Genetic Algorithm (GA). A GA performs operations on a population of
solutions to find better solutions. This makes a GA an ideal candidate for solving multiobjective
problems with a view to obtain a number of solutions simultaneously [17].
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An early GA designed for the purpose multiobjective optimisation appeared in 1984 an is due
to Schaffer [17]. Although the implemented algorithm proved to deliver promising results,
it suffered the disadvantage of being biased towards certain solutions on the pareto frontier.
Deb and Srinivas [17] addressed this problem by developing the Nondominated Sorting Genetic
Algorithm (NSGA) which is able to deliver a more thorough distribution of the solutions over
the entire pareto frontier region.
The NSGA is very closely related to a basic GA. The difference between these two optimisation
methods, lies in the way in which the selection process is executed [17]. The remainder of the
operators in the algorithms, such as the crossover and mutation, are the same.
The NSGA is based on the notion of nondominated sorting, as discussed in §3.1.2. This involves
a process where all the solutions in the current population are sorted, based on their nondom-
inated status. The solutions which are classified as nondominated, are considered to form the
first nondominated front [17]. Each solution in the first nondominated front are assigned a
large dummy fitness value. The solutions in this front are then shared with their dummy fitness
value, by means of a sharing function, based on the euclidean distance between solutions. The
sharing method comprise of adjusting the fitness in such a way that more fitness is assigned to
a less crowded region and vica versa. This maintains a level of diversity in the population and
enables the exploitation of different pareto optimal solutions in a single run [18].
After the sharing procedure is complete, the solutions contained in the first nondominated front
are temporarily removed from the population to find the second nondominated front. This
is obtained by following the same procedure, but by assigning a lower dummy fitness value
than the dummy fitness value assigned to solutions in the first nondominated front [18]. Once
the entire population is classified into nondominated fronts, the normal operators of a GA are
applied to reproduce the population, based on the dummy fitness values.
Although the NSGA is often able to provide good results, it has received criticism due to the
high computational complexity of nondominated sorting, its lack of implementing elitism and
the need for specifying a sharing parameter. Deb et al. [3] proposed an improved version of
the NSGA, called the Nondominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II (NSGA II), to address these
problems.
The NSGA II is closely related to the NSGA. The difference is that the NSGA II employs a fast
nondominated sorting procedure, an elitist diversity preservation method, and a parameterless
niching operator [3]. Since the NSGA II is considered a more efficient multiobjective optimi-
sation method than the original NSGA, it is applied to the multiobjective WA problem later
in this thesis. More emphasis will therefore be given to the discussion of the NSGA II in the
following sections. Before the working of the NSGA II is discussed, a few concepts relating to
evolutionary algorithms are reviewed.
3.5.1 Fitness assignment
In evolutionary algorithms, the variables relating to the problem may be represented in what is
called a chromosome, consisting of solution values assigned to variables. Each chromosome is
considered a solution to the problem, and a set of chromosomes representing a set of solutions
to the problem make up what is called a population. Various operators may be performed on
the population to find better solutions.
A measure of effectiveness of a solution is the fitness value. A better solution is one yielding a
higher fitness value. In multiobjective evolutionary algorithms, the notion of pareto dominance
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may be used as a measure of fitness for solutions. Pareto dominance involves calculating the
fitness of a chromosome in relation to other chromosomes contained in the population, based
on a pareto rank criterion. Various dominance criteria exist which may be used in the fitness
assignment. Raad [42] lists three such criteria: dominance count, which is the number of
solutions that a particular solution is dominated by, dominance strength, which is the number
of solutions that a particular solution dominates, and pareto rank, which is the front in which
a solution is contained. The NSGA II uses the pareto rank as a measure of fitness, where a
solution having a lower rank is better than a solution having a higher rank. An illustration
of the pareto rank fitness assignment may be seen in Figure 3.23 for a problem where two
objectives, f1(x) and f2(x), are to be minimised.
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
f2(x)
f 1
(x
)
Figure 3.23: Illustration of the pareto rank fitness used in the NSGA II.
3.5.2 Diversity preservation
One goal of multiobjective evolutionary algorithms is to provide a number of diverse solutions
which are uniformly distributed across the pareto frontier. This may be achieved by using
information relating to the density of solutions in the objective space [12, 42]. The aim is to
favor solutions in less crowded regions of the solutions space, in an attempt to achieve a more
thorough search of the solution space [42]. Diversity preservation may be achieved by a number
of existing methods, such as fitness sharing (which was implemented in the original NSGA),
crowding, restricted mating and relaxed domination [12].
The density measure utilised in the NSGA II, is called crowding, which makes use of the distances
between solutions. The crowding distance of a solution may be calculated by taking the average
distance of its two closest neighboring solutions along each objective axis or direction. Hence,
the crowding distance may be seen as the perimeter of the cuboid formed by the neighboring
solutions [3]. To calculate the crowding distance requires the sorting of the solutions in ascending
order of magnitude along each objective axis. Each side of a solution’s neighborhood cuboid
represents the distance from a solution to its two neighboring solutions. After normalising
these distances, the crowding distance may be calculated by adding together the sides of the
cuboid. The reason for normalising the distances, is to prevent differences in magnitude from the
objective function values of the solutions [42]. Since solutions with higher crowding distances
are more isolated, they are more preferred to solutions with smaller crowding distances. An
example of the crowding distance of a solution in an objective space consisting of two objectives,
f1(x) and f2(x) which are to be minimised, may be seen in Figure 3.24.
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i
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f2(x)
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)
Figure 3.24: Illustration of the cuboid formed around a solution which is used in the calculation of its
crowding distance.
3.5.3 Selection
In evolutionary algorithms a process called selection is applied to parent solutions in the popu-
lation. Selection involves selecting parent solutions from the population to form a mating pool
with the aim of choosing solutions which have a better fitness values. The solutions contained
in the mating pool are then used to generate child solutions.
One parameter in the selection process, which may be used to favor better solutions, is the
selection pressure. The selection pressure may be seen as a means of improving the popula-
tion fitness over succeeding generations. Hence, the selection pressure has an impact on the
convergence rate of the algorithm [24]. An increased selection pressure will result in favoring
solutions having higher fitness values, which may result in a higher convergence rate. However,
it should be noted that the value of selection pressure should be chosen carefully as a high se-
lection pressure may result in the algorithm converging prematurely to a sub-optimal solution,
while a low selection pressure may result in unnecessarily slowing down the convergence rate
of the algorithm [24]. Various selection procedures exist which may be used in evolutionary
algorithms, including fitness proportion selection, truncation selection or tournament selection
and the interested reader is referred to [58] for a discussion on the workings of these selection
procedures.
It is important to include some form of elitism in the selection procedure. Incorporating elitism
into the selection procedure ensures that the best solutions in the current generation are trans-
fered to the next generation [16].
The selection procedure employed in the NSGA II is a binary tournament selection. Tournament
selection consists of hosting a tournament among n solutions. The solution having the largest
fitness value in the tournament, is considered the winner, and is included into the mating pool.
The selection pressure in tournament selection is represented by the value of n, called the size
of the tournament. An increased value of n will yield an increase in the selection pressure. The
reason for this is that the fitness of the winner of a larger tournament will, on average, have a
higher fitness than the winner of a smaller tournament [24]. It is recommended in [38] that the
selection pressure in the NSGA II may be varied between a value of two and five.
The selection procedure in the NSGA II works in such a way that parent solutions having lower
ranks are chosen. If two solutions have the same rank value, the solution having the largest
crowding distance is chosen [42]. After child solutions have been created, the parent and child
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solutions are combined into a larger population of size 2N . The solutions contained in this
larger population are ranked and sorted, and the crowding distance is recalculated for each
solution. The selection procedure is then applied in an elitist manner by selecting solutions
having rank 1 first, solutions having rank 2 secondly, etc. until the population size N is reached.
3.5.4 Crossover and mutation
Once the selection process is complete, the parent solutions are used to create child solutions
by using two common GA operators known as crossover and mutation. Although the selection
process already aims to select solutions with the best fitness values, crossover and mutation
aims to further explore the solution space in an attempt to find other solutions with better
fitness values [42].
Various types of crossover and mutation operators exist, and the type of operator and implemen-
tation thereof depends largely on the specific problem at hand, as well as the solution encoding
of the variables associated with the problem [31].
Crossover is the process of combining more than one parent solution to create child solutions.
The crossover process is stochastic and is hence associated with a probability value of occurring.
The crossover probability is usually set to a high value, since crossover is considered an essential
concept of introducing variation in the population [16, 42]. Crossover techniques which may be
used include single point crossover, two point crossover, cut and splice, and uniform crossover
[53]. The NSGA II implements a single point crossover for binary coded solutions and a sim-
ulated binary crossover for real coded solutions [3]. Since the NSGA II employed later in this
thesis consists of binary coded solutions, only the single point crossover operator is explained
here. The interested reader is referred to [53] for a discussion on other crossover techniques.
The single point crossover consists of uniformly selecting a single point along the parent solutions
and slicing the solutions at this point. Child solutions are obtained by swapping the parent
solutions beyond this point. An example of a single point crossover may be seen in Figure 3.25.
Parent 1
Parent 2
Child 2
Child 1
Crossover point
Figure 3.25: Illustration of a single point crossover.
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Mutation consists of randomly altering the value of one or more of the entries in a solution from
its original state. The aim of mutation is to diversify the solutions in an attempt to explore new
regions of the search space so as to hopefully find better solutions [56, 42]. Mutation techniques
which may be used include bitwise mutation, flip bit mutation, uniform mutation and gaussian
mutation [56]. The interested reader is referred to [56] for a discussion on the these mutation
techniques.
0 0 0 01 1 1 1
0 0 01 1 1 11Child after mutation
Child before mutation
Figure 3.26: Illustration of a bitwise mutation.
The NSGA II implements bitwise mutation, which is usually implemented in problems with
binary coded solutions. Bitwise mutation works in such a way that bit values (values of variables
in the solution) are flipped from 0 to 1 and vice versa with a mutation probability. The mutation
probability is usually set at the low value 1/`, where ` is the number of variables in the solution,
since a large mutation probability may turn the GA into a random search algorithm [16, 42].
An example of a bitwise mutation may be seen in Figure 3.26.
3.5.5 The NSGA II
The first step in the NSGA II is to rank and sort the solutions in a population of size N . This
may be achieved by using the Fast Nondominated Sorting Algorithm (FNSA) [42] which has a
computational complexity of O(MN2), where M denotes the number of objectives. For each
solution i, a dominance count dci (the number of solutions which dominate i), and Si, the set
of solutions that i dominates, are calculated. This requires O(MN2) comparisons [3, 42]. All
solutions contained in the first nondominated front will have dci = 0, and are assigned rank 1.
The solutions having dci = 0 are placed in a separate set F1. For each i in F1, the algorithm
cycles through each solution j in Si, and decrements its d
c
j value by one, thus discounting the
effect of i on j’s dominance count [42]. The dominance count of all the rank 2 solutions now have
dci = 0, and are placed in a separate set F2, for the algorithm to cycle through. The algorithm
continues in this fashion until all the solutions are partitioned into ranks. A pseudocode listing
of the FNSA is presented as Algorithm 3.1.
The next step in the NSGA II is to calculate the crowding distance density measure. This
requires the population to be sorted in ascending order of magnitude along each objective axis.
Assume that the number of solutions in a population is denoted by k, and that the objective
function value of the ith solution for the hth objective function (in the sorted list) is represented
by X[i]|h. A crowding distance idist of infinity is assigned to the boundary solutions, that is
the solutions X[1]|h and X[k]|h, so as to ensure that they are selected [42]. The crowding
distances of the intermediate solutions i are incremented by the normalised distance between
their closest neighboring solutions [3, 42]. The normalised distance value may be calculated as
idist|h+(X[i+1]|h−X[i−1]|h)/(hmax−hmin). The overall crowding distance for each objective
is seen as the accumulated value of crowding distances of the individual solutions. The crowding
distances may now be applied to determine the solution density [42]. A higher value indicates
that a solution is more isolated, and a lower value implies that a solution is more crowded by
other solutions [3]. A pseudocode listing of the crowding distance procedure is presented as
Algorithm 3.2.
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A crowding distance operator ≺c is employed during the selection process of the algorithm. This
operator specifies that a more favorable solution between a pair of solutions denoted by (i ≺c j)
is the one having the lowest rank, that is irank < jrank. If the solutions reside within the same
front, then the solution with the higher crowding distance is chosen as the more favorable one.
That is, if irank = jrank, then idist > jdist. In this way, more solutions are explored in less
crowded regions of the solution space, which may lead to an approximately uniformly spaced
pareto optimal frontier [3, 42].
Algorithm 3.1: Fast Nondominated Sorting Algorithm [42].
Input: A population of solutions P , where a solution i in P represents an assignment of
values to decision variables x, and a vector z containing the objective function
values for each solution i.
Output: The set of fronts Fm containing the nondominated solutions for each front.
1 F1 ← ∅
2 forall the i ∈ P do
3 Si ← ∅
4 dc
i
= 0
5 forall the j ∈ P do
6 if i ≺ j then
7 Si ← Si ∪ {j}
8 else if j ≺ i then
9 dc
i
← dc
i
+ 1
10 end
11 end
12 if dc
i
= 0 then
13 irank ← 1
14 F1 ← F1 ∪ {i}
15 end
16 end
17 m← 1
18 while Fm 6= ∅ do
19 A ← ∅
20 forall the i ∈ Fm do
21 forall the j ∈ Si do
22 dc
j
← dc
j
− 1
23 if dc
j
= 0 then
24 jrank ← m+ 1
25 A ← A∪ {j}
26 end
27 end
28 end
29 m← m+ 1
30 Fm ← A
31 end
The main NSGA II procedure may now commence by generating an initial population P 0 ran-
domly. P 0 is sorted and ranked into fronts, by applying the FNSA. Crowding distances are
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then calculated for each solution in P 0 and a new population Q0 is created by performing
binary tournament selection on P 0, and applying the crowded comparison, crossover and mu-
tation operators. Once the initial population P 0 and the first generation Q0 is obtained, the
generation counter t is set to one, and the remainder of the algorithm is iterated until the
generation counter reaches a maximum value of t = Gmax, where Gmax denotes the number of
iterations [3, 42].
During each iteration or generation, the parent and child solutions are combined to form a
population Rt = P t ∪Qt of size 2N . The combined population Rt, is then sorted and ranked
into nondominated fronts by applying the FNSA. The new population P t+1 is created next by
adding the solutions in the first front F1, the second front F2, and so forth until the population
size N is reached. If all the solutions in the next front cannot be included in P t+1, the solutions
in that front are sorted in descending order with respect to their crowding distance, and the
solutions are added to P t+1 until a population size of N is reached [3, 42].
Once P t+1 has been created, a crowding distance is calculated for each solution in P t+1. A new
population Qt+1 is then created by performing binary tournament selection on the solutions
in P t+1 to select solutions based on the crowding distance operator ≺c, and applying the
crossover and mutation operators on the selected solutions. Crossover may be performed by
means of a single point crossover for binary coded solutions, and the simulated binary crossover
for real-coded solutions, whilst mutation may be performed by means of bitwise mutation. As
mentioned, the mutation probability is taken as 1/`, where ` denotes the number of variables
in the solution [3]. A pseudocode listing of the NSGA II is represented as Algorithm 3.3, and
an illustration of the operation of the NSGA II is shown in Figure 3.27.
F3
F2
F1
Rejected
Rejected
Pt+1Pt
Qt
Rt
Nondominated sorting sorting
Crowding distance
Figure 3.27: The procedures followed in the NSGA II [12].
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Algorithm 3.2: Crowding Distance Assignment Algorithm [42].
Input: The population of solutions P , and a vector z containing each of the objective
function’s values for each solution.
Output: The crowding distance P [i]dist for each solution in P .
1 k = |P |
2 forall the i ∈ P do
3 P [i]dist ← 0
4 end
5 forall the M objectives do
6 P = sort(P , h)
7 P [1]dist|h←∞
8 P [k]dist|h←∞
9 forall the i = 2 to (k − 1) do
10 P [i]dist|h← P [i]dist|h+ (P [i+ 1]|h − P [i− 1]|h)/(hmax − hmin)
11 end
12 end
Algorithm 3.3: Nondominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II [42].
Input: A multiobjective problem with variables x and a number of objective functions M ,
a vector z containing values for each of the objective functions, a set of constraints
and constraint violation functions, the size of the population N , and the maximum
number of generations Gmax.
Output: An approximation of the set of pareto optimal solutions in the multi objective
space W∗.
1 Generate an initial solution P 0 of size N randomly.
2 Rank and sort P 0 by using the FNSA [Algorithm 3.1].
3 Calculate the crowding distance for each solution in P 0 by using crowding distance
assignment algorithm [Algorithm 3.2].
4 Create child population Q0 of size N by using binary tournament selection based on the
crowding distance operator ≺c from P 0, and performing crossover and mutation.
5 t← 0 while t < Gmax do
6 Rt ← P t ∪Qt
7 Rank and sort Rt into fronts F1,F2, . . . by using FNSA.
8 P t+1 ← ∅ and m← 1
9 while |P t+1| < N do
10 if |Fm|+ |P t+1| <= N then
11 P t+1 ← P t+1 ∪ Fm
12 else if |Fm|+ |P t+1| > N then
13 Calculate the crowding distance for each solution in Fm.
14 Sort the solutions in Fm in descending order, based on crowding distance.
15 P t+1 ← P t+1∪ [the first (N − |P t+1|) solutions in Fm]
16 end
17 m← m+ 1
18 end
19 Calculate crowding distance for each solution in P t+1.
20 Create child population Qt+1 by using binary tournament selection based on the
crowding distance operator ≺c, crossover and mutation.
21 t← t+ 1
22 end
23 W∗ = PGmax
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.6. Chapter summary 59
For constrained optimisation problems, Deb et al. [3] propose a constraint handling approach
for the NSGA II. In this approach, the manner in which domination is defined between two
solutions i and j is modified. From [3], solution i is said to dominate solution j if:
1. Solution i and j are both feasible, and solution i dominates solution j (i.e. i ≺c j), or
2. Solution i is feasible and solution j is infeasible, or
3. Solution i and j are both infeasible, and solution i has the smallest overall constraint
violation.
The remainder of the procedures contained in the NSGA II remain unchanged and may be
applied as usual for constrained optimisation problems. In order to obtain the smallest overall
constraint violation, the constraint violations have to be normalised and summed [42]. Since
the multiobjective optimisation problem posed later in this thesis does not involve constrained
optimisation, this topic will not be discussed further. The interested reader is referred to Raad
[42] or to Deb et al. [3] for a further discussion on constrained optimisation.
3.6 Chapter summary
The purpose of this chapter was to provide the reader with sufficient information from the litera-
ture to understand the concept of multiobjective decision making as well as certain approaches
which may be used to solve these problems. This was achieved by discussing multiobjective
decision analysis in §3.1 and further discussing three approaches to solve these problems with.
The workings of the AHP were discussed in §3.2, which were followed by a comprehensive
discussion on unidimensional utility theory in §3.3. This was followed by guidelines to assess
unidimensional utility functions in §3.4, as well as techniques to assess values for the scaling
constants in multiobjective utility theory.
The chapter concluded with an introduction to evolutionary algorithms and a discussion on the
NSGA II in §3.5 which was specifically developed for multiobjective decision making problems.
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This chapter contains the application of the methodologies discussed in Chapter 3. In § 4.1 a
method is proposed to identify possible objectives in WA. The implementation of the method is
discussed and the results presented. The section concludes with the formulation of a bi-objective
WA model. In § 4.2 a comprehensive discussion on a scenario imitating a real-world GBADS
scenario is found, which is used later in the solving of the proposed model.
This is followed by a first multiobjective decision making approach towards the bi-objective
WA model in §4.3. The section contains a discussion on the procedures involved during the
assessment of the score values for the WS-threat pairs, with respect to each time step, as well
as the proposal of a AHP assignment model, which may be useful in the assignment of WSs to
threats when considering the score values obtained with the AHP.
A utility approach is considered as a next multiobjective decision making approach towards WA
in § 4.4. The assessments with respect to the qualitative characteristics as well as the quantita-
tive utility values is discussed, with respect to each objective. This is followed by a description
of obtaining scaling constants for each of the respective objectives. The section concludes with
a proposal of a utility assignment model, which may be useful in the assignment of WSs to
threats when considering the utility values obtained by the bi-objective utility function.
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Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion on the computer implemented NSGA II in § 4.5.
The section includes an interpretation of the input as well as output data, and a description of
the genetic operators utilised in the NSGA II.
4.1 Identifying objectives from a WA perspective
The first step in approaching any decision making problem, whether single objective or mul-
tiobjective, is to identify the complete set of objectives which forms the core of the decision
problem. As explained in § 3.1, this may be achieved by incorporating the help of a decision
analyst whose primary goal is to interview the decision maker in an attempt to extract impor-
tant information from the decision maker which may lead to the establishment of fundamental
objectives.
The first step in modelling the WA problem as a multiobjective decision problem is therefore to
identify the objectives deemed important in the choice of which WSs to assign to which threats.
This requires the identification of an individual or group who will act as the decision maker
during the assessment procedure. From a military perspective, it is difficult to isolate a single
individual who may act as the sole decision maker in the matter of WA; it seems more desirable
to identify a number of military experts, residing within the South African military domain,
who will collectively act as the decision maker. This is expected to yield a more comprehensive
set of objectives with respect to WA.
An ideal approach for the extraction of objectives is to host an interactive workshop presented
by an analyst, where interaction between the analyst and the decision making group, and more
importantly between the members of the decision making group, is made possible, where ideas
and different perspectives of these members may be integrated so as to obtain a final set of
objectives. Techniques such as the Delphi method or Post-it sessions as discussed in §3.1.4, may
be implemented to facilitate such a workshop. However, due to time constraints and limitations
posed by the geographic placement of these individuals, conducting such an interactive workshop
was not a viable option. An alternative is to conduct the objective extraction process by means
of an electronic questionnaire or survey, which requires completion by each military expert
in the decision making group. A survey, consisting of a set of questions relating to various
possible factors which may influence the choice of WSs to assign to threats, was devised for this
purpose. Since there are only a small number of military experts in the South African defense
force, military expert Visser was asked to help with the identification of military experts. This
process involved military expert Visser to contact the head of staff of the South African defense
force. Five military experts, who are unknown to the author, were identified by Visser [50] and
the head of staff of the South African defense force to participate in such a survey. Due to
the sensitivity of the military environment, the survey was completed anonymously by the five
military experts and hence, the author was not able to do a follow-up on no responses from the
military experts.
A first attempt in preparing the survey was to employ the techniques and questions proposed
by Keeney [32], as discussed in §3.1.4. A first-order WA survey, based on these techniques, gave
rise to the following set of questions:
1. What are your expectations with respect to the outcome in a situation where you have to
assign a WS to a threat, and why is this important?
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
4.1. Identifying objectives from a WA perspective 63
2. What process do you follow in a situation where you have to decide which WS to assign
to a threat, and why is it important?
3. What are the expectations of your superiors in a situation where a WS needs to be assigned
to a threat, and why do you think it is important?
4. What would you say are your ultimate objectives when assigning a WS to a threat? What
are your values that are absolutely fundamental when assigning a WS? Why do you think
these objectives are important and what is meant by each of them?
5. Are any constraints placed on you when deciding which WS to assign to a threat? What
are these constraints and which constraints are the most important?
6. Imagine that you are in the shoes of your enemy. What would you be concerned about in
a WA situation and why would you be concerned about this?
7. Based on your experience, what other aspects, which are not included in the current
process of deciding which WS to assign to a threat, do you think should be included in
the evaluation process in order to make a better assignment decision?
8. If a WS (WS1) is chosen to be assigned to a threat, what aspects/criteria of an alternative
WS (WS2), would make you change your decision from WS1 to WS2?
9. From a WS-target assignment perspective, what aspects/criteria of a WS would make it a
successful candidate for an assignment? Why do you think these aspects are important?
10. How would you describe WS efficiency? Please motivate your answer by explaining what
is meant and stating why you think it is important.
11. What environmental constraints do you think are important in a WA situation and why
are they important? Explain what is meant by these constraints.
12. What social constraints do you think are important in a WA situation and why are they
important? Explain what is meant by these constraints.
13. Do you think cost elements should be considered in the WA choice? Please motivate your
answer. If yes, please state these elements and explain what is meant by each and why
you think they are important.
14. What other economic objectives do you think are important in a WA situation and why
are they important? Explain what is meant by these objectives.
15. What health and safety objectives regarding your own crew, do you think are important in
a WA situation and why are they important? Explain what is meant by these objectives.
16. Which factors would you say should be included in the WA evaluation, and why are they
important?
After consulting with TEWA experts Potgieter [41], Roux [44] and military expert Visser [50],
the conclusion was drawn that the questions above are well suited for an interactive workshop,
where decision makers are in a position to ask questions and discuss different opinions amongst
one another. However, due to the lack of communication with other members of the decision
making group, and possible misconceptions in terms of terminology (which may lead to confusion
and frustration on the decision makers’ side), it was advised that this questionnaire is not
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suited for electronic circulation, and it was decided to revise the survey. A survey which is
able to lead the decision making group towards possible objectives may be more appropriate for
decision makers with a military background who are not able to interact with one another during
the extraction process. This may also result in a smoother execution of a survey conducted
electronically.
In order to be able to lead the decision maker towards appropriate objectives a thorough search
is required for factors which arise in existing WA procedures. An extensive list of such factors
was compiled from material found in the literature and suggestions posed by Potgieter [41] and
Roux [44]. These factors are contained in Table 4.1.
Possible factors
Accessibility of a WS Lethality of a WS
Ammunition cost Maintainability of a WS
Ammunition inventory Maneuverability of a WS
Area covered by a WS Manpower required to operate a WS
Availability of a WS Payload of a WS
Compatibility of a WS with respect to other WSs Range of a WS
Cognitive experience of a WS operator Reliability of a WS
Cognitive ranking of a WS operator Safety of the crew operating a WS
Collateral damage and cost of a WS assignment SSHP of a WS
Cost of deploying and operating a WS Susceptibility of a WS
Diameter of a WS Survivability of a WS under attack
WS Downtime during reloading Transportability of a WS
Effectiveness of a WS Velocity of a WS’s ammunition
Environmental influence on a WS Vulnerability of a WS
Environmental influence on sensors Weight of a WS
Ground area required by a WS
Interoperability of a WS with respect to other WSs
Table 4.1: A list of possible factors which may influence the choice of WS to assign to a threat
[8, 10, 41, 44].
The aim of the survey is thus to extract information about factors similar to those presented in
Table 4.1 for use in the identification of possible WA objectives.
A second survey was therefore developed, including questions based on a GBADS scenario
imitating aerial attacks by threats. The reason for developing a scenario-based survey is that it
was anticipated that the military experts may relate easier to the questions if they were presented
together with a graphical illustration. The questionnaire was kept simple and the completion
process was therefore simplified. It was also expected that the military experts might find the
scenario context more appealing, which could result in a positive attitude towards the survey,
in turn, having a positive impact on the quality of responses obtained.
The second survey consists of four characteristic-specific scenarios, with a set of questions re-
lating to each scenario. Each scenario consists of one DA requiring protection from one of three
possible WSs (i.e. a CIWS, a SHORAD and a VSHORAD), deployed in parallel. The aim
of using only one of each WS is to avoid unnecessary clutter in the questionnaire, and more
importantly to encourage the military experts to think hard about why one WS may be more
appropriate to assign to a threat than another. Variation in the scenarios included different sur-
rounding terrain features (i.e. flat earth surfaces as well as mountain ranges), different weather
conditions (i.e. sunny, rainy, windy), single as well as multiple threats approaching DAs, dif-
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ferent velocities at which threats travel and the assignments of WSs at varying distances from
DAs.
The majority of the questions required the military experts to make a choice between three
possible WSs to assign to the approaching threat or threats, located at various distances from
the WSs. They also had the opportunity to not assign any WSs at that given moment, implying
that the threat may be addressed at a later stage. The questions related to the choice between
WSs were followed by a question where the military experts were required to explain their
decisions. These explanatory answers may form part of the core purpose of the survey, since it
is here where the valuable information is typically provided. The reasoning behind the decision
may lead to the identification of further factors in the choice of WS to assign. The complete
final survey may be found in Appendix A.1 at the end of the thesis.
The final electronic version of the survey restricted the military experts to alter only their
choice of WS by selecting between respective radio buttons, and to insert text inside pre-
specified text boxes at the explanatory questions. This was achieved by means of Microsoft
Word [39]. An electronic copy of the restricted version of the survey may be found on the
compact disc accompanying this thesis. It is located in the directory named WA survey and
labeled WA restricted survey.docx. The survey was distributed via electronic mail to the
various military experts.
After approximately two weeks, feedback was received from three of the five military experts to
whom the second survey was sent. The feedback from the fourth military expert was incomplete
(it only consisted of a set of general comments), while no feedback was received from the last
military expert. The feedback from the surveys is summarised in Tables A.1–A.5, which may
be found in Appendix A.2 at the end of the thesis.
Ability to engage behind obstacles Night fight/fire capability
All weather capability Reaction times of WSs
Available ammunition Speed of WS ammunition
Cost of ammunition SSHP
Effective ranges of WSs Terrain features
Line of sight Vertical launch capability
Multiple engagements Weather conditions
Table 4.2: A list of possible factors with respect to WSs which may influence the choice of assignment
in the WA process, obtained from the WA survey.
After examining the responses from the survey, a list of possible factors which may influence
the choice of WS to assign to a threat was compiled and this list is presented in Table 4.2.
It is evident from Table 4.2 that there are two overarching objectives, that is to maximise
the efficiency of the WSs assigned and to minimise the cost of assignment. The only factor
contributing to the cost of WSs, is the cost of ammunition. Factors contributing to the efficiency
of WSs include the range of a WS, with respect to a threat, the SSHP of a WS, the reaction
time of a WS, and the available ammunition of a WS. A few other factors, such as weather
conditions, effective ranges and terrain features, may be used to filter the SSHP information in
order to populate the EEM.
Due to the lack of more reliable information, it was decided to develop a multiobjective WA
model with at most two conflicting objectives, for illustrative purposes. The first objective
aims to maximise the overall assignment efficiency by using the SSHP values of WSs, whereas
the second objective aims to minimise the overall cost of WSs assigned, by using the cost of
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ammunition in Rand value. These objectives are conflicting in the sense that when assigning
more WSs to a threat, the expected result is a higher overall assignment efficiency, but this
will, in turn, result in a higher overall assignment cost. Hence, the aim is to find an acceptable
trade-off between the cost and efficiency of WSs assigned.
The k-WA model from Ahuja et. al. [4] served as a point of departure for the model adopted
here. The first objective remains the same as in the original k-WA model formulation, that is to
maximise the weighted expected damage caused to threats by the assignment. This is achievable
by minimising the survival probabilities, qij, of the threats, weighted by the respective threat
priorities, Vj .
The second objective aims to minimise the total cost of all the WSs assigned. Denote the cost
of using WSi by Ci, and define the decision variable xij as a binary variable taking a value of
one if WS i is assigned to threat j, or zero otherwise. The objectives are then to
minimise
nt∑
j=1
Vj
nw∏
i=1
q
xij
ij , (4.1)
minimise
nw∑
i=1
Ci
nt∑
j=1
xij ,
subject to the constraints
nt∑
j=1
xij ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , nw (4.2)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , nw (4.3)
j = 1, . . . , nt, (4.4)
where nt and nw represent the number of threats and WSs, respectively. The formulation is
constrained by the assumption that a WS may only be assigned to one threat at a time (multiple
engagements by a single WS is deemed impossible). However, the number of WSs assigned to
a threat is unlimited. A further assumption is that an unlimited amount of funds are available
for the assignment of WSs.
Due to the fact that the above model considers only a single time step at a time, a reasonable
assumption is that the time steps are independent of one another, and that a WS may only
be considered for an assignment for the duration of one time step. This implies that a WS is
available for an assignment at each time step. Furthermore, the assignments at a current time
instance is not affected by past time instances or does not affect possible future assignments.
4.2 A comprehensive working scenario
The working of the model (4.1)–(4.4) is illustrated by means of a simulated, but realistic GBADS
scenario, analysed by Van der Merwe [49]. The scenario mimics a typical GBADS deployment
consisting of twelve ground-based WSs providing possible protection to two DAs (represented
by the black squares in Figure 4.1), DA1 and DA2, respectively.
The twelve WSs deployed in the scenario, consist of eight VSHORADs (labelled V1, . . . , V8,
respectively), comprising a middle layer of protection, and four CIWSs (labelled C1, C2, C5, C4,
respectively), comprising an inner layer of protection. The WSs are deployed in evenly spaced
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concentric circle formations around the DAs, so that the distance from a WS to the DAs is
approximately half the distance of the effective range of the various WSs. According to military
expert Visser [50], the reason for this close deployment, is to enable WSs to be turned around in
a situation where threats may approach from the opposite directions. Nevertheless, a graphical
illustration of the deployment of the WSs may be seen in Figure 4.1, where the effective ranges
of the VSHORADs and CWISs are represented by the blue and red arcs, respectively. The WSs
are each labelled on their respective range arcs to avoid clutter in the center of the figure.
N
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VSHORAD WS
CIWS
V3
DA1
DA2
V2
V1
V8
V7
V6
V4
C4
C1C3
C2
V5
1
7
k
m
Figure 4.1: The full deployment of WSs with their respective effective ranges.
Five detected aircraft (labelled T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, respectively) act as possible threats to the DAs.
They approach the deployment area in a formation of three groups at different time steps. The
first group consists of threats one and two (T1 and T2, respectively), the second group consists
of threats three and four (T3 and T4, respectively) and finally threat five (T5) is unaccompanied.
Threats T1 and T2 enter the defended airspace from the north-west and attack DA2 using a
so-called pitch-and-dive technique. They fly in a straight line, approaching at low altitude and
initially their flight paths do not cross the DAs, until they are at a distance of approximately
7 500m from DA1. Both of them pitch and turn in to DA2 to dive straight onto DA2. Their
ammunition is delivered at an approximate distance of 800m from DA2 [40].
Threats T3 and T4 act as decoys and enter the area from the south-west, flying exactly over the
DAs at high altitude (4 400m), whilst maintaining a constant speed of approximately 250ms−1
until they exit towards the north-east of the DAs.
Threat T5 enters from the south-west and attacks DA2 using the so-called toss bomb technique.
It enters the area in Figure 4.2 in a straight line which does not intersect the DAs. It turns in
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towards DA2 (to the left) at an approximate distance of 9 000m from DA2 to release a bomb at
an approximate distance of 8 000m, from where it exits the system in a south-westerly direction
[40]. The five threats, together with an approximation of their respective tracks may be seen in
Figure 4.2.
T2
DA1
T3
T4
T5
T1
4
5
k
m DA2
DA
VSHORADS WS
CIWS
Threat flight path
N
Figure 4.2: The scenario.
The time continuum of the scenario is subdivided into tα shorter time steps, each having a
duration of four seconds, because the sensors utilised for detection refresh the air picture every
four seconds to give an update on the current position of the threats. Since the proposed
models from previous sections consider only a single time step at a time, and the time steps are
independent of one another, it is redundant to solve the scenario over the entire time continuum.
Hence, only time steps t20, t35 and t39 are considered. These time steps were chosen for their
diversity, and an approximation of the location of the threats at each of these respective time
steps may be seen in Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5.
It is assumed that the TE process has been completed and that threat values have been evaluated
for each of the threats at each time step. The output received from the TE subsystem is in the
form of a combined threat list, and the evaluated threat lists for time steps t20, t35 and t39 may
be found in Table 4.3.
Threat t20 t35 t39
T1 0.04 0.91 0.99
T2 0.05 0.94 1
T3 0.91 0.96 0.76
T4 0.92 0.95 0.74
T5 0.06 1 0.5
Table 4.3: The threat values of threats T1, . . . , T5 for time steps t20, t35 and t39.
The efficiencies of the WSs are all contained in the EEM and an EEMtα instance, of the EEM,
is generated for each time step tα. Terrain features and weather conditions are ignored and
hence the EEM matrices are not filtered for any terrain or environmental conditions. The EEM
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Figure 4.3: The locations of threats T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5 at time step t20.
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Figure 4.4: The locations of threats T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5 at time step t35.
therefore contains only SSHP information. The EEM instances for EEMt20 , EEMt35 and EEMt39
are shown in Table 4.4.
Finally, it is assumed that the cost of assigning a WS to a threat comprises of only the cost of
a single burst of ammunition of that specific WS. After consulting with Visser [50], it is safe to
assume that the cost of a VSHORAD is approximately R 1 000 000, while the cost of a CIWS is
approximately R 34 000.
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Figure 4.5: The locations of threats T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5 at time step t39.
4.3 The analytic hierarchy process in WA
The AHP assessment procedure requires the input of a decision maker whose main responsibility
is to make pairwise comparisons between the different objectives, to obtain weights for each
objective, as well as pairwise comparisons between different alternatives with respect to each
objective, and to obtain score values for each alternative with respect to each objective. This
assessment procedure was carried out by the author together with military expert Visser [50],
who will be referred to as the decision maker in the remainder of this chapter.
The two objectives which were considered during the AHP assessment, is to maximise the SSHP
of WSs assigned and to minimise the cost of WSs assigned. The assumptions are made that
a WS may only be assigned to one threat at each time step and that only one WS may be
assigned to a threat at each time step.
After explaining the AHP process to the decision maker, the first step involved the assessment
of appropriate weights for each of the objectives. This was achieved by asking the decision
maker to complete a pairwise comparison matrix containing the cost and SSHP objectives as
presented in Table 4.5.
After careful consideration, the decision maker concluded that SSHP is absolutely more impor-
tant than cost and by using the index values from Table 3.2, a corresponding value of 9 was
obtained when comparing the SSHP to cost. Hence, when comparing the cost to the SSHP, a
value of 19 is obtained, which completes the pairwise comparison matrix, yielding the matrix in
Table 4.6.
After normalising the matrix in Table 4.6 and taking the average of each row, respectively,
weights of 0.9 and 0.1 were obtained for the SSHP and the cost objective, respectively. This
indicates that the SSHP objective is considered significantly more important than the cost
objective, which is also evident in the feedback obtained from the WA surveys. Since there are
only two objectives, only one comparison is involved, which is considered consistent.
The next step was to calculate score values for each of the alternatives with respect to each
objective. In view of the scenario described in §4.2, the AHP procedure has to be carried out
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V1
V2
V3
V4
V5
V6
V7
V8
C1
C2
C3
C4
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.5 0
0 0 0.1 0.1 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.1 0.1 0
0 0 0 0 0
EEMt20
V1
V2
V3
V4
V5
V6
V7
V8
C1
C2
C3
C4
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
0 0 0.1 0.5 0
0 0 0.3 0.1 0
0.1 0.5 0 0 0
0.1 0.5 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0.2 0.3 0 0 0
0 0.1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
EEMt35
V1
V2
V3
V4
V5
V6
V7
V8
C1
C2
C3
C4
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
0 0 0.1 0.1 0
0.7 0 0.5 0.5 0
0.1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.1
0 0 0 0 0.5
0 0 0 0 0
0.2 0.4 0 0 0
0.5 0.9 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
EEMt39
Table 4.4: The EEMs for time steps t20, t35 and t39 respectively.
Objectives SSHP Cost
SSHP 1
Cost 1
Table 4.5: A pairwise comparison matrix for the cost and SSHP objectives.
Objectives SSHP Cost
SSHP 1 9
Cost 1/9 1
Table 4.6: The complete pairwise comparison matrix for the cost and SSHP objectives.
for each WS-threat pair for each time step tα. Instead of bothering the decision maker with the
assessment of individual pairwise comparison matrices for each WS-threat pair for each time
step, a general pairwise comparison imitating a general index for each objective was developed,
which may be used to simplify future comparisons of WS-threat pairs.
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To find such an index pairwise comparison matrix, the decision maker was asked to complete
the pairwise comparison matrix in Table 4.7, consisting of eleven possible WSs with different
SSHP values, covering the entire range of possible SSHP values. If, for example, a pairwise
comparison is sought for a WS involving a SSHP value of 0.1 and a WS involving a SSHP value
of 0.8, the value may be obtained from the completed version of Table 4.7, by using the value
corresponding to the WSs involving these SSHP values. In this way, the completed version of
Table 4.7 may be used to make comparisons between WSs with respect to the SSHP objective,
without asking the decision maker to complete such a matrix each time.
WSj 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
WSi SSHP 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
1 0 1
2 0.1 1
3 0.2 1
4 0.3 1
5 0.4 1
6 0.5 1
7 0.6 1
8 0.7 1
9 0.8 1
10 0.9 1
11 1 1
Table 4.7: A pairwise comparison matrix, imitating a general index for the SSHP objective.
After careful consideration, the decision maker completed the pairwise comparison matrix in
Table 4.7, and the completed version of this table is presented in Table 4.8. To verify whether
the decision maker was consistent when performing his comparisons, the consistency test, as
described in §3.2.1, was carried out and a CI/RI-value of 0.04 was obtained, indicating that the
pairwise comparisons are consistent. From Table 4.8 it is clear that the decision maker considers
a WS involving a SSHP value of 0.9, the same as a WS involving a SSHP value of 1.
WSj 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
WSi SSHP 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
1 0 1 1/2 1/3 1/4 1/5 1/6 1/7 1/8 1/9 1/9 1/9
2 0.1 2 1 1/2 1/3 1/4 1/5 1/6 1/7 1/8 1/9 1/9
3 0.2 3 2 1 1/2 1/3 1/4 1/5 1/6 1/7 1/8 1/8
4 0.3 4 3 2 1 1/2 1/3 1/4 1/5 1/6 1/7 1/7
5 0.4 5 4 3 2 1 1/2 1/3 1/4 1/5 1/6 1/6
6 0.5 6 5 4 3 2 1 1/2 1/3 1/4 1/5 1/5
7 0.6 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1/2 1/3 1/4 1/4
8 0.7 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1/2 1/3 1/3
9 0.8 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1/2 1/2
10 0.9 9 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1
11 1 9 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1
Table 4.8: The complete pairwise comparison matrix, imitating a general index for the SSHP objective.
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Once the general index in Table 4.8 had been obtained, a pairwise comparison matrix could be
populated for each WS-threat pair for each time step with respect to the scenario, by using the
appropriate corresponding values from Table 4.8. For an illustration of how to use the general
index for SSHP, consider the following example.
Example 14 Suppose the SSHP values of WSs V1, . . . , V8, C1, C2, C3, C4, with respect to a par-
ticular threat, involves the values presented in Table 4.9. A pairwise comparison matrix has to
WS V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4
SSHP 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.9 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4.9: The SSHP values for a particular threat, to illustrate the working of the general index in
Table 4.8.
be populated, with respect to the SSHP objective, involving the WSs in Table 4.9. This may be
achieved by means of the general index presented in Table 4.8.
WSs involving similar SSHP values are considered the same, and a value of 1 is used in the
comparisons between these WSs. When comparisons between WS V4 and the WSs yielding a
SSHP value of 0 are considered, a value of 6 should be assigned by considering Table 4.8, since
WS V4 involves a SSHP value of 0.5.
When comparisons between WS V7 and the WSs yielding a SSHP of 0 are considered, a value
of 9 should be assigned. Finally, when comparing WS V4 and WS V7, a value of 5 should be
assigned.
Completing the pairwise comparison matrix in this way, yields the matrix presented in Ta-
ble 4.10. This pairwise comparison matrix may be used next to calculate score values with
respect to each WS, so as to use in the calculation of the final score values, to recommend the
best possible assignment of WSs to threats. 
SSHP V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4
V1 1 1 1 1/6 1 1 1/9 1 1 1 1 1
V2 1 1 1 1/6 1 1 1/9 1 1 1 1 1
V3 1 1 1 1/6 1 1 1/9 1 1 1 1 1
V4 6 6 6 1 6 6 1/5 6 6 6 6 6
V5 1 1 1 1/6 1 1 1/9 1 1 1 1 1
V6 1 1 1 1/6 1 1 1/9 1 1 1 1 1
V7 9 9 9 5 9 9 1 9 9 9 9 9
V8 1 1 1 1/6 1 1 1/9 1 1 1 1 1
C1 1 1 1 1/6 1 1 1/9 1 1 1 1 1
C2 1 1 1 1/6 1 1 1/9 1 1 1 1 1
C3 1 1 1 1/6 1 1 1/9 1 1 1 1 1
C4 1 1 1 1/6 1 1 1/9 1 1 1 1 1
Table 4.10: A pairwise comparison matrix for the SSHP objective.
The same procedure may be followed to obtain a general index with respect to the the cost
objective. The decision maker was asked to complete a general pairwise comparison matrix
similar to the one presented for the SSHP objective assessment. Since the WSs contained in
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the scenario vary between a VSHORAD WS and a CIWS, only pairwise comparisons between
these two WSs are considered with respect to their cost values.
After careful consideration, the decision maker concluded that a CIWS is considered strongly
more important than a VSHORAD WS with respect to cost. By using the index values from
Table 3.2 a corresponding value of 5 was obtained, resulting in the complete pairwise comparison
matrix in Table 4.11. Since this matrix contains only two alternatives, the pairwise comparisons
consist of only one pair, which is considered consistent.
WSj WS1 WS2
WSi Cost 34 000 1 000 000
WS1 34 000 1 5
WS2 1 000 000 1/5 1
Table 4.11: The complete pairwise comparison matrix, imitating a general index for the cost objective.
Once the general index in Table 4.11 had been obtained, a pairwise comparison matrix similar
to the one in Table 4.10 could be populated by using appropriate corresponding values from the
pairwise comparison matrix in Table 4.11. Of course, in this case, the populated matrix is with
respect to the cost objective. Since the cost values of WSs remain the same for all the threats,
and for each time step of the scenario, the pairwise comparison matrix for the cost objective
remains unchanged for the duration of the scenario. The complete pairwise comparison matrix
with respect to the cost objective for the scenario is presented in Table 4.12.
Cost V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4
V1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5
V2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5
V3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5
V4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5
V5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5
V6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5
V7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5
V8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5
C1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1
C2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1
C3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1
C4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1
Table 4.12: The complete pairwise comparison matrix for the cost objective.
Since the pairwise comparison matrix for the cost objective remains the same for each of the
time steps of the scenario, the score values for each WS alternative could be calculated with
respect to the cost objective. After normalising the pairwise comparison matrix in Table 4.12,
and calculating the average of each row, a score value was obtained for each of the respective
WSs as presented in Table 4.13.
Using the pairwise comparison matrices of this section, the weights of each objective may be
combined with the score values of each alternative, with respect to each objective, so as to
obtain the final score values for each of the WS-threat pairs. Once this is finalised, a choice
can to be made regarding which WS to assign to a threat. This seems straight forward if only
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WS V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4
Score 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
Table 4.13: Score values with respect to cost, calculated for each of the WSs to be utilised in the
calculation of the final score values in the AHP.
one threat is observed, since the WS yielding the highest overall score is considered as the best
alternative. However, in the proposed scenario there are five threats, which implies that WSs
have to be assigned to multiple threats simultaneously, and the fact that a WS may only be
assigned to one threat at a time, complicates matters even further.
One way of addressing this, is to employ the threat list from the TE subsystem and assigning
threats in a greedy manner. This may be achieved by ranking the threats in descending order of
their threat values, and assigning WSs to threats in the order of their rankings (i.e. the threat
with the highest threat value is assigned a WS first, the threat with the second highest threat
value is assigned a WS second etc.). The threat involving the highest threat value is considered
first, and the WS involving the highest score value with respect to that threat is assigned to that
threat. The next threat in the ordered threat list is then considered, and the WS involving the
highest score value with respect to that threat is assigned to the threat. The process continues
until all the threats in the threat list have been assigned WSs. If a proposed WS for a specific
threat is already assigned to a higher ranked threat, the second best WS (i.e. the WS yielding
the second highest overall score value, with respect to that specific threat) is assigned to that
threat, and so forth.
An alternative way of assigning the WS to the threats is to develop an assignment model in
which the aim is to assign WSs to threats with respect to their final overall score values. The
objective of the assignment model is to maximise the total score values of all the assigned WSs,
weighted by the priorities of eliminating threats when WS-threat proposals are made.
Stated mathematically, the problem is therefore to
maximise S =
nt∑
j=1
Vj
nw∑
i=1
sijxij, (4.5)
subject to the constraints nt∑
j=1
xij ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , nw, (4.6)
nw∑
i=0
xij ≤ k, j = 1, . . . , nt, (4.7)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , nw, (4.8)
j = 1, . . . , nt, (4.9)
where Vj represents the priority of eliminating threat j and sij represents the final score value
of a WS-threat pair. The number of threats and WSs are denoted by nt and nw, respectively,
and the decision variables are denoted by xij. The decision variables are binary in nature, and
xij assumes the value 1 if WS i is assigned to threat j, or 0 otherwise. The model is constrained
by assuming that a WS may only be assigned to one threat at a time, and that a maximum of
k WSs may be assigned to a threat at a time.
The model requires the final set of score values of the WS-threat pairs (in matrix form), as well
as the threat list for the same time step, and provides the values of the decision variables as
output, which represent the proposed assignments of WSs to threats.
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When comparing the WA model in (2.1)–(2.5) with the AHP assignment model in (4.5)–(4.9), it
is clear that the objective function in the WA model is nonlinear, whereas the objective function
of the AHP assignment model is linear. This implies that the AHP assignment model may easily
be solved by using techniques such as the well-known simplex algorithm in a branch-and-bound
context, whereas the nonlinear WA model may be more difficult to solve, typically by barrier
or penalty methods.
The AHP works in such a way that a score value is calculated for each WS-threat pair. Since the
AHP aims to maximise the accumulated score value of the WSs assigned, the WS yielding the
highest overall score with respect to a specific threat should be recommended for assignment.
In the case where a VSHORAD and a CIWS both achieves a SSHP value of 0, the CIWS should
therefore be chosen for assignment, since it achieves the highest score value due to the low cost
incurred when assigning it. This results in the assignment of a WS which, in effect, achieves an
efficiency of 0 with respect to the SSHP objective, and simultaneously results in an increase of
the accumulated cost incurred in assigning WSs. To solve this problem of assigning ineffective
WSs, a set of dummy WSs was employed. A dummy WS achieves a SSHP value of 0 with
respect to the entire set of threats and a cost value of R 0 is incurred if such a WS is assigned
to a threat. Assigning a dummy WS therefore imitates the option of not assigning any actual
WS. Hence, by adding these dummy WSs to the current set of WSs should result in the model
achieving a higher score value than if only the VSHORAD and CIWS were available. The
number of dummy WSs to add to the current set of WSs is knt. This implies that there should
be one dummy WS for each WS that is allowed to be assigned to a threat.
The introduction of the dummy WSs does not have any effect on the AHP pairwise comparison
matrices with respect to SSHP. However, since only the outcomes of a VSHORAD and CIWS
were considered during the pairwise comparison assessments with respect to cost, a new pairwise
comparison matrix has to be populated which includes all three alternatives. Since there is no
significant difference between the cost of a CIWS and the cost of a dummy WS, by using the
index values from Table 3.2, a pairwise comparison between the dummy WS and the CIWS was
assumed to be 2, indicating that a dummy variable is slightly more important than a CIWS
with respect to cost. By following the same procedure for a dummy WS and a VSHORAD,
a value of 9 was assumed for the comparison between a dummy WS and a VHORADS with
respect to cost. The complete pairwise comparison matrix is presented in Table 4.14.
WSj WS1 WS2 WS3
WSi Cost 0 34 000 1 000 000
WS1 0 1 2 9
WS2 34 000 1/2 1 5
WS3 1 000 000 1/9 1/5 1
Table 4.14: The complete pairwise comparison matrix with the addition of a dummy WS, imitating a
general index for the cost objective.
In view of the scenario described in §4.2, a complete pairwise comparison matrix was populated,
and may be found in Appendix B in Table B.1. The pairwise comparison matrix was verified for
consistency by using a RI value of 1.6086 obtained from Alonso and Lamata [6], and a RI/CI
value of 0.0002 was obtained, implying that the pairwise comparisons were consistent. The
score values corresponding to each of the WSs which were used in the proposed scenario are
presented in Table 4.15.
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WS Score
V1 0.0136
V2 0.0136
V3 0.0136
V4 0.0136
V5 0.0136
V6 0.0136
V7 0.0136
V8 0.0136
C1 0.0660
C2 0.0660
C3 0.0660
C4 0.0660
D1 0.1255
D2 0.1255
D3 0.1255
D4 0.1255
D5 0.1255
Table 4.15: Score values with respect to cost, calculated for each of the WSs including five dummy
WSs to be utilised in the calculation of the final score values in the AHP.
4.4 A functional utility approach
The AHP and the utility approaches are similar in the sense that both are subjective in nature.
This implies that the utility approach also requires the input of a decision maker. Hence, the
utility assessments were also carried out in conjunction with military expert Visser [50], acting
as the decision maker. A brief introduction to the processes involved during the assessment of
utility values was given to the decision maker so as to ensure that he clearly understood what
was required of him.
The utility model is restricted by producing a solution for each WS-threat pair at a time,
implying that the model has to be solved for each of the WS-threat pairs at each time step.
The same two objectives utilised in the AHP approach toward WA are also utilised in the utility
approach (i.e. to maximise the SSHP of WSs assigned to the threats and to minimise the cost
of WSs assigned simultaneously). Two constraints were enforced during the development of the
utility model for WA. They are the restrictions of allowing only one WS to be assigned to a
threat and of assigning a WS at most once, for each time step.
The guidelines discussed in §3.3.7 were followed in that qualitative characteristics of utility func-
tions were first obtained for each of the objectives (i.e. SSHP and cost), after which quantitative
values for each of the objectives were computed. Before these assessments could commence, the
independence between these two objectives first had to be verified. This was achieved by using
the independent conditions discussed in §3.4. Finally, a combined bi-objective utility function
was constructed.
4.4.1 Independence between SSHP and cost
The first independence condition to verify is mutual preferential independence. This was
achieved by verifying that the SSHP objective is preferentially independent of the cost ob-
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jective, and that the cost objective is preferentially independent of the SSHP objective. The
SSHP and cost values used in the assessment procedures of all the independence conditions were
chosen as 0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9 for the SSHP objective and as R 34 000, R 300 000, R 500 000,
R 750 000 and R 1 000 000 for the cost objective, respectively, since these values are evenly spaced
out and cover the range of possible SSHP and cost values.
To verify whether the cost objective is preferentially independent of the SSHP objective, the
decision maker was asked to indicate his preference between different pairs of cost values, whilst
keeping the value of SSHP fixed at a certain level.
To render the process comprehensible for the decision maker, the decision maker was asked to
imagine that he had a choice between two WSs, WS1 and WS2. Both WSs involve a SSHP
value of 0.2 (i.e. the fixed objective function value) and different cost values. The decision
maker was asked to indicate his preference between WS1 and WS2, with respect to the cost
values presented in Table 4.16. The decision maker indicated that he prefers the WS involving
the lower cost value (i.e. WS1). The process was repeated by fixing the SSHP values at 0.5,
0.7 and 0.9, respectively. At each of these assessments, the decision maker indicated that he
preferred the WS involving the lower cost value (i.e. WS1). The decision maker concluded by
stating that if the SSHP value is fixed (regardless of the value), he will always prefer the lower
cost value. Based on these findings, it is safe to assume that the cost objective is preferentially
independent of the SSHP objective.
Cost WS1 Cost WS2
R 34 000 R 1 000 000
R 34 000 R 500 000
R 300 000 R 750 000
R 500 000 R 900 000
R 750 000 R 1 000 000
Table 4.16: Different pairs of cost values used to verify whether cost is preferentially independent of
SSHP.
In order to ascertain mutual preferential independence, the SSHP objective should also be pref-
erentially independent of the cost objective. While fixing the cost value at R 34 000, the decision
maker was therefore asked to indicate his preference between two different WSs involving differ-
ent SSHP values, as presented in Table 4.17. The decision maker indicated that he preferred the
WS involving the higher SSHP value (i.e.WS2) between each pair. The process was repeated
by fixing the cost value at each of the remaining values that is, R 300 000, R 500 000, R 750 000
and R 1 000 000, respectively. At each of the assessments the decision maker indicated that he
preferred the WS involving the higher SSHP value (i.e.WS2). Finally, he concluded by stating
that if the cost value is fixed (no matter what the value), he will always prefer the higher SSHP
value.
Based on these findings, is seems reasonable to accept that SSHP is preferentially independent of
cost and since both the objectives are preferentially independent of one another, the conclusion
can be drawn that they are mutually preferentially independent.
The procedure for verifying the stronger utility independent condition involves similar assess-
ments to those carried out during the preferential independence assessments, with the difference
being that the decision maker is asked to assess CE values with respect to a given lottery in-
volving different outcomes in one objective, whilst keeping the value of the other objective fixed
at a specific level. A lottery involving the same form as the lottery presented in Figure 3.20
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SSHP WS1 SSHP WS2
0 0.9
0 0.5
0.2 0.5
0.2 0.9
0.5 0.7
0.5 0.9
0.7 0.9
Table 4.17: Different pairs of SSHP values used to verify whether SSHP is preferentially independent
of cost.
may be used to simplify the assessment.
To verify whether cost is utility independent of SSHP, the lottery presented in Figure 4.6 was
used. Once again the decision maker was asked to imagine that he has a choice between WS1
and WS2 which both WSs involve a SSHP of 0.2 (i.e. the fixed objective function value), where
WS1 incurs a cost value if assigned which is linked to a probability distribution involving two
outcomes with an equal chance of occurring and where WS2 yields a sure unknown outcome.
The decision maker was asked to assess his CE which makes him indifferent between WS1 and
WS2, with respect to the cost value of WS2. After careful consideration, the decision maker
indicated that his CE for the values presented in Figure 4.6 is R 517 000. The process was
repeated with the value of the SSHP fixed at 0.2, but by using different cost values in the
lottery. The cost values utilised in the assessment, as well as the corresponding CE values are
presented in Table 4.18.
The procedure described above was repeated for lotteries involving the same values presented
in Table 4.18, but by fixing the value of the SSHP at 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9, respectively. The decision
maker provided the same CE for each of the lotteries, whilst keeping the SSHP values fixed at
the specified levels. The decision maker concluded that if the SSHP value is fixed (regardless of
the value), his CE will always be equal to the expected value of the lottery, when considering
to cost. Hence, it was concluded that cost is utility independent of SSHP.
WS1
WS2
0.5
0.5
0.2, R 34 000
0.2, R 1 000 000
0.2, CE
Figure 4.6: A lottery used to verify whether cost is utility independent of SSHP.
To verify whether SSHP is utility independent of cost, a similar lottery to the one in Figure 4.6
was used, but where the cost values were fixed at R 34 000, R 300 000, R 500 000, R 750 000 and
R 1 000 000, respectively, and the SSHP values were varied. The decision maker provided the
same CE with respect to SSHP values for each of the lotteries, whilst keeping the cost value
fixed at the specified levels. These SSHP values as well as the corresponding CE values are
presented in Table 4.19. He concluded that if the cost value is fixed (regardless of the value),
his CE assessments for the values presented in Table 4.19, will remain the same. Hence, this
verifies that SSHP is utility independent of cost.
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50% Cost outcome WS1 50% cost outcome WS1 CE WS2
R 34 000 R 1 000 000 R 517 000
R 34 000 R 500 000 R 267 000
R 300 000 R 750 000 R 525 000
R 500 000 R 900 000 R 700 000
R 750 000 R 1 000 000 R 875 000
Table 4.18: Different cost values used in a lottery to verify whether cost is utility independent of SSHP.
50% SSHP outcome WS1 50% SSHP outcome WS1 CE WS1
0 0.9 0.7
0 0.5 0.4
0.2 0.7 0.6
0.3 0.5 0.4
0.7 0.9 0.8
Table 4.19: Different SSHP values used in a lottery to verify if SSHP is utility independent of cost.
Since the cost objective and the SSHP objective are also utility independent of one another
they are, in fact, mutually utility independent. Hence, the multilinear utility function may be
used to model the preferences of the decision maker for these two objectives.
One last utility independent condition should be tested, which may simplify the form of the
final multiobjective utility function even further. Since the objectives are mutually utility
independent, only one assessment is necessary to verify whether they are additive independent.
The decision maker was presented with WS1 and WS2, as shown in Figure 4.7, where each WS
involves two possible outcomes, each having an equal chance of occurring. WS1 achieves the
best possible values of the SSHP objective and the cost objective in one outcome, and the worst
possible values of the SSHP objective and the cost objective in the other outcome. WS2 achieves
the best possible value of the SSHP objective and the worst possible value of the cost objective
in one outcome, and the worst possible value of the SSHP objective and the best possible value
of the cost objective in the other outcome.
The decision maker was required to indicate his preference between WS1 and WS2, or to indicate
whether he is indifferent between the WSs. If he indicates, in any sense, that he prefers either of
the WSs, the SSHP objective and the cost objective are not additive independent. However, if
he is indifferent between these two WSs, the SSHP objective and the cost objective are additive
independent.
0.5
0.5
0, R 1000 000
0.9, R 34 000
WS1
0.5
0.5
0, R 34 000
0.9, R 1 000 000
WS2
Figure 4.7: Two lotteries to test whether cost and SSHP are additive independent.
The decision maker indicated that he is indifferent between the two WSs. He concluded that
since the SSHP values are the same for both WSs, the only factor contributing to his decision
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is the cost. Since the expected values with respect to cost are equal for both of the lotteries,
the decision maker considers WS1 and WS2 as the same.
This result showed that the cost objective and the SSHP objective are additive independent.
Hence, the utility function for each objective may be assessed without considering the other
objective. These individual utility functions may then be scaled and combined to form an
additive utility function in order to represent the preferences of the decision maker for the cost
objective and the SSHP objective simultaneously.
4.4.2 Assessing qualitative characteristics for SSHP and cost
Now that the form of the bi-objective utility function for cost and SSHP is known, an individual
utility function for each of these objectives could be assessed. Before assessing the quantitative
utility values of the individual utility functions, it may be useful to first assess some qualitative
characteristics with respect to these objectives. A first qualitative characteristic is to establish
whether the utility functions are monotonic or not. During the assessment of preferential
independence, the decision maker consistently indicated that he preferred a smaller cost value
to a larger cost value among a number of cost value pairs. This may be a good enough reason
to suspect that the utility function for the cost objective is monotonically decreasing.
For the SSHP values, the decision maker consistently indicated that he preferred a larger SSHP
value to a lower SSHP value among a number of SSHP value pairs. This may be a good enough
reason to suspect that the utility function for the SSHP objective is monotonically increasing.
However, these suspicions may be verified by presenting the decision maker with possible out-
comes of two potential WSs with respect to both objectives. In each case, he was asked to
indicate his preference between the two WSs. The values used during the assessment to verify
monotonicity for the cost and SSHP objectives are presented in Table 4.20. For the SSHP
values, the decision maker consistently preferred the WS involving the larger SSHP value. Once
all the assessments in Table 4.20 were completed, the following question was put to the decision
maker: “If WSi involves a larger SSHP value than WSj , will WSi always be preferred to WSj?”
The decision maker answered affirmatively, implying that the utility function for the SSHP
objective is monotonically increasing.
For the cost values, the decision maker consistently indicated that he preferred the WS with
the lower cost. Once all the assessments in Table 4.20 had been completed, a final question
was put to the decision maker: “If WSi involves a lower cost value than WSj, will WSi always
be preferred to WSj?” The decision maker answered affirmatively, implying that the utility
function for the cost objective is monotonically decreasing. The corresponding preferences of
the decision maker are also presented in Table 4.20.
The next qualitative characteristic involved determining the risk attitude of the decision maker.
This is achievable by presenting the decision maker with a number of lotteries and sure outcomes,
which are equal to the expected value of each respective lottery, similar to those in Figure 3.18.
The decision maker is then required to indicate his preference between the lottery or the sure
outcome.
The lotteries were presented to the decision maker in the form of two WSs, WS1 and WS2.
The outcome of assigning WS1 is modelled by a lottery involving two outcomes with equal
probability, while WS2 achieves the sure outcome. The values utilised in the lotteries and sure
outcomes are summarised in Tables 4.21 and 4.22 for the SSHP and cost objectives, respectively.
The first two columns represent the outcomes associated with WS1, whereas the third column
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WSi WSj Choice
0 0.9 0.9
0.1 0.7 0.7
0.1 0.5 0.5
0 0.3 0.3
0.3 0.9 0.9
0.3 0.7 0.7
0.3 0.5 0.5
0.5 0.9 0.9
0.5 0.7 0.7
SSHP
WSi WSj Choice
R 34 000 R 1 000 000 R 34 000
R 34 000 R 750 000 R 34 000
R 34 000 R 300 000 R 34 000
R 150 000 R 900 000 R 150 000
R 300 000 R 750 000 R 300 000
R 300 000 R 1 000 000 R 300 000
R 450 000 R 600 000 R 450 000
R 600 000 R 900 000 R 600 000
R 750 000 R 1 000 000 R 750 000
Cost
Table 4.20: Tables to establish whether the decision maker’s utility functions are monotonic for the
SSHP objective and the cost objective.
represents the sure outcome, and the fourth column contains the preference of the decision
maker.
50% WS1 50% WS1 WS2 Preference
0.9 0.1 0.5 WS1
0.9 0.3 0.6 WS1
0.9 0.5 0.7 WS1
0.9 0.7 0.8 WS1
0.7 0.3 0.5 WS1
0.7 0.1 0.4 WS1
0.6 0.2 0.4 WS1
0.5 0.3 0.4 WS1
0.5 0.1 0.3 WS1
SSHP
Table 4.21: SSHP values for determining the risk attitude of the decision maker with respect to the
SSHP objective.
The decision maker consistently indicated that he preferred the WS involving the lottery to the
WS with the sure outcome (i.e. prefers WS1 to WS2) with respect to the SSHP values. This
implies that he exhibits a risk seeking attitude. He explained that from a WA perspective, he
would rather assign a WS involving a chance to yield a higher SSHP value than a WS with
a lower SSHP value for sure. The decision maker was slightly hesitant when the SSHP values
became large, especially in the case where WS1 involved an even chance of a SSHP of 0.9 and
0.7 and WS2 involved a sure SSHP value of 0.8. The decision maker was asked to carefully think
about his preference, and in this case he concluded that a SSHP value of 0.8 is not significantly
better than a SSHP value of 0.7. He therefore decided to still choose WS1.
The ensure that the decision maker understood the consequences of his preferences, he was
asked the following question: “If the expected value of WS1 is always equal to the value of
WS2, will you always prefer WS1 to WS2?” His answer was affirmative. Hence, the conclusion
may therefore be drawn that the decision maker exhibits a risk seeking attitude with respect to
the SSHP objective. This implies that a utility function for the SSHP objective should take on
a convex form.
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50% WS1 50% WS1 WS2 Preference
R 34 000 R 1 000 000 R 517 000 Indifferent
R 34 000 R 500 000 R 267 000 Indifferent
R 34 000 R 250 000 R 142 000 Indifferent
R 300 000 R 1 000 000 R 650 000 Indifferent
R 300 000 R 750 000 R 525 000 Indifferent
R 500 000 R 1 000 000 R 750 000 Indifferent
R 500 000 R 750 000 R 625 000 Indifferent
R 250 000 R 1 000 000 R 625 000 Indifferent
R 250 000 R 750 000 R 500 000 Indifferent
Cost
Table 4.22: Cost values for determining the risk attitude of the decision maker with respect to the cost
objective.
For the cost assessments, the decision maker explained that since the cost value of WS1 is equal
to the expected cost value of WS2 at each assessment, he regards WS1 and WS2 the same, with
respect to cost values. Hence, he is indifferent between WS1 and WS2, despite the fact that
certain assessments involved large cost values of up to R 1 000 000. To ensure that the decision
maker understood the consequence of his preferences he was asked the following question: “If
the expected cost value of WS1 is always equal to the cost value of WS2, will you always be
indifferent to these two WSs?” His response was affirmative. Hence, the conclusion was drawn
that he exhibits a risk neutral behaviour, with respect to the cost values. This implies that his
utility function for the cost objective should take on a linear form (i.e. a straight line).
4.4.3 Assessing individual utility functions for SSHP and cost
Quantitative utility values were finally assessed for each of the cost and SSHP objectives in order
to be presented as a utility function. The CE approach, as discussed in §3.3.6, was followed to
assess the utility values of the outcomes with respect to both objectives. The process involves
the decision maker assessing his CE for lotteries involving two different outcomes with equal
chance. This is achievable by presenting the decision maker with a number of lotteries similar to
the one presented in Figure 3.10. The outcomes in the lotteries are varied between the possible
outcomes with respect to the two objectives, in order to obtain corresponding CE values. Utility
values may then be calculated for the CE values.
A lottery was once again presented to the decision maker as WS1 and the CE as WS2. In each
assessment the decision maker was required to indicate the SSHP value of WS2 which will make
him indifferent between assigning WS1 and WS2. Since the best and worst outcomes of the
SSHP objective are 1 and 0, respectively, these outcomes were assigned utility values of 1 and
0, respectively, and they were utilised in the first CE assessment. WS1 involves two outcomes,
each having an equal chance of occurring. The decision maker was asked to think carefully
about his CE with respect to WS1, and he indicated that if WS2 involves a SSHP value of 0.7,
he would be indifferent between WS1 and WS2. The utility value corresponding to a SSHP
value of 0.7 may thus be calculated as
u(0.7) = 0.5u(1) + 0.5u(0) = 0.5(1) + 0.5(0) = 0.5. (4.10)
Since the utility values corresponding to SSHP values of 0, 0.7 and 1 are then known, any two
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of them could be used in the next assessment. The next assessment involved SSHP values of 1
and 0.7, and the decision maker provided a CE value of 0.9 for this lottery. The utility value
corresponding to a SSHP value of 0.9 was therefore calculated in the same way as for a SSHP
value of 0.7, and the result is u(0.9) = 0.75. This process was repeated until a number of values
from the range of possible SSHP values had been considered. The SSHP values, as well as the
corresponding CE values assessed are presented in Table 4.23. The corresponding utility values
are presented in Table 4.24, and illustrated graphically in Figure 4.8.
50% WS1 50% WS1 CE Expected value
0 0.9 0.7 0.45
0.7 1 0.9 0.85
0.7 0.9 0.8 0.80
0 0.7 0.5 0.35
0.5 0.7 0.6 0.60
0 0.5 0.4 0.25
0 0.4 0.3 0.20
0 0.3 0.2 0.15
0 0.2 0.1 0.10
Table 4.23: CE values assessed for different SSHP values.
SSHP value Utility value
1 1
0.9 0.75
0.8 0.6250
0.7 0.5000
0.6 0.3750
0.5 0.2500
0.4 0.1250
0.3 0.0625
0.2 0.0313
0.1 0.0156
0 0
Table 4.24: Utility values calculated for the SSHP values presented in Table 4.23.
By examining Figure 4.8, it is clear that the utility function has a convex form, implying that
the decision maker is risk seeking. This verifies the qualitative characteristic that the utility
function of the SSHP is convex. The fact that the majority of the CE values are greater than
the expected values of their corresponding lotteries in Table 4.23, also verifies the fact that the
utility function of the SSHP is risk seeking.
A utility function corresponding to the graph in Figure 4.8 was sought. Since the SSHP objective
only contains eleven possible values, these values may either be used directly when solving the
WA problem in the context of the scenario discussed in §4.2, or a curve may be fitted through
the data points in Table 4.24 to approximate the utility function. The problem with fitting a
function is that it is only an approximation of the original set of data points, which may leave
room for small errors. Since the number of data points are small, it was decided to rather use
a piecewise linear utility function through the data points in Table 4.24. A linear function was
obtained between each of the data points. The resulting piecewise linear convex utility function
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
4.4. A functional utility approach 85
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
SSHP
U
ti
li
ty
va
lu
es
Figure 4.8: The utility function corresponding to the utility values of the SSHP objective.
for SSHP corresponding to the data points in Table 4.24 is
uSSHP(x) =


0.156x − 1.839 × 10−18, if 0 < x ≤ 0.1,
0.157x − 0.0001, if 0.1 < x ≤ 0.2,
0.312x − 0.0311, if 0.2 < x ≤ 0.3,
0.625x − 0.125, if 0.3 < x ≤ 0.4,
1.25x − 0.375, if 0.4 < x ≤ 0.9,
2.5x− 1.5, if 0.9 < x ≤ 1.
(4.11)
The same procedure may be followed to determine utility values for the cost objective. By
presenting the same lottery concept involving two different WSs to the decision maker, he was
required to provide his CE values for different cost values covering the possible range of cost
values.
The best and worst outcomes for cost, which are R 0 (in the case of no assignment) and
R 1 000 000, respectively, were assigned utility values of 1 and 0, respectively. Since the utility
values of these two outcomes were known, they are employed in the first assessment. The deci-
sion maker provided a CE value of R 500 000 and the corresponding utility value was calculated
as
u(R 500 000) = 0.5u(R 0) + 0.5u(R 1 000 000) = 0.5(1) + 0.5(0) = 0.5. (4.12)
A next assessment was considered involving any one of the outcomes with a known utility value,
and the corresponding utility value was calculated accordingly. The process was repeated until
a fair number of assessments had been made, covering the full range of possible cost values, and
the evaluated utility values may be presented as a utility function. The different cost values
used in the assessment, as well as the corresponding CE values, are presented in Table 4.25.
The resulting utility values are presented in Table 4.26 and illustrated graphically in Figure 4.9.
By examining the graph in Figure 4.9, it is evident that the utility function for the cost objective
is linear, implying a risk neutral attitude with respect to the cost objective. This verifies the
qualitative characteristic discussed previously. Since the utility function of the cost objective is
a decreasing linear function, it should have the form of a linear function ucost(y) = −my + c,
where m denotes the gradient of the graph and c is a constant term. A linear utility function
through the cost values and their corresponding utility values is ucost(y) = 1− 1× 10
−6y.
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50% WS1 50% WS1 CE
R 0 R 1 000 000 R 500 000
R 0 R 500 000 R 250 000
R 500 000 R 1 000 000 R 750 000
Table 4.25: CE values assessed for different cost values.
Cost value Utility value
R 0 1
R 250 000 0.75
R 500 000 0.50
R 750 000 0.25
R 1 000 000 0
Table 4.26: Utility values calculated for the range of cost values.
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Figure 4.9: The utility function corresponding to the assessed utility values for the cost objective.
The utility function ucost(y) is used to evaluate utility values for the range of cost values and
compared to the original values to determine the deviation from the original utility values. The
original assessed utility values as well as the utility values calculated by means of ucost(y) with
respect to the cost values, are presented in Table 4.27. It is evident from Table 4.27 that the
originally assessed utility values are all on the line ucost(y) = 1−1×10
−6y, so that this function
is the utility function which represents the preferences of the decision maker with respect to the
cost objective.
4.4.4 Assessing scaling constants for SSHP and cost
The final step, before the multiobjective utility function may be compiled, is to assess scaling
constants for each of the objectives. This is achieved by using the lottery process described in
§3.4. The decision maker is presented with a lottery A and a sure outcome B, as illustrated
in Figure 4.10. The lottery A involves two outcomes, where the first outcome is the best
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Cost value Original utility value ucost(y)
R 0 1 1
R 250 000 0.75 0.75
R 500 000 0.50 0.50
R 750 000 0.25 0.25
R 1 000 000 1 1
Table 4.27: A comparison between the original utility values of cost, and the utility values calculated
by means of ucost(y).
possible outcomes in both objectives with a probability of p and the second outcome involves
the worst possible outcomes in both objectives with a probability of (1− p). The sure outcome
B, is varied depending on which one of the scaling constants is sought. The decision maker is
required to provide the probability p which makes him indifferent between the lottery A and
the sure outcome B.
A
B
p
1− p
0, R 1 000 000
1, R 0
x, y
Figure 4.10: Lottery used to determine scaling constants for the SSHP and cost objectives.
The decision maker is finally asked to imagine that lottery A represents WS1, involving outcomes
linked to a probability distribution and the sure outcome B represents WS2 involving a sure
outcome.
To assess the scaling constant for SSHP, denoted by kSSHP, the decision maker was presented
with WS1 and WS2 in Figure 4.11. The sure outcomes of WS2 involve the best outcome in
the SSHP objective (i.e. the value 1) and the worst outcome in cost objective (i.e. the value
R 1 000 000). The decision maker was required to provide the probability p which makes him
indifferent between WS1 and WS2.
WS1
WS2
p
1− p
0, R 1 000 000
1, R 0
1, R 1 000 000
Figure 4.11: Lottery used to determine scaling constant kSSHP.
To aid the decision maker in the assessment, he was first required to indicate his preference when
p = 0.5. This yields an expected SSHP value of 0.5 with an expected cost value of R 500 000, for
WS1. The decision maker explained that although WS1 involves a possibly smaller cost value,
he prefers WS2 to WS1, since it involves a much higher sure SSHP value. Since the decision
maker had a clear preference, the process have to be repeated for a different value of p. The
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process was repeated with p = 0.7, yielding an expected SSHP value of 0.7 and an expected
cost value of R 300 000, for WS1. Once again the decision maker indicated that he preferred
WS2 to WS1, regardless of the possibly lower cost involved in assigning WS1. When p = 0.8,
expected SSHP and cost values were calculated as 0.8 and R 200 000, respectively, and when
p = 0.9, expected SSHP and cost values were calculated as 0.9 and R 100 000, respectively, for
WS1.
The decision maker explained that if p = 0.8 he would still prefer WS2 to WS1 due to the high
sure outcome of the SSHP value of WS2. Finally, he concluded that if p = 0.9, he would be
indifferent between WS1 and WS2 since a SSHP value of 0.9 is considered just as effective as
a sure SSHP value of 1. Based on these findings, it was therefore concluded that the scaling
constant for the SSHP objective, kSSHP = 0.9.
Since the objectives are additive independent, the scaling constant for the cost objective, denoted
by kcost, may be calculated as kcost = 1− kSSHP, which yields an answer of 0.1, if kSSHP = 0.9.
However, this may be verified by using the same procedure during the assessment of kSSHP, to
evaluate the scaling constant for the cost objective kcost.
The decision maker was presented with a lottery involving WS1 and WS2, as shown in Figure
4.12. In this case, the outcome of WS1 remains unchanged, whereas the outcome of WS2 involves
the worst outcome in the SSHP objective and the best outcome in the cost objective.
WS1
WS2
p
1− p
0, R 1 000 000
1, R 0
0, R 0
Figure 4.12: A lottery used to determine the scaling constant kcost.
Since the expected outcomes of both objectives for WS1 had been calculated when p = 0.5, the
decision maker was asked to provide his preference between the two WSs. He explained that
since WS1 involves a possible higher SSHP value, he preferred WS1. When p = 0.3, expected
values of 0.3 and R 700 000 were obtained for the SSHP and cost outcomes, respectively, for
WS1. The decision maker indicated that he still preferred WS1 to WS2, since he would rather
choose a WS involving some chance of hitting a target, than a WS having no chance to do so.
When p = 0.2 and p = 0.1, expected SSHP values of 0.2 and 0.1, were obtained, respectively,
and expected cost values of R 800 000 and R 900 000, were obtained, respectively.
The decision maker explained that when p = 0.2, he still preferred WS1 to WS2, since he would
rather assign a WS with a SSHP of 0.2, than a WS whose SSHP is 0, even though the cost of
assigning this WS is significantly higher. Finally, the decision maker concluded that he will be
indifferent between WS1 and WS2 if the value of p = 0.1.
This verifies that the scaling constant should be kcost = 0.1. Hence the scaling constants for
SSHP and cost may be taken as 0.9 and 0.1, respectively, in the compilation of the bi-objective
utility function. It is clear from the results obtained during the assessments with the decision
maker that he deems the SSHP objective much more important than the cost objective. This
is reasonable since the DAs might be worth more than the cost of assigning WSs.
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4.4.5 A bi-objective WA utility function
Finally, a bi-objective utility function for the cost and SSHP objectives may be compiled.
Combining the individual utility functions of the SSHP and cost objectives using their respective
scaling constants, yields the bi-objective additive utility function
u(x, y) = 0.9uSSHP(x) + 0.1ucost(y)
= 0.9uSSHP(x) + 0.1(1 − 1× 10
−6y), (4.13)
where uSSHP(x) represents the piecewise linear convex utility function for SSHP in (4.11). This
utility function may be used to calculate utility values for each WS-threat pair for each time
step with respect to the SSHP and cost involved in a specific assignment. The WS yielding
the highest utility value with respect to a threat, should then be recommended for possible
assignment to that threat.
In the scenario considered in §4.2, WSs have to be assigned to multiple threats simultaneously.
By incorporating the threat lists, the same greedy assignment procedure as discussed for the
AHP assignment procedure may be used to propose assignments.
An alternative approach is to develop a utility assignment model for recommending possible
assignments based on the utility values obtained from the additive utility model above. The
objective of such an assignment model should be to maximise the total utility values of all the
assigned WSs, weighted by the priorities of eliminating a threat when a WS-threat proposal is
made. Therefore, the objective is to
maximise U =
nt∑
j=1
Vj
nw∑
i=1
uijxij , (4.14)
subject to the constraints
nt∑
j=1
xij ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , nw, (4.15)
nw∑
i=0
xij ≤ k, j = 1, . . . , nt, (4.16)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , nw, (4.17)
j = 1, . . . , nt, (4.18)
where Vj represents the priority of eliminating threat j and uij represents the combined utility
value obtained from u(x, y) in (4.14), involving the SSHP and cost, of a WS-threat pair. The
number of threats and WSs are denoted by nt and nw, respectively, and the decision variables
are denoted by xij . The decision variables are again binary in nature. The variable xij takes a
value equal to 1 if WS i is assigned to threat j, or zero otherwise. The model is constrained by
assuming that a WS may only be assigned to one threat at a time, and that a maximum of k
WSs may be assigned to a threat at a time.
The model (4.14)–(4.18) requires the combined set of utility values of the WS-threat pairs (in
matrix form) at a time step, as well as the threat list corresponding to the same time step.
Thus, the model has to be solved for each time step.
Since the utility approach aims to maximise the accumulated utility value, it will assign a WS
to a threat if the utility value of that WS-threat pair achieves the highest positive utility value
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with respect to other WS-threat pairs. The implication of this is that if a CIWS achieves a
SSHP value of zero with respect to a specific threat, a positive utility value will nevertheless
be obtained by means of the additive utility function for that specific WS-threat pair. This
is due to the uSSHP(x) achieving a value of 0 and ucost(y) achieving a value of 0.966. When
these values are combined by means of the additive utility model in (4.13) a value of 0.0966
is obtained. If the combined utility values of remaining WSs are 0 with respect to the same
threat, the utility model will assign the CIWS. Hence, there is a possibility of assigning WSs
to threats which, in effect, achieve zero efficiency with respect to these threats. This results
in assigning unnecessary WSs to threats while simultaneously driving up the cost of assigning
WSs to threats. This problem was solved by incorporating dummy WSs, denoted by D`, where
` denotes the `th dummy WS. A dummy WS represents an alternative of not assigning a WS.
Hence, by adding a dummy WS to the existing set of WSs, three possible choices arise, to assign
a VSHORAD WS, to assign a CIWS, or to assign no WS. Since the assignment of dummy WSs
involves no assignment of actual WSs, it achieves SSHP values of 0 with respect to the entire
set of threats and achieves cost values of R 0. The number of dummy WSs to add to the current
set of WSs depends on the value of k and the number of threats nt, and is given by knt.
4.5 The NSGA II
A final approach towards solving the WA problem for the scenario proposed in §4.2 involves
a computer implemented version of the NSGA II discussed in §3.5. The NSGA II was coded
in the software suite Matlab [37] and is able to solve the WA problem for the complete set of
threats in a single run, for each time step. This implies that the NSGA II considers the entire
set of WS-threat pairs simultaneously and recommends possible assignments of WSs to threats,
with respect to a specific time step. The bi-objective WA model (4.1)–(4.4) described in §4.1,
was used in the implementation of the NSGA II.
The NSGA II requires the survival probabilities of the threats (in matrix notation), as well as the
threat lists at each time step as input. Since the survival probability of a threat is equal to the
difference between a value of one and the corresponding SSHP value, the survival probability
for each threat with respect to each WS at time steps t20, t35 and t39 may be calculated by
subtracting each value in the EEMs in Table 4.4 from one. The resulting survival probabilities
of the various threats with respect to the WSs, are presented in Table 4.28 for time steps t20, t35
and t39. The threat lists presented in Table 4.3 are used as input for each time step. The
NSGA II also requires the specification of the number of threats as well as the number of WSs,
denoted by nt and nw, respectively.
The final requirements, with respect to input data, are the specification of parameter values
involving the size of the population, the number of iterations, the tour and pool sizes in the
selection procedure and the probability of a mutation occurring. Once the parameter values are
specified, the model may be solved for each time step.
The ith solution, or chromosome, pi to the problem is presented in matrix form with dimensions
nw × nt. To accommodate the restriction of allowing a WS to be assigned to at most one
threat at a time, a solution is allowed to have only one non-zero entry in a row. An example
of such a solution may be found in Table 4.29, where WS V1 is assigned to threat T2, and WS
V2 is assigned to threat T5, and so forth. A number, N , of these solutions are contained in the
population at each iteration of the NSGA II.
The solutions contained in the population are sorted and ranked on the basis of nondomination,
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V1
V2
V3
V4
V5
V6
V7
V8
C1
C2
C3
C4
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0.5 1
1 1 0.9 0.9 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0.9 0.9 1
1 1 1 0 1
Survival probabilities
for time step t20
V1
V2
V3
V4
V5
V6
V7
V8
C1
C2
C3
C4
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
1 1 0.9 0.5 1
1 1 0.7 0.9 1
0.9 0.5 1 1 1
0.9 0.5 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
0.8 0.7 1 1 1
1 0.9 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
Survival probabilities
for time step t35
V1
V2
V3
V4
V5
V6
V7
V8
C1
C2
C3
C4
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
1 1 0.9 0.9 1
0.3 1 0.5 0.5 1
0.9 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0.9
1 1 1 1 0.5
1 1 1 1 1
0.8 0.6 1 1 1
0.5 0.1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
Survival probabilities
for time step t39
Table 4.28: The survival probabilities of threats T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5 for time steps t20, t35 and t39,
respectively.
by using the objective function values f1 and f2 of the solutions. Objective function value f1
corresponds to the minimisation of the combined survival probabilities of the threats, weighted
by their threat priorities. Since nt = 5 and a threat involves a probability of 1 of surviving, if
no WS is assigned to it, the maximum value that f1 may adopt is 5, implying that f1 represents
a numerical value between 0 and 5.
Objective function value f2 corresponds to the minimisation of the cost of the WSs assigned
to the various threats and may be interpreted as the sum of the cost (in Rand value) of the
WSs assigned to the threats. Since there are eight VSHORAD WSs and four CIWS, f2 may
adopt any value in the range from R 0, if no WSs are assigned, to R 8 136 000, if the entire set of
WSs are assigned. The objective function values are presented in matrix form with dimensions
2 × N . An example of the values of f1 and f2 corresponding to various candidate solutions is
presented in Table 4.30.
The fitness assignment of a solution employed in the NSGA II is based on the pareto rank,
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

T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 1 0 0 0
V2 0 0 0 0 1
V3 1 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 1 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 1
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 1 0
C1 1 0 0 0 0
C2 0 0 1 0 0
C3 0 0 1 0 0
C4 0 1 0 0 0


Table 4.29: An example of a solution to the bi-objective WA problem utilised in the NSGA II.
[ p1 p2 p3 ... pi
f1 2.12 3.54 2.4 . . . 4.2
f2 4 068 000 2 034 0000 3 068 000 . . . 34 000
]
Table 4.30: An example of the objective function values corresponding to different solutions obtained
from the NSGA II.
with respect to a specific solution. If, for example, a solution is contained in rank 1, its fitness
value is equal to 1. The fitness values and the crowding distances of solutions are used in the
selection process to select parent solutions by using the binary tournament selection procedure
described in §3.5.3. In the case where two selected solutions involve the same fitness value, the
solution yielding the larger crowding distance is chosen.
Once parent solutions have been selected, the crossover operator may be performed to generate
child solutions. This is achieved by considering each corresponding row of two parent solutions
at a time, randomly selecting one of these rows to use in the corresponding row of the child
solution. The NSGA II was implemented in such a manner that only one child solution is
generated during each crossover. This may result in some form of diversity in the child solutions
generated. However, the algorithm may take longer to find the approximately pareto optimal
solutions, since only one child solution is generated in contrast to the conventional way of
generating two child solutions. An example of such a crossover between two parent solutions is
presented in Figure 4.13.
Due to the restriction on the row entries of a solution, a bitwise mutation operator is not
appropriate, since flipping a random bit (entry) in a solution may possibly lead to a solution
with more than one non-zero entry per row, thereby violating constraint (4.2) of the model. A
more appropriate mutation operator is therefore to randomly select a row and to change the
values of the entries to zero. A random column is then selected, and the entry corresponding
to the original selected row is then assigned a value of one. Stated otherwise, a WS is chosen
randomly and is unassigned. A threat is then chosen randomly and the randomly chosen WS
is assigned to this threat.
The current generation of the population is combined with the child solutions generated from the
same generation to form a larger population, which is sorted and ranked. The next generation
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Parent 1 Child 1Parent 2
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
00 0 0 0 00 0 0 0
0 0 0 01 0 0 0 01
00 00 1
0 0 0 0 1
00 00 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1
1
1
1
Figure 4.13: A graphical illustration of a crossover performed on two parent solutions in the NSGA II.
is then obtained by selecting parent solutions from this larger population and performing the
crossover and mutation operators on these selected solutions. The procedure is repeated until
the maximum number of generations is reached.
The results generated by the NSGA II include the solutions contained in each of the nondom-
inated fronts as well as the objective function value of each objective corresponding to each
solution, which serves as the output data.
4.6 Chapter summary
The aim in this chapter was to present the reader with an impression of the activities involved
in an application of the multiobjective decision methodologies considered in Chapter 3 on a
near realistic generated scenario. This was achieved by presenting a method for the extraction
of objectives which are deemed important in the choice of which WSs to assign in §4.1. This
method was implemented via electronic mail and two of the objectives thus obtained were used
to formulate the bi-objective WA model (4.1)–(4.4).
In §4.2 a realistic scenario was comprehensively described. This scenario which was used as
an illustrative example for implementation of the model and methodologies. Thereafter the
procedures followed during the AHP assessments were described in §4.3 so as to obtain score
values for each WS-threat pair. This section closed with a description of a proposed AHP
assignment model, which may aid in the assignment of WSs to threats when considering the
score values obtained by means of the AHP.
In §4.4 the procedures followed during the assessment of qualitative characteristics as well as
quantitative values of the individual utility functions for each objective were described. This
section also contains a description of the derivation of a bi-objective additive utility function as
well as the assessments of scaling constants for each of the objectives. The section closed with
a description of a proposed utility assignment model, which may aid in the assignment of WS
to threats when considering utility values.
Finally, the chapter closed in §4.5 with a description of the computer implemented NSGA II
in terms of the structure of solutions, input and output data as well as the way in which the
genetic operators were performed.
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This chapter contains the results obtained by each of the methodologies described in Chapter 4
for solving the WA problem for the scenario of §4.2. The results obtained by means the AHP
process are presented and interpreted in §5.1. This is followed, §5.2, by a description and a brief
interpretation of the results obtained by means of the bi-objective utility function of §4.4.5.
Finally, the results obtained from the output of the NSGA II are presented in §5.3.
5.1 The AHP results
As mentioned in §4.2, the methodologies in this thesis are only applied in the context of the
proposed scenario for time steps t20, t35 and t39. Since the SSHP values change for each time
step, a new pairwise comparison matrix has to be populated for each WS-threat pair, for each
of the time steps. Since there are five threats, five pairwise comparison matrices have to be
populated for the SSHP objective for each time step by using the index values in Table 4.8.
The resulting pairwise comparison matrices may be found in Appendix B. All of these pairwise
comparison matrices have been verified for consistency, and the results of these verifications are
presented in Appendix B.
Normalising each of the pairwise comparison matrices, and calculating the average of each row
yields a score value for each of the WS-threat pairs with respect to the SSHP objective for each
time step. The resulting score values are presented in Tables 5.1–5.3, for time steps t20, t35 and
t39, respectively.
For the cost objective, the score values calculated in §4.3 may be used in the calculation of the
final score values. As mentioned previously, these values remain the same for the duration of
the scenario; hence, the values remain the same for each time step. Recall that these values
may be found in Table 4.15.
Combining the weights of each of the objectives with the score values of each WS for each
objective and for each threat, yields five lists of final score values for each WS — one for each
95
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Scores values T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0.0588 0.0588 0.0526 0.0411 0.0588
V2 0.0588 0.0588 0.0526 0.0411 0.0588
V3 0.0588 0.0588 0.0526 0.0411 0.0588
V4 0.0588 0.0588 0.0526 0.0411 0.0588
V5 0.0588 0.0588 0.0526 0.2637 0.0588
V6 0.0588 0.0588 0.1053 0.0802 0.0588
V7 0.0588 0.0588 0.0526 0.0411 0.0588
V8 0.0588 0.0588 0.0526 0.0411 0.0588
C1 0.0588 0.0588 0.0526 0.0411 0.0588
C2 0.0588 0.0588 0.0526 0.0411 0.0588
C3 0.0588 0.0588 0.1053 0.0802 0.0588
C4 0.0588 0.0588 0.0526 0.0411 0.0588
D1 −D5 0.0588 0.0588 0.0526 0.0411 0.0588
Table 5.1: Score values with respect to the SSHP objective for time step t20, calculated for each
WS-threat pair to be utilised in the calculation of the final score values in the AHP.
Scores values T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0.0475 0.0320 0.0930 0.2679 0.0588
V2 0.0475 0.0320 0.1950 0.0843 0.0588
V3 0.0935 0.2056 0.0475 0.0432 0.0588
V4 0.0935 0.2056 0.0475 0.0432 0.0588
V5 0.0475 0.0320 0.0475 0.0432 0.0588
V6 0.0475 0.0320 0.0475 0.0432 0.0588
V7 0.0475 0.0320 0.0475 0.0432 0.0588
V8 0.0475 0.0320 0.0475 0.0432 0.0588
C1 0.0475 0.0320 0.0475 0.0432 0.0588
C2 0.1479 0.1170 0.0475 0.0432 0.0588
C3 0.0475 0.0597 0.0475 0.0432 0.0588
C4 0.0475 0.0324 0.0475 0.0432 0.0588
D1 −D5 0.0475 0.0324 0.0475 0.0432 0.0588
Table 5.2: Score values with respect to the SSHP objective for time step t35, calculated for each
WS-threat pair to be utilised in the calculation of the final score values in the AHP.
threat at each time step. These results are presented in Tables 5.4–5.6 for time steps t20, t35
and t39, respectively. These score values may be used to propose possible assignments of WSs
to the threats. Since WSs have to be assigned to multiple threats simultaneously, the threat
lists are employed for the purpose of this assignment. The threat lists are ranked in descending
order, as shown in Table 5.7 for time steps t20, t35 and t39, respectively. The threats are then
assigned WSs in order of their threat rankings. Consider, for example, time step t20. Threat
T4 will be assigned a WS first at this time step, followed by threat T3 and so forth, until the
entire set of threats have been assigned WSs.
Consider time step t35. Threat T5 has the highest threat value at this time step and is therefore
assigned a WS first. Considering the fifth column in Table 5.5 it is clear that WSsD1,D2,D3,D4
and D5 have the highest score value with respect to threat T5. Hence, any one of these WSs
may be considered for a possible assignment to threat T5. Suppose WS D1 is assigned to threat
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Scores values T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0.0302 0.0339 0.0843 0.0843 0.0432
V2 0.2773 0.0339 0.2679 0.2679 0.0432
V3 0.0567 0.0339 0.0432 0.0432 0.0432
V4 0.0302 0.0339 0.0432 0.0432 0.0432
V5 0.0302 0.0339 0.0432 0.0432 0.0432
V6 0.0302 0.0339 0.0432 0.0432 0.0843
V7 0.0302 0.0339 0.0432 0.0432 0.2679
V8 0.0302 0.0339 0.0432 0.0432 0.0432
C1 0.0861 0.1615 0.0432 0.0432 0.0432
C2 0.1868 0.3299 0.0432 0.0432 0.0432
C3 0.0302 0.0339 0.0432 0.0432 0.0432
C4 0.0302 0.0339 0.0432 0.0432 0.0432
D1 −D5 0.0302 0.0339 0.0432 0.0432 0.0432
Table 5.3: Score values with respect to the SSHP objective for time step t39, calculated for each
WS-threat pair to be utilised in the calculation of the final score values in the AHP.
Scores values T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0.0543 0.0543 0.0487 0.0384 0.0543
V2 0.0543 0.0543 0.0487 0.0384 0.0543
V3 0.0543 0.0543 0.0487 0.0384 0.0543
V4 0.0543 0.0543 0.0487 0.0384 0.0543
V5 0.0543 0.0543 0.0487 0.2387 0.0543
V6 0.0543 0.0543 0.0961 0.0735 0.0543
V7 0.0543 0.0543 0.0487 0.0384 0.0543
V8 0.0543 0.0543 0.0487 0.0384 0.0543
C1 0.0595 0.0595 0.0540 0.0436 0.0595
C2 0.0595 0.0595 0.0540 0.0436 0.0595
C3 0.0595 0.0595 0.1013 0.0436 0.0595
C4 0.0595 0.0595 0.0540 0.0436 0.0595
D1 −D5 0.0655 0.0655 0.0599 0.0496 0.0655
Table 5.4: The final score values for each of the WSs for time step t20.
T5, implying that no actual WS is assigned to threat T5.
The second threat to assign a WS to is the one with the second highest threat value, that is
threat T3. Considering the third column in Table 5.5, the WS with the highest overall score
value is recommended for assignment. This is WS V2, which means that WS V2 may not be
considered for any other assignment during time step t35.
The third threat to assign a WS to is threat T4. By considering column four in Table 5.5, WS
V1 achieves the highest overall score value with respect to threat T4, and is therefore assigned
to threat T4. By similarly considering column two in Table 5.5 it is clear that WSs V3 and V4
yield the highest overall score value with respect to threat T2 and any one of these WS may
therefore be assigned to threat T2. Finally, by considering column one in Table 5.5, it follows
that WS C2 should be assigned to threat T1.
The same procedure is followed to assign WSs to threats for time steps t20 and t35, respectively.
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Scores values T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0.0441 0.0301 0.0851 0.2424 0.0543
V2 0.0441 0.0301 0.1768 0.0772 0.0543
V3 0.0855 0.1864 0.0441 0.0402 0.0543
V4 0.0855 0.1864 0.0441 0.0402 0.0543
V5 0.0441 0.0301 0.0441 0.0402 0.0543
V6 0.0441 0.0301 0.0441 0.0402 0.0543
V7 0.0441 0.0301 0.0441 0.0402 0.0543
V8 0.0441 0.0301 0.0441 0.0402 0.0543
C1 0.0493 0.0354 0.0493 0.0455 0.0595
C2 0.1397 0.1062 0.0493 0.0455 0.0595
C3 0.0493 0.0604 0.0493 0.0455 0.0595
C4 0.0493 0.0358 0.0493 0.0455 0.0595
D1 −D5 0.0553 0.0417 0.0553 0.0514 0.0655
Table 5.5: The final score values for each of the WSs for time step t35.
Scores values T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0.0286 0.0319 0.0772 0.0772 0.0402
V2 0.2509 0.0319 0.2424 0.2424 0.0402
V3 0.0524 0.0319 0.0402 0.0402 0.0402
V4 0.0286 0.0319 0.0402 0.0402 0.0402
V5 0.0286 0.0319 0.0402 0.0402 0.0402
V6 0.0286 0.0319 0.0402 0.0402 0.0772
V7 0.0286 0.0319 0.0402 0.0402 0.2424
V8 0.0286 0.0319 0.0402 0.0402 0.0402
C1 0.0841 0.1519 0.0455 0.0455 0.0455
C2 0.1747 0.3035 0.0455 0.0455 0.0455
C3 0.0338 0.0371 0.0455 0.0455 0.0455
C4 0.0338 0.0371 0.0455 0.0455 0.0455
D1 −D5 0.0398 0.0431 0.0514 0.0514 0.0514
Table 5.6: The final score values for each of the WSs for time step t39.
Time step t20
Threat WS Rank
T4 0.92 1
T3 0.91 2
T5 0.06 3
T2 0.05 4
T1 0.04 5
Time step t35
Threat WS Rank
T5 1 1
T3 0.96 2
T4 0.95 3
T2 0.94 4
T1 0.91 5
Time step t39
Threat WS Rank
T2 1 1
T1 0.99 2
T3 0.76 3
T4 0.74 4
T5 0.50 5
Table 5.7: The ranked threat lists for time steps t20, t35 and t39, respectively.
The assignments of WSs to threats proposed at each time step are summarised in Table 5.8.
These assignments are also presented graphically in Figures 5.1–5.3 for time steps t20, t35 and
t39, respectively.
When considering time step t20 and examining Figure 5.1, the assignment of WS V5 to threat
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Time step t20
Threat WS
T4 V5
T3 C3
T5 D1/No WS
T2 D2/No WS
T1 D5/No WS
Time step t35
Threat WS
T5 D1/No WS
T3 V2
T4 V1
T2 V3 or V4
T1 C2
Time step t39
Threat WS
T2 C2
T1 V2
T3 V1
T4 D1/No WS
T5 V7
Table 5.8: The assignments of WSs proposed by the AHP in conjunction with the greedy assignment
heuristic for time steps t20, t35 and t39, respectively.
V3
V4
V6 V8
C1
C2
C4
V7
V5
C3
V2
V1
N
T3
2
6
.5
k
m
T1
T2
T5
T4
Threat flight path
WS-threat assignment
DA
Threat
CIWS
VSHORADS WS
Figure 5.1: A graphical illustration of the recommended assignments of WSs to threats T1, T2, T3, T4
and T5 obtained by the AHP in conjunction with the greedy assignment heuristic at time step t20.
T4 and the assignment of WS C3 to threat T3 seem plausible. Threats T1, T2 and T5 are not
assigned any actual WSs.
When considering time step t35 and examining Figure 5.2, the assignment of the WSs to the
threats seem plausible. However, it seems more intuitive to assign WS V7 to threat T5. However,
WS V7 has a SSHP value of zero with respect to threat T5. This is due to the orientation of
WS V7 (which is parallel to the direction from whence threat T5 approaches) — threat T5 is in
a so-called blind spot of WS V7, implying a SSHP value of zero.
The assignment model (4.5)–(4.9) discussed in §4.3 may also be used to find possible assignments
of WSs with respect to threats T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5. The model was coded in the software
suite Lingo 11.0 [34], and was solved for time steps t20, t35 and t39. To enable a possible
comparison between the results obtained by means of the greedy assignment procedure and
the AHP assignment model, the parameter value of k is set to the value 1, implying that a
maximum of one WS may be assigned to each threat.
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Figure 5.2: A graphical illustration of the recommended assignments of WSs to threats T1, T2, T3, T4
and T5 obtained by the AHP in conjunction with the greedy assignment heuristic at time step t35.
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Figure 5.3: A graphical illustration of the recommended assignments of WSs to threats T1, T2, T3, T4
and T5 obtained by the AHP in conjunction with the greedy assignment heuristic at time step t39.
For each time step, the score values in Tables 5.4–Table 5.6 and the corresponding threat list in
Table 4.3 are used as input. The proposed assignment lists as well as the corresponding objective
function value (denoted by S) and the total cost of the assigned WSs are summarised for each
time step in Table 5.9. The assignments are also presented graphically in Figures 5.4–Figure 5.6
for time steps t20, t35 and t39, respectively.
When comparing the proposed assignments from the greedy assignment heuristic and the pro-
posed assignments obtained by means of the AHP assignment model (4.5)–(4.9), it is evident
from Figures 5.1–5.6 that both methods propose the exact same assignments. This may be due
to the small number of WSs and threats present in the system. If a large number of WSs and
threats are present, these models may deliver different results.
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Time step t20
Threat WS
T1 D1/No WS
T2 D5/No WS
T3 C3
T4 V5
T5 D3/No WS
S 0.3216
Cost R 1 034 000
Time step t35
Threat t35
T1 C2
T2 V4
T3 V2
T4 V1
T5 D1/No WS
S 0.7678
Cost R 3 034 000
Time step t39
Threat t39
T1 V2
T2 C2
T3 V1
T4 D2/No WS
T5 V7
S 0.7679
Cost R 3 034 000
Table 5.9: The assignments of WSs proposed by the AHP assignment model (4.5)–(4.9) for time steps
t20, t35 and t39.
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Figure 5.4: A graphical illustration of the recommended assignments of WSs to threats T1, T2, T3, T4
and T5 obtained by the AHP assignment model (4.5)–(4.9) for time step t20.
All the results presented thus far were generated subject to the constraint that a maximum
of k = 1 WS may be assigned to a threat. To illustrate how the model works if the value of
k is increased, results of the AHP model (4.5)–(4.9) are presented for time step t35 with the
parameter value k = 2. Using the same input values as previously described, the assignments
proposed by the model are presented in Table 5.10. These proposed assignments are also
presented graphically in Figure 5.7. The model works in such a way that it will assign the
maximum number of WSs (denoted by k) to each threat until there are no more WSs available.
Hence, in the case where k = 2, two WSs are assigned to each threat. In Figure 5.7 it is
illustrated that when k = 2, the model assigns the same WSs as in the case when k = 1
together with an additional WS to each threat. From the results in Table 5.10, it is clear that
the additional WSs assigned are all dummy WSs, except for the extra assignment of WS V4 to
threat T2. These results seem plausible.
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Figure 5.5: A graphical illustration of the recommended assignments of WSs to threats T1, T2, T3, T4
and T5 obtained by the AHP assignment model (4.5)–(4.9) for time step t35.
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Figure 5.6: A graphical illustration of the recommended assignment of WSs to threats T1, T2, T3, T4
and T5 obtained by the AHP assignment model (4.5)–(4.9) for time step t39.
If the objective function values are considered, there is an increase of 0.1725 in the total score
values of the WSs assigned when two WS may be assigned to a threat for time step t35. This
is due to the additional assignment of WS V4 to threat T2. The extra assignment of WS V4
results in a better efficiency with respect to threat T4; however, this results in an increase in
the accumulated cost of assigning WSs of R 1 000 000.
The results obtained by means of both the greedy assignment heuristic as well as the AHP
assignment model in (4.5)–(4.9) are able to achieve a trade-off between the efficiency of WSs
assigned and the cost incurred in assigning these WSs, since an increase in the efficiency of WSs
results in an increase in the cost incurred in assigning these WSs. Although the AHP seems
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Time step t35
Threat WS
T1 C2 and D8/No WS
T2 V3 and V4
T3 V2 and D6/No WS
T4 V1 and D9/No WS
T5 D1 and D10
S 0.9403
Cost R 4 034 000
Table 5.10: The assignments of WSs proposed by the AHP assignment model (4.5)–(4.9) for time step
t35, with k = 2.
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Figure 5.7: A graphical illustration of the recommended assignments of WSs to threats T1, T2, T3, T4
and T5 obtained by the AHP assignment model (4.5)–(4.9) for time step t35, with k = 2.
to present plausible results, the processes involved in the assessments of score values are very
tedious. Another disadvantage is that if an additional alternative is added to the current set
of alternatives, a new pairwise comparison matrix has to be populated from start in order to
calculate new score values for each of the alternatives.
5.2 Results obtained by means of the additive utility function
The additive utility function u(x, y) = 0.9uSSHP(x) + 0.1ucost(y), derived in §4.4.5, was used to
evaluate a combined utility value for each WS-threat pair with respect to the cost and SSHP
objectives. Since the SSHP values change during each time step, a new combined utility value
has to be evaluated for each WS-threat pair with respect to the SSHP and cost objectives at
each time step of the scenario presented in §4.2. Once the combined utility values have been
evaluated, the WS-threat pair yielding the highest utility value with respect to a specific threat
may be recommended as the best alternative amongst the other WSs for possible assignment.
Again only time steps t20, t35 and t39 are considered to illustrate the working of WA via the
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additive utility function. The EEMs in Table 4.4 were used as input to uSSHP(x) and the cost
values corresponding to each WS were used as input to ucost(y). By using the additive utility
function
u(x, y) = 0.9(uSSHP(x)) + 0.1(1 − 1× 10
−6y), (5.1)
combined utility values were evaluated for each WS-threat pair for each time step, as shown in
Tables 5.11–5.13 for time steps t20, t35 and t39, respectively.
Utility values T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 0 0
V2 0 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0.2250 0
V6 0 0 0.0140 0.0140 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966
C2 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966
C3 0.0966 0.0966 0.1106 0.1106 0.0966
C4 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966
D1–D5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Table 5.11: The combined utility values for each of the WS-threat pairs for time step t20.
Utility values T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0.0140 0.2250 0
V2 0 0 0.0562 0.0140 0
V3 0.0140 0.2250 0 0 0
V4 0.0140 0.2250 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966
C2 0.1247 0.1529 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966
C3 0.0966 0.1106 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966
C4 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966
D1–D5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Table 5.12: The combined utility values for each of the WS-threat pairs for time step t35.
When only a single threat is observed to which WSs have to be assigned, an assignment may
easily be proposed by choosing the WS yielding the highest utility value with respect to that
threat. However, when multiple threats are considered simultaneously, the WA problem may
be solved by employing the threat priorities of the threats contained in the threat lists. The
ranked threat list in Table 5.7 was used again in conjunction with a greedy assignment heuristic
to assign WSs to threats in order of their rank. The heuristic involves a process where the
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Utility values T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0.0140 0.0140 0
V2 0.4500 0 0.2250 0.2250 0
V3 0.0140 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0.0140
V7 0 0 0 0 0.2250
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0.1248 0.2091 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966
C2 0.3216 0.7716 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966
C3 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966
C4 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966 0.0966
D1–D5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Table 5.13: The combined utility values for each of the WS-threat pairs for time step t39.
highest ranked threat is assigned a WS first by assigning the WS yielding the highest utility
value with respect to the specific threat. Thereafter a WS is assigned to the threat involving the
second highest rank by assigning the WS yielding the highest utility value with respect to the
specific threat provided that this WS has not already been assigned to a higher ranked threat.
This process continues until all the threats have been assigned a WS. If it happens that a WS
yielding the highest utility value with respect to a specific threat has already been assigned to a
higher ranked threat, the WS yielding the second highest utility value may be assigned to that
specific threat.
To illustrate the working of the process, consider time step t39. Since threat T2 involves the
lowest rank, it is considered first. When examining column two in Table 5.13, it is found that
WS C2 yields the highest utility value with respect to T2 and it is therefore assigned to threat
T2.
Since threat T1 achieves the second highest rank, it is considered next. By examining the first
column in Table 5.13, it is found that WS V2 yields the highest utility value with respect to T1
and it is therefore assigned to threat T1. Threat T3 is considered next, and by examining the
third column in Table 5.13, it is found that WS V2 should be assigned to threat T3. However,
WS V2 has already been assigned to threat T1. Hence, the WS yielding the second highest
utility value should instead be assigned to threat T1. WSs D1–D5 yield the same second highest
utility values with respect to threat T3. Suppose WS D1 is assigned to threat T3, implying that
no actual WS is assigned to threat T3. Threat T4 is considered next, and by examining the
forth column in Table 5.13, it is found that WS V2 should be assigned to threat T4, however,
WS V2 is already assigned to threat T1. The WS yielding the second highest utility value with
respect to threat T4 is WSs D1–D5. Since WS D1 has already been assigned to a higher ranked
threat, any one of the remaining dummy WSs may be assigned to threat T4. Suppose WS D2
is assigned to threat T4, again implying that no actual WS is assigned to threat T4. Finally,
threat T5 is considered, and by examining the fifth column in Table 5.13, it is found that WS
V7 yields the highest utility value with respect to T5. This WS is therefore assigned to threat
T5.
The greedy assignment heuristic was also applied at time steps t20 and t35, respectively, to find
possible assignments of WSs to threats. The proposed assignments for all three time steps are
summarised in Table 5.14 and are also presented graphically in Figures 5.8–5.10 for time steps
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t20, t35 and t39, respectively.
Time step t20
Threat WS
T4 V5
T3 C3
T5 D1/No WS
T2 D2/No WS
T1 D3/No WS
Time step t35
Threat WS
T5 D1/No WS
T3 D2/No WS
T4 V1
T2 V3 or V4
T1 C2
Time step t39
Threat WS
T2 C2
T1 V2
T3 D1/No WS
T4 D2/No WS
T5 V7
Table 5.14: The assignment of WSs by means of the additive utility function u(x, y) in (4.13), in
conjunction with the greedy assignment heuristic for time steps t20, t35 and t39, respectively.
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Figure 5.8: Graphical illustration of the assignments of WSs to threats obtained by means of the
additive utility function u(x, y) in (4.13), in conjunction with the greedy assignment heuristic for time
step t20.
When considering time step t20 and examining Figure 5.8, the assignments of WSs V5 and C3
to threats T4 and T3, respectively, seem intuitively plausible.
When considering time step t35 and examining Figure 5.9, the assignment of WSs C2, V3 (or
V4) and V1 to threats T1, T2 and T4, respectively, also seem acceptable from an intuitive point
of view. A strange occurrence is the assignment of WS D2 to threat T3, since WS V2 achieves a
SSHP value of 0.3 as opposed to the SSHP value of 0 achieved by WS D2 with respect to threat
T3. The reason for this assignment is that a VSHORAD WS achieving a SSHP value of 0.3,
yields a utility uSSHP(0.3) = 0.0625 and if scaled by kSSHP = 0.9, yields a scaled utility value
of 0.0563. Since a VSHORAD achieves the highest cost value in the scenario, its utility value
ucost(R 1 000 000) = 0, and when scaling this value by kcost = 0.1, yields the scaled utility value
0. Hence, the combined utility value of a VSHORAD WS achieving a SSHP of 0.3 is evaluated
as ux,y(0.3, R 1 000 000) = 0.0563.
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Figure 5.9: Graphical illustration of the assignments of WSs to threats obtained by means of the
additive utility function u(x, y) in (4.13), in conjunction with the greedy assignment heuristic for time
step t35.
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Figure 5.10: Graphical illustration of the assignments of WSs to threats obtained by means the additive
utility function u(x, y) in (4.13), in conjunction with the greedy assignment heuristic for time step t39.
The utility value for a dummy WS (i.e. with a SSHP of 0) may be evaluated as uSSHP(0) = 0
and if scaled by kSSHP = 0.9, yields the scaled utility value of 0. Since a dummy WS achieves the
lowest cost value with respect to the other WSs in the scenario, the utility value ucost(R 0) = 1 is
evaluated, and if scaled by kcost = 0.1 yields the scaled utility value of 0.1. Hence, the combined
utility value of a dummy WS achieving a SSHP of 0 is evaluated as ux,y(0, R 0) = 0.0966. Since
the dummy WS achieves a higher utility value, it is recommended for an assignment, implying
that no actual WS is assigned.
From these evaluations it is clear that when only the SSHP values are employed in the decision
to assign WSs to threats, a VSHORAD WS achieving a SSHP of 0.3 should rather be consid-
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ered for assignment than no assignment at all. However, when the SSHP values are used in
conjunction with the cost values, the VSHORAD is heavily penalized in the utility function for
cost, since xcost(R 1 000 000) = 0. On the other hand, the dummy WS is rewarded in the utility
function for cost, since xcost(R 0) = 1. Only if the SSHP value of the VSHORAD increases to
a value of 0.4 should the VSHORAD be recommended for an assignment, since a utility value
ux,y(0.4, R 1 000 000) = 0.1125 is obtained.
Sensitivity analysis with respect to the SSHP values of a CIWS revealed that if a CIWS achieves
a SSHP value of as low as 0.1, it should be recommended for an assignment rather than not
assigning it, since ux,y(0.1, R 34 000) = 0.1106.
Sensitivity analysis with respect to the SSHP values of a VSHORAD WS and a CIWS revealed
that if a VSHORAD achieves a SSHP value of 0.4 and a CIWS achieves a SSHP value of 0.3,
the CIWS should be recommended for assignment, since ux,y(0.4, R 1 000 000) = 0.1125 for the
VSHORAD WS while ux,y(0.3, R 34 000) = 0.1529 for the CIWS. The reason for this is also that
the VSHORAD is penalized due to its high cost value. However, only if a VSHORAD achieves
a SSHP value of 0.5 and a CIWS achieves a SSHP value of 0.4, only then should a VSHORAD
WS be recommended for assignment rather than the CIWS, since ux,y(0.5, R 1 000 000) = 0.2250
for the VSHORAD WS while ux,y(0.4, R 34 000) = 0.2091 for the CIWS.
When considering time step t39 and examining Figure 5.10, the assignments of WSs V2, C2 and
V7 to threats T1, T2 and T5, respectively, all seem plausible.
An alternative approach towards the assignment of WSs to threats is to employ the utility
assignment model (4.14)–(4.18) discussed in §4.4.5. The model was coded in the software suite
Lingo 11.0 [34] and the model was solved for time steps t20, t35 and t39, respectively. The
parameter value k was set to a value of 1, implying that only one WS may be assigned to each
threat. The reason for this was to allow for possibility of comparing the assignments proposed
by the greedy assignment procedure and the assignments proposed by the utility assignment
model.
The combined evaluated utility values in Tables 5.11– 5.13, as well as the corresponding threat
lists in Table 4.3 are used as input to the utility assignment model for each time step. The
output obtained is the proposed assignments of WSs with respect to threats as well as the
corresponding total utility value (denoted by U) of the WSs assigned. The proposed assignments
together with their corresponding objective function values as well as the cost involved in the
proposed assignments are presented in Table 5.15 for each time step. These assignments are
also presented graphically in Figures 5.11–5.13 for time steps t20, t35 and t39, respectively.
Time step t20
Threat WS
T4 V5
T3 C3
T5 D1/No WS
T2 D2/No WS
T1 D3/No WS
U 0.3227
Cost R 1 034 000
Time step t35
Threat WS
T5 D1
T3 D2
T4 V1
T2 V3
T1 C2
U 0.7348
Cost R 2 034 000
Time step t39
Threat WS
T2 C2
T1 V2
T3 D2/No WS
T4 D1/No WS
T5 V7
U 1.4796
Cost R 2 034 000
Table 5.15: The assignment of WSs by means of the utility assignment model (4.14)–(4.18) for time
steps t20, t35 and t39, respectively.
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Figure 5.11: Graphical illustration of the recommended assignment of WSs to threats obtained by
means of the utility assignment model (4.14)–(4.18) for time step t20.
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Figure 5.12: Graphical illustration of the recommended assignment of WSs to threats obtained by
means of the utility assignment model (4.14)–(4.18) for time step t35.
When comparing the assignments proposed by the greedy assignment heuristic and the assign-
ments proposed by the utility assignment model (4.14)–(4.18) for all three time steps, it is found
that the exact same assignments are proposed at each time step, respectively.
The results presented thus far in this section were obtained subject to the constraint that only
one WS may be assigned to a specific threat at a time. To illustrate the working of the utility
assignment model (4.14)–(4.18) if this restriction is relaxed to allow a maximum of two WSs
to be assigned to a specific threat, consider the utility assignment model for time step t39 with
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Figure 5.13: Graphical illustration of the recommended assignment of WSs to threats obtained by
means of the utility assignment model (4.14)–(4.18) for time step t39.
k = 2. The assignments proposed by the utility assignment model (4.14)–(4.18) with k = 2 are
presented in Table 5.16 and are also shown graphically in Figure 5.14. The utility assignment
model works in such a way that it will assign the maximum specified number of WSs to each
threat, until all the available WSs are considered for an assignment. Therefore, if k = 2, two
WSs are assigned to each threat. When comparing the results obtained when k = 1 to the
results obtained when k = 2, it is found that similar assignments are made, but in the case
where k = 2 an additional assignment of WS C1 is made to threat T2. The reason for this is
that WS C1 achieves a SSHP value of 0.4 with respect to threat T2. It can therefore contribute
towards the accumulated efficiency of WSs with respect to this threat and hence it is assigned.
The result of the additional assignment of WS C1 is an increase in the accumulated utility value
U of 0.5081 and an increase in the accumulated cost of R 34 000.
Time step t39
Threat WS
T1 V2 and D3
T2 C1 and C2
T3 D7 and D10/No WS
T4 D8 and D9/No WS
T5 V7 and D2
U 1.9877
Cost R 2 068 000
Table 5.16: The assignment of WSs by the utility assignment model (4.14)–(4.18) for time step t39,
with k = 2.
The conclusion may therefore be drawn that both the greedy assignment heuristic and the
utility assignment model (4.14)–(4.18) are able to achieve an acceptable trade-off between the
efficiency of WSs assigned to threats and the cost incurred by assigning these WSs, since an
increase in the efficiency of WSs with respect to threats results in an increase in the cost incurred
by assigning these WSs. Although the utility model is able to achieve a trade-off between the
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Figure 5.14: Graphical illustration of the recommended assignment of WSs to threats obtained by
means of the utility assignment model (4.14)–(4.18) for time step t39, with k = 2.
objectives, it only provides a single solution at each time step. A more desirable approach
may be to investigate a model which is able to present a number of nondominated solutions
for each time step, simultaneously achieving trade-off between the two objectives of all the
nondominated solutions. In this way, the decision maker may be presented with a number of
good quality solutions from which he may choose.
A disadvantage of the utility functional approach is that the processes involved in finding a
utility function for each of the individual objectives, are very tedious. The assessments carried
out during the evaluation of a utility function are also subject to the input of a decision maker.
The implication is that the assessments carried out in conjunction with the decision maker
may differ if the assessments are carried out with a different decision maker. In view of the
bi-objective WA model, this implies that different results may be obtained if a different military
expert were employed to act as the decision maker.
Another disadvantage of the utility functional approach is that if any additional alternatives are
added to the current set of alternatives which achieve values falling outside the current range
of values in any one of the objectives, a large portion of the assessments have to be reevaluated
in order to obtain a new utility function for the relevant objective.
5.3 NSGA II results
The pareto optimal solutions to the bi-objective WA model (4.1)–(4.4), were obtained for each
time step by means of the computer-implemented version of the NSGA II. The model was solved
in the context of the proposed scenario in §4.2 for time steps t20, t35 and t39, respectively. The
survival probabilities of threats with respect to each WS used in conjunction with the threat
lists corresponding to each time step served as input to the NSGA II. The initial population of
solutions were generated by randomly assigning WSs to threats for each solution.
Another input requirement of the NSGA II is to specify the parameter values for the algorithm.
These values include the number of iterations, the size of the population of solutions, the tour
size and pool size in the selection procedure, and the probability of a mutation occurring. The
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aim is to find the set of parameter values which will yield a good spread of pareto optimal
solutions. An initial set of parameter values were chosen where the number of iterations were
fixed at 350, the size of the population of solutions was 200 and the tour and pool sizes involved
in the selection process were 2 and 100, respectively, since a tour size is commonly chosen
between 2 and 5 and the pool size is commonly chosen to be half the size of the population
[38]. The probability of a mutation occurring should be chosen relatively small; a commonly
employed value of 1/n was therefore chosen, where n denotes the number of decision variables,
yielding a value of 0.014. These initial parameter values used in the NSGA II are summarised
in Table 5.17.
Parameter Value
Number of iterations 350
Population size 200
Tour size 2
Pool size 100
Mutation probability 0.014
Table 5.17: The initial parameter values used in the NSGA II.
In order to find the set of parameter values which may result in a good spread of pareto optimal
solutions, a sensitivity analysis was performed with respect to the parameters in Table 5.17.
This was achieved by solving the WA problem for the scenario in §4.2 at time step t35 with the
parameter values presented in Table 5.17 and varying the values of each of these parameters
separately while keeping the remaining parameter values fixed at the initial solutions. After
performing a sensitivity analysis in this fashion it was found that when changing the value of the
number of iterations from 350, to 500 and to 750, respectively, while keeping the values of the
remaining parameters fixed, yields the same spread of solutions on the pareto frontier. It was
also found that a number of iterations of 350 yields a better spread of solutions on the pareto
frontier than a value of 200. The number of iterations was therefore kept fixed at a maximum
of 350 for each time step of the scenario in §4.2.
The size of the population was changed to a value of 300 while keeping the values of the
remaining parameters fixed. It was found that the same spread of solutions was obtained as for
a population of size 200. Since an increase in the population size yields no significant increase
in the quality of the solutions obtained, the size of the population was kept fixed at 200 for
each time step of the scenario in §4.2. The tour size and pool size were also changed to values
of 4 and 150, respectively, while keeping the values of the remaining parameters fixed. These
changes yielded the same spread of pareto optimal solutions as the solutions obtained when
the values were 2 and 100, respectively, and the values were therefore kept fixed at 2 and 100,
respectively, for each each time step of the scenario in §4.2. Finally, since the probability of
mutating should be small, it was decided to keep it fixed at 0.014 for each time step of the
scenario in §4.2.
The NSGA II provides a number of solutions simultaneously in the bi-objective solution space.
Since one is interested only in the nondominated solutions contained in the first front (i.e.
the approximately pareto optimal solutions), the focus of the presentation of results in this
section is on the solutions contained in the set of approximately pareto optimal solutions. The
interested reader is referred to Appendix C for a graphical presentation of the entire set of
solutions uncovered in the bi-objective decision space for each time step of the scenario in §4.2.
The entire set of solutions corresponding to time step t20 is presented graphically in Figure C.1
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in Appendix C. The set of approximately pareto optimal solutions contains five solutions
and these solutions together with their corresponding objective function values (accumulated
survival probability objective and in rand value (R) for the cost objective) are listed in Table 5.18
and presented graphically in Figure 5.15.
Approximately Pareto optimal
solutions for time step t20
Accumulated
Solution survival probabilities Cost
1 1.3444 R 2 034 000
2 1.4260 R 1 034 000
3 1.5166 R 1 000 000
4 1.8836 R 34 000
5 1.9754 R 0
Table 5.18: The set of approximately pareto optimal solutions obtained by the NSGA II for time step
t20 of the scenario in §4.2.
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Figure 5.15: Graphical illustration of the set of approximately pareto optimal solutions obtained by
means of the NSGA II for time step t20 of the scenario in §4.2.
The proposed assignments of WSs to threats corresponding to each of the solutions in the
approximate pareto front are for time step t20 presented in Table C.1 in Appendix C and these
assignments are summarised in Table 5.19. By examining the results in Table 5.19, it is found
that Solution 1 achieves an accumulated survival probability of the threats of 1.3444 and a cost
value of R 2 034 000, and involves the assignment of WSs V6 and C3 to threat T3 and WS V5
to threat T4. The other threats are not assigned any WSs, since the available WSs achieve a
SSHP value of zero with respect to these threats. Solution 2 achieves an accumulated survival
probability of the threats of 1.4260 and a cost value of R 1 034 000, and involves the assignment
of WS C3 to threat T3 and WS V5 to threat T4. Solution 3 achieves an accumulated survival
probability of the threats of 1.5166 and a cost value of R 1 000 000, and involves the assignment
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Solution 1 at t20
Threat WS
T1 None
T2 None
T3 V6 and C3
T4 V5
T5 None
Accumulated pi 1.3444
Cost in R 2 034 000
Solution 2 at t20
Threat WS
T1 None
T2 None
T3 C3
T4 V5
T5 None
Accumulated pi 1.4260
Cost R 1 034 000
Solution 3 at t20
Threat WS
T1 None
T2 None
T3 None
T4 V5
T5 None
Accumulated pi 1.5166
Cost R 1 000 000
Solution 4 at t20
Threat WS
T1 None
T2 None
T3 None
T4 C3
T5 None
Accumulated pi 1.8836
Cost R 34 000
Solution 5 at t20
Threat WS
T1 None
T2 None
T3 None
T4 None
T5 None
Accumulated pi 1.9754
Cost R 0
Table 5.19: The assignment of WSs proposed by the NSGA II for each of the fire solutions on the
approximate pareto frontier for time step t20 shown in Figure 5.15.
of WS V5 to threat T4. Finally, Solution 4 achieves an accumulated survival probability of the
threats of 1.8836 and a cost value of R 34 000, and involves the assignment of WS C3 to threat
T4. Solution 5 involves no assignment of WSs to threats.
By examining these results, it is clear that in the first solution a WSs is assigned to a threat if
it achieves a SSHP value greater than zero with respect to the threat. This solution yields the
maximum value in the cost objective and the minimum value in the survival probability objective
for the current time step. In the next solution, Solution 2, it is found that the assignment of
WSs remains the same, except for assigning only WS C3 to threat T3, rather than assigning
WSs V6 and C3 to threat T3. The cost therefore decreases, but there is a slight increase in total
survival probabilities of the threats. Solutions 3 and 4 follow suite until no WSs are assigned to
any of the threats in Solution 5. Solution 5 yields the maximum value of the survival probability
objective and the minimum value of the cost objective for time step t20.
Fifteen solutions were obtained in the approximately pareto optimal set of solutions for time
step t35. These solutions, together with their corresponding objective function values, are listed
in Table 5.20 and presented graphically in Figure 5.16. The entire set of solutions in the bi-
objective decision space are presented in Table C.2 in Appendix C. The proposed assignment
of WSs to threats corresponding to each of the solutions in the approximately pareto optimal
set of solutions, are presented in Tables C.2 and C.3 in Appendix C. A summarised version of
these assignments are presented in Table 5.21.
When examining these results it is found that Solution 1 entails assignment of an available WS
to a threat if it achieves a SSHP value of greater than zero with respect to the threat. Following
the solutions from the top left along the approximate pareto optimal frontier results in similar
assignments, except that one fewer assignment is proposed with respect to one of the threats at
each of the solutions. This results in a decrease in the overall cost value and a slight increase
in the accumulated survival probabilities of the threats.
Finally, ten solutions were obtained in the set of approximately pareto optimal solutions for
time step t39. The entire set of solutions in the bi-objective decision space are presented in
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Approximately Pareto optimal
solutions for time step t35
Accumulated
Solution survival probabilities Cost
1 3.0925 R 4 068 000
2 3.1161 R 4 034 000
3 3.2991 R 4 000 000
4 3.3050 R 3 068 000
5 3.3522 R 3 034 000
6 3.5351 R 3 000 000
7 3.5939 R 2 068 000
8 3.6412 R 2 034 000
9 3.8240 R 2 000 000
10 3.9468 R 1 068 000
11 4.0129 R 1 034 000
12 4.2962 R 1 000 000
13 4.4209 R 68 000
14 4.4870 R 34 000
15 4.7703 R 0
Table 5.20: The set of approximately pareto optimal solutions obtained by the NSGA II for time step
t35 of the scenario in §4.2.
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Figure 5.16: Graphical illustration of the set of approximately pareto optimal solutions obtained by
means of the NSGA II for time step t35 of the scenario in §4.2.
Figure C.3 in Appendix C. The set of pareto optimal solutions together with their corresponding
objective function values for time step t39 are listed in Table 5.22 and presented graphically in
Figure 5.17. The proposed assignment of WSs to threats corresponding to solutions contained
on the approximate pareto optimal frontier are presented in Tables C.4 and C.5 in Appendix C,
and these results are summarised in Table 5.23.
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Solution 1 at t35
Threat WS
T1 C2
T2 V3, V4 and C3
T3 V2
T4 V1
T5 None
Accumulated pi 3.0925
Cost R 4 068 000
Solution 2 at t35
Threat WS
T1 C2
T2 V3 and V4
T3 V2
T4 V1
T5 None
Accumulated pi 3.1161
Cost R 4 034 000
Solution 3 at t35
Threat WS
T1 None
T2 V3 and V4
T3 V2
T4 V1
T5 None
Accumulated pi 3.2991
Cost R 4 000 000
Solution 4 at t35
Threat WS
T1 C2
T2 V3 and C3
T3 V2
T4 V1
T5 None
Accumulated pi 3.3050
Cost R 3 068 000
Solution 5 at t35
Threat WS
T1 C2
T2 V3
T3 V2
T4 V1
T5 None
Accumulated pi 3.3522
Cost R 3 034 000
Solution 6 at t35
Threat WS
T1 None
T2 V3
T3 V2
T4 V1
T5 None
Accumulated pi 3.5351
Cost R 3 000 000
Solution 7 at t35
Threat WS
T1 C2
T2 V3 and C3
T3 None
T4 V1
T5 None
Accumulated pi 3.5939
Cost R 2 068 000
Solution 8 at t35
Threat WS
T1 C2
T2 V3
T3 None
T4 V1
T5 None
Accumulated pi 3.6412
Cost R 2 034 000
Solution 9 at t35
Threat WS
T1 None
T2 V3
T3 None
T4 V1
T5 None
Accumulated pi 3.8240
Cost R 2 000 000
Solution 10 at t35
Threat WS
T1 None
T2 C2 and C3
T3 None
T4 V1
T5 None
Accumulated pi 3.9468
Cost R 1 068 000
Solution 11 at t35
Threat WS
T1 None
T2 C2
T3 None
T4 V1
T5 None
Accumulated pi 4.0129
Cost R 1 034 000
Solution 12 at t35
Threat WS
T1 None
T2 None
T3 None
T4 V1
T5 None
Accumulated pi 4.2962
Cost R 1 000 000
Solution 13 at t35
Threat WS
T1 None
T2 C2 and C3
T3 None
T4 None
T5 None
Accumulated pi 4.4209
Cost R 68 000
Solution 14 at t35
Threat WS
T1 None
T2 C2
T3 None
T4 None
T5 None
Accumulated pi 4.4870
Cost R 34 000
Solution 15 at t35
Threat WS
T1 None
T2 None
T3 None
T4 None
T5 None
Accumulated pi 4.7703
Cost R 0
Table 5.21: The assignment of WSs proposed by the NSGA II for each of the fifteen fire solutions on
the approximate pareto frontier for time step t35 shown in Figure 5.16.
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Approximately Pareto optimal
solutions for time step t39
Accumulated
Solution survival probabilities Cost in R ′000
1 1.9613 R 5 068 000
2 1.9852 R 4 068 000
3 2.0102 R 3 068 000
4 2.0702 R 3 034 000
5 2.0858 R 2 068 000
6 2.1457 R 2 034 000
7 2.3358 R 1 068 000
8 2.3957 R 1 034 000
9 2.8952 R 68 000
10 3.0949 R 34 000
Table 5.22: The set of approximately pareto optimal solutions obtained by the NSGA II for time step
t39 of the scenario in §4.2.
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Figure 5.17: Graphical illustration of the set of approximately pareto optimal solutions obtained by
means of the NSGA II for time step t39 of the scenario in §4.2.
When considering Solution 1 of the set of approximately pareto optimal solutions for time step
t39 it is found that WSs V2, V3 and C1 are assigned to threat T1, WS C2 is assigned to threat
T2, WS V1 is assigned to threat T3 and WSs V6 and V7 are assigned to threat T5. No WSs
are assigned to Threat T4. Since WS V2 achieves a SSHP value of 0.7 with respect to threat
T1 as opposed to a SSHP value of 0.5 with respect to threat T4 and the fact that threat T1 is
considered a higher priority threat than threat T4, WS V2 is assigned to threat T1 rather than
assigned to threat T4. The same reason applies for assigning WS V1 to threat T3 rather than
assigning it to threat T4. The remaining WSs achieves SSHP of zero with respect to threat T4.
Hence, no WS is assigned to threat T4. Solution 1 in the set of approximately pareto optimal
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Solution 1 at t39
Threat WS
T1 V2, V3 and C1
T2 C2
T3 V1
T4 None
T5 V6 and V7
Accumulated pi 1.9613
Cost in R 5 068 000
Solution 2 at t39
Threat WS
T1 V2 and C1
T2 C2
T3 V1
T4 None
T5 V6 and V7
Accumulated pi 1.9852
Cost R 4 068 000
Solution 3 at t39
Threat WS
T1 V2 and C1
T2 C2
T3 V1
T4 None
T5 V7
Accumulated pi 2.0102
Cost R 3 068 000
Solution 4 at t39
Threat WS
T1 V2
T2 C2
T3 V1
T4 None
T5 V7
Accumulated pi 2.0702
Cost R 3 034 000
Solution 5 at t39
Threat WS
T1 V2 and C1
T2 C2
T3 None
T4 None
T5 V7
Accumulated pi 2.0858
Cost R 2 068 000
Solution 6 at t39
Threat WS
T1 V2
T2 C2
T3 None
T4 None
T5 V7
Accumulated pi 2.1457
Cost R 2 034 000
Solution 7 at t39
Threat WS
T1 V2 and C1
T2 C2
T3 None
T4 None
T5 None
Accumulated pi 2.3358
Cost R 1 068 000
Solution 8 at t39
Threat WS
T1 V2
T2 C2
T3 None
T4 None
T5 None
Accumulated pi 2.3957
Cost R 1 034 000
Solution 9 at t39
Threat WS
T1 C1
T2 C2
T3 None
T4 None
T5 None
Accumulated pi 2.8952
Cost R 68 000
Solution 10 at t39
Threat WS
T1 None
T2 C2
T3 None
T4 None
T5 None
Accumulated pi 3.0949
Cost R 34 000
Table 5.23: The assignment of WSs proposed by the NSGA II for each of the ten fire solutions on the
approximate pareto frontier for time step t39 shown in Figure 5.17.
solutions for time step t39 represents the maximum value achieved for the cost objective and
the minimum value achieved for the accumulated survival probabilities at time step t39. The
assignments of WSs to threats for Solution 1 for time step t39 are presented graphically in
Figure 5.18.
When considering Solution 3 of the set of approximately pareto optimal solutions for time step
t39 it is found that similar assignments are proposed as the assignments proposed in Solution
1, except for only assigning WSs V2 and C1 to threat T1, rather than assigning WSs V2, V3 and
C1 to threat T1, and only assigning WS V7 to threat T5, rather than assigning WSs V6 and V7
to threat T5. This results in a decrease in the total cost value of R 2 000 000 and an increase in
the accumulated survival probabilities of threats of 0.0489. The assignments of WSs to threats
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Figure 5.18: Graphical illustration of the assignment of WSs to threats obtained by means of the
NSGA II for Solution 1 at time step t39.
corresponding to Solution 3 in the set of approximately pareto optimal solutions for time step
t39 are presented graphically in Figure 5.19.
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Figure 5.19: Graphical illustration of the assignments of WSs to threats obtained by means of the
NSGA II for Solution 3 at time step t39.
Next, consider Solution 6 of the set of approximately pareto optimal solutions for time step t39.
The assignments contained in this solution are similar to the assignments proposed in Solution
3, except for the assignment of only WS V2 to threat T1, rather than assigning WSs V2 and C2 to
threat T1, while no assignments are made to threat T3 rather than assigning WS V1 to threat T3.
The result of this assignment is a decrease in the cost value of R 1 034 000 and an increase in the
accumulated survival probabilities of threats of 0.1355. The proposed assignments corresponding
to Solution 6 for time step t39 are presented graphically in Figure 5.20.
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Figure 5.20: Graphical illustration of the assignment of WSs to threats obtained by means of the
NSGA II for Solution 6 at time step t39.
In Solution 8 of the set of approximately pareto optimal solutions for time step t39, similar
assignments are proposed as in the assignments proposed in solution 6, except that no WSs are
assigned to threat T5, rather than assigning WS V7 to threat T5. This results in a decrease in
the cost value of R 1 000 000 and an increase in the accumulated survival probabilities of threats
of 0.25. The proposed assignments corresponding to Solution 8 in the pareto solutions of time
step t39 are presented graphically in Figure 5.21.
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Figure 5.21: Graphical illustration of the assignment of WSs to threats obtained by means of the
NSGA II for Solution 8 at time step t39.
Finally, when considering Solution 10 in the set of approximately pareto optimal solutions for
time step t39, it is found that similar assignments are proposed as in the assignments proposed
in Solution 8, except that no WSs are assigned to threat T1 rather than assigning WS V2 to
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threat T1. This results in a further decrease in the total cost value of R 1 000 000 and an increase
in the total survival probabilities of threats of 0.6992. This solution achieves the minimum value
for the cost objective as well as the maximum value for the accumulated survival probability
objective. The proposed assignments of WSs to threats of Solution 10 for time step t39 are
presented graphically in Figure 5.22.
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Figure 5.22: Graphical illustration of the assignment of WSs to threats obtained by means of the
NSGA II for Solution 10 at time step t39.
When following the solutions along the set of approximately pareto optimal solutions, it is found
that one solution (the one in the top left-hand corner) achieves the worst possible value for the
cost objective and achieves the best possible value for the accumulated survival probability
objective at a specific time step (i.e. Solution 1 at each respective time step). The next solution
involves an assignment of one fewer WS with respect to one of the threats resulting in a decrease
in the cost objective and an increase in the accumulated survival probability objective. The
remaining solutions on the approximate pareto frontier follow suite until the last solution on
the pareto front is reached which achieves the best possible value for the cost objective and
achieves the worst possible value for the accumulated survival probability objective at a specific
time step (i.e. Solutions 5, 15 and 10 for times steps t20, t35 and t39, respectively).
The solutions contained in the set of pareto optimal solutions are nondominated, implying that
no solution in the set of pareto solutions is better than any other solution in the set. The
NSGA II therefore works in such a way, that rather than recommending a specific solution
to the decision maker, as in the case with the AHP and utility models, a set of solutions are
presented to the decision maker simultaneously, from which he may choose the one which best
corresponds to his needs and judgment.
The NSGA II also provides a useful trade-off between the cost objective and the survival prob-
ability objective by means of the approximately pareto optimal solutions that it produces.
An advantage of the NSGA is that it does not require the input of a decision maker as was
the case with the AHP and utility models. It is also flexible in the sense that it is able to
accommodate a variation in the number of WSs and threats, without the incorporation of
artificial model constraints or excessive numerical re-calculations at each step.
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Another significant advantage of the NSGA II, is that the objective functions may be con-
strained, individually or together, and part of the pareto optimal set of solutions may still be
recommended to the decision maker. In context of the scenario in §4.2, suppose the decision
maker constrains the cost objective by indicating that the maximum allowable cost of assign-
ing WSs to threats is R 3 500 000. This constraint is presented graphically by the horisontal
line labelled B in Figure 5.23. The constraint implies that no solution above this line may be
recommended for assignments of WSs to threats. This implies that Solutions 1 and 2 may not
be recommend for assignments of WSs to threats. Any of the solutions below this line may be
recommended for a possible assignment of WSs to threats. The accumulated survival probabil-
ity objective may be constrained similarly. Suppose that a maximum acceptable value for the
accumulated survival probability is 2.1. This constraint is presented graphically by the vertical
line labelled A in Figure 5.23. This constraint implies that any solution to the left of line A
may be considered as a possible assignment of WSs to threats, while Solutions 6–10 may not
be considered as an assignment of WSs to threats.
The possibility also exists that both objectives may be constrained. Suppose that the value of
cost is restricted to a maximum of R 3 500 000 and that the accumulated survival probability
of the threats is restricted to a maximum 2.1. This implies that any solution below line B and
to the left of line A may be considered for a possible assignment of WSs to threats. Hence,
Solutions 3, 4 and 5 may be considered for an assignment, of which Solution 5 may be considered
to be optimal.
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Figure 5.23: Graphical illustration of the set of approximately pareto optimal solutions obtained by
means of the NSGA II for time step t39 of the scenario in §4.2, when the bi-objective WA problem is
constrained.
To summarise, the NSGA II is able to provide the decision maker with a set of approximately
pareto optimal solutions of assignments rather than providing the decision maker with a single
solution of possible assignments. This results in shifting the choice of the assignment of WSs to
the decision maker, since he may then choose the solution on the approximate pareto frontier
which best corresponds to his intuition. The NSGA II also provides a useful trade-off between
the cost and survival probability objectives by means of the pareto frontier along which it is
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clearly illustrated how much of one objective is offered for a gain in the other objective. Finally,
the NSGA II permits the possibility of constraining any one of the two objective functions, or
both simultaneously, while still providing good quality solutions.
5.4 Chapter summary
The main focus of this chapter was to present the reader with the results obtained from the
methodologies described in Chapter 4 for solving the bi-objective WA problem in the context of
the proposed scenario described in §4.2. This was achieved by discussing the results of the AHP
in §5.1 followed by a discussion on the results obtained by means of the additive utility function
in §5.2. The results obtained by means of the NSGA II were discussed in §5.3. Finally, the
chapter closed with an overall conclusion on the results obtained by each of the methodologies
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This chapter opens, in §6.1, with a description of the work contained in this thesis. This
is followed, in §6.2, by an appraisal of the research contributed in the thesis. The chapter
closes, in §6.3, with a discussion on a number of ideas with respect to future work towards the
development of more sophisticated multiobjective WA models.
6.1 Thesis summary
The thesis commenced in Chapter 1 with a brief introduction to the role played by the FCO in
a GBAD military environment, as well as the conditions under which the FCO has to operate
when faced with a choice of assigning WSs to observed aerial threats. This was followed by an
informal description of the problem considered in this thesis as well as the objectives pursued
in the thesis.
In Chapter 2, a literature review was presented on the various subsystems contained within a
GBADS. This included descriptions of the physical elements (such as DAs, sensors and WSs),
the central TM software system and the TE and WA subsystems, with an emphasis on the WA
subsystem. A discussion on the tactical environment in which a GBADS has to operate and a
description of the k-WA model (which is based on the classical assignment problem) concluded
the chapter in which Thesis Objective I in §1.2 was therefore achieved.
Thesis Objective II was achieved in §3.1.4, where a literature review was presented with respect
to the various procedures which may be employed in order to extract fundamental objectives in
a multiobjective decision problem context from a decision maker or group of decision makers.
This objective was further pursued in the context of the WA problem in §4.1. The second
125
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aim in Chapter 3 was to provide a literature review on available methodologies in the litera-
ture for solving multiobjective decision problems. This was achieved by a description of the
processes involved in the AHP, followed by an explanation of the assessments involved in captur-
ing qualitative as well as quantitative information for the construction of utility functions and
a description of the working a multiobjective evolutionary algorithm, in fulfillment of Thesis
Objective IV.
The methodologies described in Chapter 3 were applied in Chapter 4 in the context of a sim-
ulated GBADS scenario. A description of the procedures carried out in conjunction with a
military expert followed. The chapter closed with a description of the practical implementation
of the NSGA II, in fulfillment of Thesis Objective III.
Thesis Objective V was achieved in Chapter 5, in which the results obtained by means of the
AHP, a bi-objective utility function and the computer implemented NSGA II were reported.
Thesis Objective VI is achieved at the end of this chapter where a number of ideas for possible
future research with respect to the multiobjective WA problem are proposed.
6.2 An appraisal of the work contained in this thesis
The main aim of the research conducted in this thesis was to investigate the possibility of mod-
elling the WA problem as a multiobjective decision problem. A first step towards multiobjective
decision problems is to establish the fundamental objectives of the problem which are used in
the development of a multiobjective decision model. In the context of WA, a modest first ap-
proach towards establishing objectives for the WA problem was to send out a WA survey to
a number of military experts residing within the South African military domain. This survey
consisted of posing scenario-specific questions to the various military experts in an attempt to
extract those objectives which they deem important in the choice of assigning WSs to threats.
The feedback received from the survey was analysed in order to obtain a list of possible objec-
tives. Two of these objectives were chosen to employ for illustrative purposes in the context of
a multiobjective WA problem in a simulated GBADS scenario. A bi-objective WA model was
formulated, based on these two objectives. This model captures two very essential conflicting
objectives in the context of the WA problem.
Three general approaches towards solving multiobjective decision making problems were re-
searched and documented in this thesis. The working of these methodologies were demonstrated
by solving the bi-objective WA model described above in the context of a realistic GBAD sim-
ulated scenario. Two of these approaches are subjective in nature, implying that the input of
a decision maker was required. The necessary assessments for these approaches were carried
out in conjunction with a military expert. The information captured during these assessment
procedures were employed to solve the WA problem by means of the two subjective multiob-
jective approaches. In this way, the application of both these approaches were illustrated with
respect to a real-world WA problem. The bi-objective WA model was also solved by means of a
computer implemented version of the NSGA II, a powerful multiobjective optimisation evolu-
tionary metaheuristic. The model provided promising results and one advantage of employing
this method is that it is able to present the decision maker with an entire front of approximately
pareto optimal solutions. This implies that the decision maker may choose from amongst these
good solutions a solution which best corresponds to his intuition. It may happen that a deci-
sion maker is not entirely convinced by a solution presented to him. By using the NSGA II,
this choice in finding an acceptable trade-off between the conflicting objectives is shifted to the
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decision maker by presenting him with a number of good quality, nondominated solutions from
which he may then choose.
The conclusion was drawn that the AHP is able to generate plausible results and achieve a
trade-off between the two objectives. However, a major disadvantage of the AHP is that if
the current set of WSs are supplemented by additional WSs or if additional threats enter the
defended airspace, a portion of the calculations carried out during the subjective AHP pre-
processsing assessment procedure has to be reevaluated.
The bi-objective utility model also seems able to generate plausible results. However, if the set
of WSs is supplemented by additional WSs or if the values of these additional WSs exceed the
range of the current values employed in the assessment of any of the two objectives, a portion
of the assessments carried out in conjunction with the decision maker has to be reevaluated in
order to construct a new utility function.
It was further concluded that although both the AHP and utility approaches generate good
quality solutions, they are restricted to generating only one solution at time.
Based on these findings, the NSGA II is recommended as the more desirable choice for solving
the multiobjective WA problem, since it is able to present the decision maker with a suite of
nondominated solutions of good quality, from which he may choose the one which he deems fit.
Furthermore, the NSGA II is flexible in the sense that the number of threats and WSs entering
the system may be varied without having to make considerable alterations.
6.3 Possible future work
This section contains ideas and suggestions for possible future work with respect to the multi-
objective WA problem. Since the scope of any research project is restricted, there is always a
possibility for improvement. A number of future developments are discussed which may lead to
more sophisticated multiobjective WA models.
6.3.1 Establishing objectives by means of an interactive workshop
Although the feedback received from the surveys sent out to five military experts was deemed
sufficient for the purposes of this thesis, a more comprehensive approach towards establishing
fundamental objectives for the multiobjective WA problem may be to host an interactive work-
shop in the presence of a workshop facilitator in conjunction with a number of military experts,
spanning a large portion of the hierarchal ranks contained in the South African military domain,
so as to obtain the input from a diverse set of individuals, in an environment where the military
individuals are free to contribute ideas and question the views of their peers. The idea is to
exchange ideas and question proposals made by the military individuals in a more intimate way.
The aim of hosting such an interactive workshop may be to reach a possible consensus with
respect to the objectives relating to the multiobjective WA problem in a South African GBAD
context.
6.3.2 Subjective assessments by means of a group of military individuals
Due to the diverse geographic placement of military personnel in South Africa, the assessments
for both the AHP and utility approaches towards solving the multiobjective WA problem were
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carried out by interviewing only one military expert. A more comprehensive approach may be
to capture information regarding these assessments from a group of military individuals, and
to use this information to develop multiobjective WA models for both the AHP and utility
approaches. This is expected be a very challenging exercise, since a consensus has to be reached
regarding assessments based on intuition and knowledge with respect to some of the assessments
carried out during these approaches.
6.3.3 Multiobjective WA in the context of other simulated GBAD scenarios
Since the multiobjective WA problem was solved by means of the methodologies in §4 in the
context of only one simulated GBAD scenario, a further step in the research towards the mul-
tiobjective WA problem may be to solve the problem with the same methodologies in §4, but
in the context of various simulated GBAD scenarios.
6.3.4 Multiperiod multiobjective WA optimisation
Since the scope of this thesis was restricted to solving the multiobjective WA problem for a single
period at a time, a first step in further research with respect to the bi-objective WA model may
be to consider the possibility of modelling the bi-objective WA problem for the current period
as well as a number of future time steps, thereby introducing a dynamic, scheduling element
into the static WA models of this thesis. A further step may then be to include time windows in
the model, during which a WS is available and capable with respect to assignment to a threat.
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APPENDIX A
Weapon assignment survey
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This appendix contains the WA questionnaire which was used to extract possible objectives
when a choice has to be made with respect to WA. An electronic version of this survey was sent
to five military experts via electronic mail. A hard copy of this survey may be found in §A.1
while the feedback received from the military experts is provided in tabular form in §A.2.
A.1 A WA objectives identification survey
The survey commences by providing the reader with a brief background regarding the survey,
as well as an explanation of the purpose of the survey. An introduction to multiobjective
optimisation with respect to WA is also provided for further education. In order to comply
with military lingo, a 35mm Gun is an example of a Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) , a
Starstreak is an example of a Very Short Range Air Defense System (VSHORADS) WS, and an
Umkhonto is an example of a Short Range Air Defense System SHORADS WS. The complete
survey follows.
Establishing Weapon Assignment (WA) factors
This questionnaire forms part of a greater study at the University of Stellenbosch with respect
to Threat Evaluation and Weapon Assignment (TEWA) as part of a Ground Based Air Defence
System (GBADS) environment. For additional information on the project, see the attached
section at the end of this questionnaire.
For the purpose of this questionnaire, suppose that all the scenarios are contained within a typ-
ical GBADS environment, where Defended Assets (DAs) have to be protected against incoming
aerial threats. Threats are detected and evaluated by a Threat Evaluation (TE) system, and
necessary information is transferred to a Weapon Assignment (WA) system.
Each set of questions is based on a specific scenario subject to different conditions. Please note
that these scenarios are simplified versions of real-world scenarios. Consider only the given
133
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conditions and please complete the questions from the perspective of a TEWA system. Please
state reasons for your decisions at the Why questions.
The following conditions apply throughout the entire questionnaire, unless explicitly stated
otherwise:
1. All detected threats are considered fixed wing aircraft.
2. Weather conditions are considered to be daytime with sunny skies and no wind.
3. The dotted line in each scenario represent the flight paths of threat.
4. Each scenario has one DA represented by a green circle.
5. Each detected threat is travelling at a speed of 250 m/s.
6. In each scenario one of each of the following Weapon Systems (WS), represented by blue
squares, are available:
(a) 35mm cannon section,
(b) Starstreak system,
(c) Umkhonto system.
7. All WSs are deployed and ready for action.
8. The threat positions A and B (represented by red dots) in the scenarios are located at
various distances from the WSs.
9. A maximum of one WS may be considered for assignment with respect to a threat at
each position, i.e. either one of the WSs may be selected or none at all, in which case it is
decided that the threat should be engaged at a later stage.
10. Note that threat positions A and B are independent of each other, i.e.when WSs are
considered for assignment to a threat at position B, the proposed assignment at position
A may be ignored.
11. In each of the scenarios, threat position A is located 12 km from the WSs and threat
position B is located 8 km from the WSs, which is on the OP warning line.
12. At each position, any one of the WSs may be selected or you may choose to wait, which
implies that the threat will be engaged at a later stage.
Questions:
Please select your choice of WS by circling the appropriate alternative.
Scenario 1
1.1. Which WS would you like TEWA to propose to the threat at the indicated positions A
and B, respectively?
A: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
B: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
A.1. A WA objectives identification survey 135
A 12km
B 8km
Figure A.1: Scenario 1 for survey questions 1.1–1.12 and 4.1–4.8.
1.2. Why did you choose these WSs at each of the respective positions?
Now suppose the weather conditions change to heavy rainfall.
1.3. Which WS would you like TEWA to propose to the threat at the indicated positions A
and B, respectively?
A: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
B: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
1.4. Why did you choose these WSs at each of the respective positions?
Now suppose that it is sunny weather conditions, but with a very strong cross wind (> 60 km/h).
1.5. Which WS would you like TEWA to propose to the threat at the indicated positions A
and B, respectively?
A: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
B: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
1.6. Why did you choose these WSs at each of the respective positions?
Now suppose it is night time, with clear skies and no wind.
1.7. Which WS would you like TEWA to propose to the threat at the indicated positions A
and B, respectively?
A: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
B: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
1.8. Why did you choose these WS at each of the respective positions?
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Now suppose that the weather is sunny with no wind and the threat is travelling at 150m/s.
1.9. Which WS would you like TEWA to propose to the threat at the indicated positions A
and B, respectively?
A: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
B: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
1.10. Why did you choose these WS at each of the respective positions?
Now suppose that the weather is sunny with no wind and the threat is travelling at 300m/s.
1.11. Which WS would you like TEWA to propose to the threat at the indicated positions A
and B, respectively?
A: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
B: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
1.12.Why did you choose these WSs at each of the respective positions?
Scenario 2
 12km
 8km
A1 A2
B2B1
Threat 2 Threat 1 
Figure A.2: Scenario 2 for survey Questions 2.1–2.8.
Suppose that a WS may only be assigned to exactly one threat at a time.
2.1. Which one of the WSs would you like TEWA to assign to the threats at the indicated
positions A1, A2, B1 and B2, respectively?
A1: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
A2: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
B1: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
B2: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
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2.2. Why did you choose these WSs at each of the respective positions?
Now suppose that threat 1 is travelling at 150m/s, while threat 2 travels at 250m/s.
2.3. Which one of the WSs would you like TEWA to assign to the threats at the indicated
positions A1, A2, B1 and B2, respectively?
A1: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
A2: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
B1: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
B2: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
2.4. Why did you choose these WSs at each of the respective points?
Now suppose that threat 1 is only detected at position B1 and travelling at 250m/s, while threat 2
is still detected at position A2.
2.5. Which one of the WSs would you like TEWA to assign to the threats at the indicated
positions A2, B1 and B2, respectively?
A2: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
B1: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
B2: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
2.6. Why did you choose these WSs at each of the respective positions?
 12km
 8km
A1 A2
B2B1
T
h
re
a
t 
2
 
T
h
re
a
t 
1
 
B4B3
A4A3
T
h
re
a
t 
3
T
h
re
a
t 
4
 
Figure A.3: Scenario 2 for survey Questions 2.9 and 2.10.
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Now suppose that a WS may be assigned to more than one threat at a time.
2.7. Which WSs would you like TEWA to assign to the threats at the indicated positions A1,
A2, B1 and B2, respectively?
A1: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
A2: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
B1: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
B2: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
2.8. Why did you choose these WSs at each of the respective positions?
Now suppose that there are four detected threats as may be seen in Figure 3, and that a WS
may be assigned to more than one threat at a time.
2.9. Which WSs would you like TEWA to assign to the threats at the indicated positions A1,
A2, B1 and B2, respectively?
A1: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
A2: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
A3: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
A4: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
B1: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
B2: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
B3: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
B4: Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
2.10. Why did you choose these WS at each of the respective positions?
Scenario 3
A 12km
B 8km
Figure A.4: Scenario 3 for survey questions 3.1 and 3.2.
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In this scenario the WSs and DAs are partially surrounded by a mountain range as indicated in
Figure A.4. Due to the mountain range, there is no line of sight between the WSs and the threat
at position A; the threat only comes into line of sight at position B. However, it is detected by
radar at position A.
3.1. Which one of the three WSs would you choose to assign at the indicated positions A and
B, respectively?
A:Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
B:Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
3.2. Why did you choose these WSs at each of the respective positions?
Scenario 4
Consider the same situation as in Scenario 1. Additionally, take the monetary cost of one
Umkhonto missile as R 2million, the monetary cost of one Starstreak missile as R 1million
and the monetary cost of a single burst of ammunition for a 35mm Cannon section as R 17 000.
Consider the monetary cost of assigning a WS to a threat in answering the following questions.
4.1. Which one of these WS would you like TEWA to propose to the threat at position B?
Umkhonto Starstreak 35mm Gun None
4.2. Why did you choose this WS?
4.3. Are there any other cost factors, other than the monetary cost of ammunition, which should
be included in calculations by TEWA when considering WSs against a threat?
Consider the monetary cost of assigning a Starstreak with a predicted Single Shot Hit Probability
(SSHP) of 0.9, and a 35mm with a predicted SSHP of 0.7 at position B.
4.4. Which one of these WS would you like TEWA to propose to the threat at position B?
4.5. Under which circumstances would you like TEWA to rather propose a WS which is less
capable (smaller SSHP), because it is cheaper to assign?
Suppose the Starstreak has one round of ammunition (hot; and no cold) available, and the 35mm
has 50 bursts of ammunition available.
4.6. Would you like TEWA to propose the Starstreak or the 35mm? Why did you choose this
WS?
4.7. Under which circumstances would you like TEWA to rather propose a WS with more
ammunition than a WS with less ammunition.
4.8. Do you think that ammunition available to a WS should be considered a factor in your
decision to assign a WS? Simply answer by stating only YES or NO.
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5. Do you think the following factors should be considered when deciding which WSs to propose
to threats? A simple YES or NO answer next to each is sufficient.
5.1. SSHP
5.2. Cost of ammunition
5.3. Available ammunition to a WS
5.4. Line of sight
5.5. Weather conditions
5.6. Vertical launch ability of a WS
5.7. Multiple engagements of a WS
5.8. Terrain
5.9. Reaction time of a WS
5.10. Speed of WS ammunition
5.11. Effective range of a WS
6. Can you think of any other factors not covered in this questionnaire that you feel should be
included in the decision of assigning WSs to threats?
Additional information regarding the research project.
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this study. The purpose of this study is to
model the WA problem as a so-called multiobjective decision making problem. In a typical
multiobjective decision making problem, a decision maker has to choose between a number
of alternatives (courses of action), where multiple conflicting objectives (factors) have to be
achieved (taken into account). An example of conflicting objectives are, for instance, where an
investor wants to maximise the return on his investment, but at the same time wants minimise
his exposure to risk. Because of their conflicting nature, it is impossible to achieve both at the
same time.
In a WA context, the decision maker would have to choose between different WS-threat pairs
(the alternatives) where, for instance, the decision maker wants to maximise the capability
of the WSs (e.g. SSHP) and to simultaneously minimize the cost of assigning those WSs (the
conflicting objectives). The first step in any multiobjective decision process is to establish the
relevant objectives or factors that are considered when a choice is made with respect to which
WS to assign. These factors form the building blocks of the multiobjective models. It is critical
that both the decision maker and the consulting analyst have a clear understanding about the
problem at hand as well as what the decision maker wants to achieve in the end. The final set of
objectives should include all the important aspects of a decision. Failing to perform a thorough
analysis on the relevant objectives may result in models delivering inaccurate or inappropriate
results.
In practice, these objectives or factors are obtained by interviewing experts in the specific field
of relevance to try and extract all the objectives which are important. The purpose of this
questionnaire is therefore to try and obtain all the necessary and important objectives that
should be included in the decision to assign a WS to an incoming threat.
These factors may then be utilised in the construction of three multiobjective decision support
approaches involving utility functions, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and a Nondom-
inated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II (NSGA II). A utility function captures the preferences of
the alternatives of a decision maker for each objective. The AHP, on the other hand, makes use
of pairwise comparisons between alternatives for each of the objectives. The necessary infor-
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mation needed for the utility function and AHP models will be obtained by means of follow-up
interviews and/or questionnaires.
A.2 Feedback obtained from the WA survey
This section contains a summary of the feedback received from the surveys after they were
completed by the military experts. Complete feedback was obtained from only three of the five
military experts, hence, the tables contain only feedback from these three military experts. A
forth military expert did not complete the survey. However, he made a few suggestions and
comments, which are captured in the final table, Table A.5. The feedback is captured in five
tables labeled as Table A.1 to Table A.5. Each table consists of the question number and the
corresponding feedback from each of the military experts, labeled Result 1 – Result 3.
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Question nr Result 1 Result 2 Result 3
1.1 A Umkhonto Starstreak Umkhonto
1.1 B Starstreak 35mm Gun 35mm Gun
1.2 The range is applicable. The 35mm will provide a better defence A, due to the range.
layout and any missile can be used as B, due to the ability of the 35 section.
GAP filler.
1.3 A Umkhonto Umkhonto Umkhonto
1.3 B Starstreak Starstreak 35mm Gun
1.4 The application range. Can be launched from different shelter A, the Umkhonto has an all-weather capability.
positions. B, the 35 has an all-weather capability.
1.5 A Starstreak 35mm Gun Umkhonto
1.5 B 35mm Gun Umkhonto 35mm Gun
1.6 Enough reaction time for the 35 mm layer defence will pose a bigger A, the Umkhonto will lock onto the target
Guns and the Starstreak. threat than any of the other. when it is close, and therefore the wind will not
play a role.
B, the 35 has the ability to set the MET data
and therefore bring the wind speed into
calculation. The Starstreak has to be controlled
by the operator and he has to counteract by
steering the missile onto the target; that is
difficult with a strong wind.
1.7 A Umkhonto Starstreak Umkhonto
1.7 B Starstreak Umkhonto 35mm Gun
1.8 Capability to fire at night, even Starstreak has a shorter engage A, all weather capability.
the Guns can be utilised. distance than the Umkhonto. B, all weather capability.
Table A.1: WA survey feedback for questions 1.1–1.8.
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Question nr Result 1 Result 2 Result 3
1.9 A Starstreak 35mm Gun Umkhonto
1.9 B 35mm Gun Umkhonto Starstreak
1.10 Enough time to lock on target. I think the wind will influence the A, distance.
Starstreak more than the other. B, the operator has the ability to acquire the
target and fire.
1.11 A Umkhonto 35mm Gun Umkhonto
1.11 B None Umkhonto 35mm Gun
1.12 The target will be difficult to I think the wind will influence the A/B, the ability of the system in both cases.
track effectively by the Starstreak more than the other. With the Starstreak it is up to the
Starstreak and Guns. operator to achieve this
2.1 A1 Umkhonto Umkhonto Umkhonto
2.1 A2 Umkhonto Umkhonto None
2.1 B1 Starstreak 35mm Gun 35mm Gun
2.1 B2 Starstreak 35mm Gun Starstreak
2.2 Longer range. As detterent. A1, to achieve a hit at this distance. A2 will be
addressed by the Umkhoto at the B position.
B1/B2 will be addressed at the same time.
2.3 A1 Starstreak Umkhonto Umkhonto
2.3 A2 Umkhonto Umkhonto Umkhonto
2.3 B1 Starstreak 35mm Gun Starstreak
2.3 B2 Umkhonto 35mm Gun 35mm Gun
2.4 The reaction time of the Different ADA defence layers. Due to the variance in speed, A1 and A2 will be at
weapon system. different positions and can therefore be engaged
by the same WS.
Table A.2: WA survey feedback for questions 1.9–2.4.
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2.5 A2 35mm Gun Umkhonto Umkhonto
2.5 B1 Umkhonto 35mm Gun 35mm Gun
2.5 B2 Umkhonto 35mm Gun Starstreak
2.6 The distance and the reaction time of Different ADA defence layers. -
the Guns versus the Starstreak missile.
2.7 A1 35mm Gun Umkhonto Umkhonto
2.7 A2 Starstreak Umkhonto Umkhonto
2.7 B1 Umkhonto 35mm Gun 35mm Gun
2.7 B2 Umkhonto 35mm Gun Starstreak
2.8 It will give each weapon system enough Different ADA defence layers. A, because of distance.
time to react. B, because it is easier to assign one at a time.
2.9 A1 Umkhonto - Umkhonto
2.9 A2 Umkhonto 35mm Gun Umkhonto
2.9 A3 Umkhonto 35mm Gun None
2.9 A4 Umkhonto 35mm Gun None
2.9 B1 Starstreak 35mm Gun Starstreak
2.9 B2 Starstreak 35mm Gun 35mm Gun
2.9 B3 Starstreak 35mm Gun Starstreak
2.9 B4 Starstreak 35mm Gun 35mm Gun
2.10 The application distance of each weapon Different defence layout. -
distance will be the determining factor.
3.1 A None Umkhonto Umkhonto
3.1 B Umkhonto - 35mm Gun
3.2 Umkhonto might be in the position to Gap filler or flack trap. The Umkhonto launches vertically and then
engage at 12km, based on the height. acquires the target from the radar signal and
However, the masking will hamper both can therefore be applied against A.
the Guns and the Starstreak to track B, the reaction and acquiring of the target by
at 8km. the 35 is very quick.
Table A.3: WA survey feedback for questions 2.5–3.2.
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Question nr Result 1 Result 2 Result 3
4.1 Starstreak Umkhonto 35mm Gun
4.2 It is the better weapon with the better Better hit probability. If all are equal, then the
application range to engage at that cheapest applies.
track on that distance, irrespective
of the cost.
4.3 No, unless the decision is to be made Hit probability. -
when the target is within range for
both Starstreak and Guns.
4.4 Starstreak Umkhonto 35mm Gun
4.5 When the target is within range for both - -
Starstreak and Guns.
4.6 35mm, because you have 50 chances to engage 35mm Gun 35mm Gun
on the target than a single shot which
might result in a miss.
4.7 When the weapon with more ammunition - The ammo should always try
have the same hit probability as the to be levelled if possible. Try
one with less ammunition. not to deplete a system.
4.8 Yes - Yes
5.1. SSHP Yes - Yes
5.2. Cost of ammunition No - Yes
5.3. Available ammunition Yes Yes Yes
5.4. Line of sight (LOS) Yes Yes Yes
5.5. Weather conditions Yes Yes Yes
5.6. Vertical launch capability Yes Yes Yes
5.7. Multiple engagements Yes Yes Yes
5.8. Terrain features Yes Yes Yes
5.9. Reaction times Yes Yes Yes
5.10. Speed of WS ammunition No Yes No
5.11. Effective ranges of WSs Yes Yes Yes
Table A.4: WA survey feedback for questions 4.1–5.
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6. When there is an interference of rotary No Targets crossing, targets flying
wings circulating during the engagement, away from the DA and ECCM.
TEWA is to make the decision in terms
of fixed or rotary per WS.
General comments
1. A TEWA system must always consider a combination of WSs or more than one WS to a target. No attacking aircraft
will be deterred by only one WS.
2. Monetary cost should only be taken into consideration when weapon systems have an equal fire solution.
3. The better fire solution should carry more weight than the amount of ammo available. Only if both WSs
have the same hit probability, then the WS with more ammo should be designated.
Table A.5: WA survey feedback for question 6 and general comments made by the military experts.
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APPENDIX B
AHP pairwise comparison matrices
This appendix contains the table presenting the pairwise comparison matrix for the cost ob-
jective as well as the tables presenting the AHP pairwise comparison matrices for the SSHP
objective, with respect to each WS-threat pair and for each time step in the scenario described
in §4.2. The pairwise comparisons with respect to each WS-threat pair (with the inclusion of
the dummy WSs) for the cost objective are presented in Table B.1. The pairwise comparisons
for threats T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5, with respect to time step t20 are presented in Tables B.2–B.6,
respectively.
SSHP V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
V1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9
V2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9
V3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9
V4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9
V5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9
V6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9
V7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9
V8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9
C1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
C2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
C3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
C4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
D1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
D2 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
D3 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
D4 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
D5 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Table B.1: The AHP pairwise comparison matrix for the cost objective with respect to each WS-threat
with the inclusion of dummy WSs.
The pairwise comparison matrices were verified for consistency, with respect to each threat.
The corresponding CI/RI values for each of the pairwise comparison matrices with respect to
time step t20 are presented in Table B.7. Since each of the CI/RI values in Table B.7 is less
than 0.1, it may be concluded that the pairwise comparisons involved are consistent.
The pairwise comparisons for threats T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5 with respect to time step t35 are
presented in Tables B.8–B.12, respectively.
The corresponding CI/RI values for each of the pairwise comparison matrices with respect to
time step t35 are presented in Table B.13. Since each of the CI/RI values in Table B.13 is less
147
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SSHP V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
V1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table B.2: The AHP pairwise comparison matrix for the SSHP objective with respect to threat T1 at
time step t20.
SSHP V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
V1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table B.3: The AHP pairwise comparison matrix for the SSHP objective with respect to threat T2 at
time step t20.
than 0.1, it may be concluded that the pairwise comparisons involved are consistent.
Finally, the pairwise comparisons for threats T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5 with respect to time step t39
are presented in Tables B.14–B.18, respectively.
The corresponding CI/RI values for each of the pairwise comparison matrices with respect to
time step t39 are presented in Table B.19. Since the CI/RI values in Table B.19 are all less than
0.1, it may be concluded that the pairwise comparisons involved are consistent.
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SSHP V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
V1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
V2 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
V3 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
V4 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
V5 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
V6 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
V7 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
V8 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
C1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
C2 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
C3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
C4 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
D1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
D2 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
D3 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
D4 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
D5 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table B.4: The AHP pairwise comparison matrix for the SSHP objective with respect to threat T3 at
time step t20.
SSHP V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
V1 1 1 1 1 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
V2 1 1 1 1 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
V3 1 1 1 1 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
V4 1 1 1 1 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
V5 6 6 6 6 1 5 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 6 6 6
V6 2 2 2 2 1/5 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
V7 1 1 1 1 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
V8 1 1 1 1 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
C1 1 1 1 1 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
C2 1 1 1 1 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
C3 2 2 2 2 1/5 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
C4 1 1 1 1 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
D1 1 1 1 1 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
D2 1 1 1 1 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
D3 1 1 1 1 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
D4 1 1 1 1 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
D5 1 1 1 1 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table B.5: The AHP pairwise comparison matrix for the SSHP objective with respect to threat T4 at
time step t20.
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SSHP V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
V1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table B.6: The AHP pairwise comparison matrix for the SSHP objective with respect to threat T5 at
time step t20.
Table CI/RI value
B.2 0
B.3 0
B.4 0
B.5 0.0009
B.6 0
Table B.7: The CI/RI values for the AHP pairwise comparison matrices with respect to time step t20.
SSHP V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
V1 1 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V2 1 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V3 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1/2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
V4 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1/2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
V5 1 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V6 1 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V7 1 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V8 1 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C1 1 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C2 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
C3 1 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C4 1 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D1 1 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D2 1 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D3 1 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D4 1 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D5 1 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table B.8: The AHP pairwise comparison matrix for the SSHP objective with respect to threat T1 at
time step t35.
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SSHP V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
V1 1 1 1/6 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1/4 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
V2 1 1 1/6 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1/4 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
V3 6 6 1 1 6 6 6 6 6 3 5 6 6 6 6 6 6
V4 6 6 1 1 6 6 6 6 6 3 5 6 6 6 6 6 6
V5 1 1 1/6 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1/4 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
V6 1 1 1/6 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1/4 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
V7 1 1 1/6 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1/4 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
V8 1 1 1/6 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1/4 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
C1 1 1 1/6 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1/4 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
C2 4 4 1/3 1/3 4 4 4 4 4 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
C3 2 2 1/5 1/5 2 2 2 2 2 1/3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
C4 1 1 1/6 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
D1 1 1 1/6 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
D2 1 1 1/6 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
D3 1 1 1/6 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
D4 1 1 1/6 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
D5 1 1 1/6 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table B.9: The AHP pairwise comparison matrix for the SSHP objective with respect to threat T2 at
time step t35.
SSHP V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
V1 1 1/3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
V2 3 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
V3 1/2 1/4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V4 1/2 1/4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V5 1/2 1/4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V6 1/2 1/4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V7 1/2 1/4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V8 1/2 1/4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C1 1/2 1/4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C2 1/2 1/4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C3 1/2 1/4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C4 1/2 1/4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D1 1/2 1/4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D2 1/2 1/4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D3 1/2 1/4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D4 1/2 1/4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D5 1/2 1/4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table B.10: The AHP pairwise comparison matrix for the SSHP objective with respect to threat T3
at time step t35.
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SSHP V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
V1 1 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
V2 1/5 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
V3 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V4 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V5 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V6 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V7 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V8 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C1 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C2 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C3 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C4 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D1 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D2 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D3 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D4 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D5 1/6 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table B.11: The AHP pairwise comparison matrix for the SSHP objective with respect to threat T4
at time step t35.
SSHP V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
V1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table B.12: The AHP pairwise comparison matrix for the SSHP objective with respect to threat T5
at time step t35.
Table CI/RI value
B.8 0.0003
B.9 0.0032
B.10 0.0003
B.11 0.0005
B.12 0
Table B.13: The CI/RI values for the AHP pairwise comparison matrices with respect to time step
t35.
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SSHP V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
V1 1 1/8 1/5 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V2 8 1 7 8 8 8 8 8 6 3 8 8 1 1 1 1 1
V3 2 1/7 1 2 2 2 2 2 1/2 1/5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
V4 1 1/8 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V5 1 1/8 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V6 1 1/8 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V7 1 1/8 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V8 1 1/8 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C1 3 1/6 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 1/4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
C2 6 1/3 5 6 6 6 6 6 4 1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
C3 1 1/8 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C4 1 1/8 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D1 1 1/8 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D2 1 1/8 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D3 1 1/8 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D4 1 1/8 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D5 1 1/8 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/3 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table B.14: The AHP pairwise comparison matrix for the SSHP objective with respect to threat T1
at time step t39.
SSHP V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
V1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1/6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
C2 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 6 1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
C3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/5 1/9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table B.15: The AHP pairwise comparison matrix for the SSHP objective with respect to threat T2
at time step t39.
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SSHP V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
V1 1 1/5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
V2 5 1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
V3 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V4 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V5 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V6 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V7 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V8 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C1 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C2 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C3 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C4 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D1 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D2 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D3 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D4 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D5 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table B.16: The AHP pairwise comparison matrix for the SSHP objective with respect to threat T3
at time step t39.
SSHP V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
V1 1 1/5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
V2 5 1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
V3 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V4 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V5 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V6 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V7 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V8 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C1 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C2 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C3 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C4 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D1 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D2 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D3 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D4 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D5 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table B.17: The AHP pairwise comparison matrix for the SSHP objective with respect to threat T4
at time step t39.
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SSHP V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
V1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V2 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V3 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V4 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V5 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V6 2 2 2 2 2 1 1/5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
V7 6 6 6 6 6 5 1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
V8 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C2 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C3 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C4 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D2 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D3 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D4 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D5 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table B.18: The AHP pairwise comparison matrix for the SSHP objective with respect to threat T5
at time step t39.
Table CI/RI
B.14 0.0460
B.15 0.0032
B.16 0.0005
B.17 0.0005
B.18 0.0005
Table B.19: The CI/RI values for the pairwise comparison matrices with respect to time step t39.
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APPENDIX C
Solutions obtained by the NSGA II
This appendix contains the assignment of WSs to threats as proposed by the NSGA II for
each of the three time steps. The entire set of solutions obtained is illustrated graphically for
each of the three time steps. Moreover, the proposed assignments on the approximate pareto
front are presented in matrix form, denoted by Solr where r represents the r
th solution on the
approximate pareto frontier.
The entire set of solutions in bi-objective decision space corresponding to time step t20 is pre-
sented graphically in Figure C.1. There are five solutions on the approximate pareto frontier
for time step t20, and the proposed assignments of WSs to the threats corresponding to each of
these five solutions are presented in Table C.1.
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Figure C.1: The set of solutions obtained by means of the NSGA II for time step t20.
The set of solutions in two-dimensional objective space obtained by the NSGA II for time
step t35 are presented graphically in Figure C.2. Fifteen solutions are contained in the set of
approximately pareto optimal solutions for time step t35. The assignment of WSs to threats
corresponding to solutions 1–9 are presented in Table C.2, while the assignment of WSs to
threats corresponding to solutions 10–15 are presented in Table C.3.
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

Sol1 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 0 0
V2 0 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 1 0
V6 0 0 1 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 0 0 0 0 0
C3 0 0 1 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol2 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 0 0
V2 0 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 1 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 0 0 0 0 0
C3 0 0 1 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol3 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 0 0
V2 0 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 1 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 0 0 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol4 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 0 0
V2 0 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 0 0 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 1 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol5 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 0 0
V2 0 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 0 0 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0


Table C.1: The assignment of WSs to threats for the approximately pareto optimal solutions obtained
by means of the NSGA II for time step t20.
The set of solutions obtained by the NSGA II for time step t39 are presented graphically in
Figure C.3. There are ten solutions in the set of approximately pareto optimal solutions. The
assignment of WSs to threats for the first six approximately pareto optimal solutions are pre-
sented in Table C.4, while the assignments corresponding to the remaining four approximately
pareto optimal solutions are presented in Table C.5.
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Figure C.2: The set of solutions obtained by means of the NSGA II for time step t35.
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Figure C.3: The set of solutions obtained by means of the NSGA II for time step t39.
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

Sol1 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 1 0
V2 0 0 1 0 0
V3 0 1 0 0 0
V4 0 1 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 1 0 0 0 0
C3 0 1 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol2 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 1 0
V2 0 0 1 0 0
V3 0 1 0 0 0
V4 0 1 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 1 0 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol3 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 1 0
V2 0 0 1 0 0
V3 0 1 0 0 0
V4 0 1 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 0 0 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol4 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 1 0
V2 0 0 1 0 0
V3 0 1 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 1 0 0 0 0
C3 0 1 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol5 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 1 0
V2 0 0 1 0 0
V3 0 1 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 1 0 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol6 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 1 0
V2 0 0 1 0 0
V3 0 1 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 0 0 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol7 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 1 0
V2 0 0 0 0 0
V3 0 1 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 1 0 0 0 0
C3 0 1 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol8 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 1 0
V2 0 0 0 0 0
V3 0 1 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 1 0 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol9 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 1 0
V2 0 0 0 0 0
V3 0 1 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 0 0 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0


Table C.2: The assignment of WSs to threats for the approximately pareto optimal solutions obtained
by means of the NSGA II for solutions 1–9 for time step t35.
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

Sol10 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 1 0
V2 0 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 0 1 0 0 0
C3 0 1 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol11 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 1 0
V2 0 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 0 1 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol12 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 1 0
V2 0 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 0 0 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol13 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 0 0
V2 0 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 0 1 0 0 0
C3 0 1 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol14 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 0 0
V2 0 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 0 1 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol15 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 0 0
V2 0 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 0 0 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0


Table C.3: The assignment of WSs to threats for the approximately pareto optimal solutions obtained
by means of the NSGA II for solutions 10–15 for time step t35.
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

Sol1 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 1 0 0
V2 1 0 0 0 0
V3 1 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 1
V7 0 0 0 0 1
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 1 0 0 0 0
C2 0 1 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol2 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 1 0 0
V2 1 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 1
V7 0 0 0 0 1
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 1 0 0 0 0
C2 0 1 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol3 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 1 0 0
V2 1 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 1
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 1 0 0 0 0
C2 0 1 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol4 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 1 0 0
V2 1 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 1
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 0 1 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol5 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 0 0
V2 1 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 1
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 1 0 0 0 0
C2 0 1 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol6 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 0 0
V2 1 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 1
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 0 1 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0


Table C.4: The assignment of WSs to threats for the approximately pareto optimal solutions obtained
by means of the NSGA II for solutions 1–6 for time step t39.
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

Sol7 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 0 0
V2 1 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 1 0 0 0 0
C2 0 1 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol8 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 0 0
V2 1 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 0 1 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol9 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 0 0
V2 0 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 1 0 0 0 0
C2 0 1 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0




Sol10 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0 0 0
V2 0 0 0 0 0
V3 0 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 0
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0 0 0 0 0
C2 0 1 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0


Table C.5: The assignments of WSs to threats for the approximately pareto optimal solutions obtained
by means of the NSGA II for solutions 7–10 for time step t39.
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APPENDIX D
Contents of the accompanying compact disc
This appendix contains a brief description of the contents of the compact disc included with
this thesis. The compact disc contains an electronic version of the WA questionnaire (described
in §4.1) which was sent to military experts for completion. The disc also includes the computer
code of the implemented NSGA II, which may be used to reproduce the results obtained by
means of the NSGA II in this thesis. It also contains an electronic copy of the thesis itself. The
material on the compact disc is organised as follows into three directories:
WA Survey. This directory contains the WA questionnaire, WA restricted survey.docx,
which was sent to five military experts. The user requires Microsoft Office Word [39] to open
the file. Furthermore, the user has restricted access to the file and is only allowed to enter
text into the relevant textboxes and to make choices with respect to WSs by selecting between
various radio buttons.
NSGA II. This directory houses twelve .m-files containing the code for the various operators of
the NSGA II as well as a file, input.mat, containing the input data required. The user requires
the software suite Matlab [37] to run the code and is required to specify input data including
the EEM data, the cost values c of WSs, the number of threats nt and the number of WSs
nw. The user is also required to specify various other algorithmic parameter values, including
the number of iterations, the population size, the tour size, the pool size and the mutation
probability.
Thesis electronic version. This directory contains an electronic copy of the thesis, Thesis.pdf.
The reader requires Adobe Reader [2] to open this document.
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